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The work of Jurgen Habermas,

Marxist philosopher and social

theorist,

a
is

contemporary German
only recently becoming

the English speaking world.

This dissertation has

more available

in

two main aims,

the first being to contribute to the dissemination of

his thought.

The first three chapters present

a

basically

chronological account of his work, focussing particularly on his

efforts tc develop an epistemological basis for critical

theory, to

analyze the crisis potential of late capitalism, and,

line with his

in

theorv of social evolution, to examine the possibilities for movement
to a more highly developed social

formation.

Throughout his work, Habermas has struggled to resolve the
theory/praxis dilemma which has haunted Marxist thought.

This prompts

the second major aim of the dissertation, to develop a theory of

education based on Habermas' work.

This

is

undertaken

first to consider the possibilities contained
the generation of

a

in

in

an effort

Habermas' work for

political praxis, and second to provide

a

perspective from which to reflect back on the theory itself.

Within the framework of the dissertation, only the contours
of a radically-motivated education could be articulated.

It

is

argued that an education based on Habermas' work would take
'reflexive

i

ntersubject ve activity' as its central
i

be concerned to develop a

image, and would

identity'

in

its students,

preliminary to their collective participation

in

a

society

'rational

'fully rational

'

It

is

concluded that while,

in

general, Habermas offers

substantial direction for the development of praxis, there are some

persistently troubling features of his work, particularly with regard
to his communication theory.

his theory to Habermas'
a

transition to

a

Given the centrality of this aspect of

attempt to generate normative principles for

higher form of social organization, his efforts

seem to falter at precisely this point.
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INTRODUCTION

According to George Lichtheim, the work of Jurgen
Habermas

constitutes "the most impressive body of philosophy and
sociology to
have come out of Central Europe during the 1960's" 1

.

Habermas'

encyclopaedic knowledge (drawing on philosophy, sociology, economics,
and linguistics), together with the originality and ambitiousness
of
his work, have established him as one of the most influential
in

contemporary Germany.

Yet his work

is

thinkers

barely known in, much less

impress itself on, the Anglo-American world.

There

is

however, an embryonic interest

this country, stimulated, at least

in

his thought

There are problems with

reception, however, for Habermas writes

enormously complex fashion

(a

complexity which

is

This dissertation will

in

only compounded

translation), and because his work embraces themes from
of disciplines.

in

part, by the recent translation

and publication of some of his major works.
its dissemination and

in

a

an
in

wide range

seek to render his thought

more accessible.

A full

appreciation of the theoretical contributions of

Jurgen Habermas necessitates an historical perspective.

associated with, and

1

is

He

is

currently the major representative of,

a

group

Quoted in Martin Jay, "Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory."
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Number k, 197^> P* 29.

2

of Marxist scholars known as the Frankfurt School
the site of the group's formation

-

(the name reflects

Frankfurt-am-Main,

West Germany);

its organizational

Soz al forschung

(Institute for Social Research), set up

i

what

in

is

now

form was the Institut for
in

1923,

independently endowed, and committed to the re-examination and re-

formulation
theory.

-

in

the light of historical circumstances

-

of Marxist

Under the directorship of Max Horkheimer, the Institute

attracted a group of gifted young intellectuals into its membership
Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal

others.

,

Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, and

2

The Nazi ascendancy
in

-

Germany forced the group's relocation,

in

1933, to Columbia University in New York City.

Despite the

difficulties attendant on such an emigration, the group continued to
function, producing the Journal which had already established its
German intellectual circles.

reputation

in

publish

German rather than

in

in

(That

it

continued to

translation no doubt contributed to

the School's subsequent lack of impact on American social
In
-

1950,

the German government

invited the School

Herbert Marcuse was one of the few who declined

theory.)

to return to Frankfurt
-

where

it

has

exerted a steadily growing influence on the post-war generation of
students, and on the broader intellectual scene.
remains unabated,

2

if

That

influence

controversial, today.

See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. Boston, Massachusetts.
Little, Brown and Company, 1973-

3

While thoroughly grounded

in

Marxist theory, members of the

Frankfurt School sought to develop and extend that theory

The demise of working-class

circumstances.

of changing historical

the light

in

movements throughout Europe, together with the emergence of Facism,
had seriously jeopardized the revolutionary possibilities which Marx
had foreshadowed;

thus confronted, the School saw the necessity for

order that these developments

re-evaluation of the original theory

in

might be further illuminated and,

possible, overcome.

if

a

of
Their investigations transcended the familiary categories

Marxist thought.

Convinced that economic structures no longer held

the exclusive key to

thorough-going social and political critique,

a

supposedly ep phenomena
members of the School moved to an analysis of

1

i

factors

-

personality development, the family and,

culture

-

in

an effort to locate the sources of

mystification.

in

particular, mass

ideology and

however,
As the investigation proceeded,

it

became

industry' under late capitalism
increasingly clear that the 'culture

represented one

of

the

most powerful of these sources.

was fast becoming
cons us on was the the individual
1

a

Their

completely

i

character,
assimilated and social determined
this most graphical ly:

Marcuse has captured

4

... this private space has been invaded and
whittled down by
technological reality.
Mass production and mass distribution claim
the entire individual ... The result is not adjustment
but mimesis: an
immediate identification of the individual with his society
and,
through it, with the social as a whole. 3

This process was complemented by the increasing dominance of

scientific, or instrumental, rationality, an idea of reason which

completely divorced fact from value, the empirical from the normative,
theory from practice.

Under such

rationally decided upon

-

a

schema, only 'means' can be

'ends', particularly at the level of the

goals and purposes of human activity, are inaccessible to reason.

The School came to understand the possibility of technological supremacy
as

involving the institutionalization of domination, one that could be

justified in the name of rationality itself.

Such

deprived the human race of the only basis on which

achieve

a

less oppressive, more rational

As a counterpoise,

might work to

a

dritical

fundamental connection between

a

The hope was that

knowledge and the possibility of human freedom.
critical

it

development

society.

they sought to develop

rationality, one which asserted

a

reason, through the potential

it

contained for the

identification and dissolution of oppressive social structures, was

capable of undermining the sc ent
i

i

f

i

ca

1

1

y- eg
1

i

t

i

mated rationality which

held increasing sway, not only over the operation of capitalist society,

3

Herbert Marcuse, One~D mens ona
Press, 1964, p. 10
i

i

1

Man

.

Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon

5

but equally over the consciousness of

its members.

Both targets of the Frankfurt School critique
redounded on
the possibilities for the development of revolutionary
praxis.

Insofar as the individual was increasingly manipulated and
controlled
by the wider culture, and to the extent that technological

reason

inserted itself into the consciousness of human beings, the Frankfurt
School was progressively forced to conclude that the possibilities for

transcending these cultural and social constraints were extremely
limited.

Their precise articulation of the way

individual

psyche interiorized the culture seemed to contain an immanent

in

which the

conclusion: the inevitable disappearance of an historical subject

capable of engaging

in

revolutionary struggle.

The Frankfurt School had stressed the importance of praxis

throughout its work, and particularly, its vital

relation to theory.

During the later years of its existence, however (and especially
1

960

1

s

)

,

the realization that critical

for praxis grew.

demonstrations

in

in

the

theory could offer few guidelines

The paradox was painfully apparent during the student

Germany

-

the School was angrily condemned for its

failure to provide more coherent theoretical structures for the

development of revolutionary action.

Members of the School

(many of

whom perceived the student uprisings as irrational, given the lack of
social

preconditions for revolution) took the position that theory was

the only possible form of praxis.

6

Many commentators have understood this conclusion as
revealing
the internal

bankruptcy of critical theory.

note has been taken of what appears to be

a

More recently, however,

re-assessment of the

position on the part of various members of the School.
Huyssen, for example, referring to

a

"Culture Industry Re-considered"

discerns

-

late article of Adorno's
a

a

mass of people, also holds out the possibility of
4

-

position which, while

continues to understand the culture industry as

that deception.

Andreas

it

'deception' of the
a

transcendence of

Consider the following paragraph:

The culture industry ... impedes the development of autonomous
independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves.
These, however, would be the pre-condition for a democratic society
which needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and
develop 5

From this vantage-point, the issue becomes one of

investigating the limits of the culture industry's potential "as
6
means of fettering consciousness"

emphasis

-

What is crucial

.

needs has not been successful.

4

is

6

shift of

It

is

in

integration of psychic

this gap that the potential

to be found.

Andreas Huyssen, "Introduction to Adorno", New German Critique
Number 6, Fall
97 5
P* 10.
1

5

a

from the explication of the mechanisms of mimesis to an

articulation of the extent to which cultural

for praxis

is

,

»

Theodor Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered", New German Cr
Number 6, Fall 1975, PP* 18-19*
ibid.

a

i

t

i

que

,

7

Habermas' contribution derives from his attempt to develop
and

extend the earlier work of the Frankfurt School.

discussion of instrumental

reason by seeking to explicate with greater

precision the alternative rationality

-

formulation of 'ends'

in

-

He has sharpened the

which figured

one directly applicable to the
their work.

has gone beyond other members of the School

in an

In

so doing, he

effort to develop an

epistemological base not only for normative ('practical') reason, but
also for critical

theory itself.

Out of this work has evolved

a

fresh attempt to confront the

theory/praxis issue, and this aspect of his thought
of the dissertation.

a

brief, Habermas' explication of

In

rationality leads him to

is

a

major concern
a

practical

focus on the centrality of communication

for human society and the possibility of an effective political

which derives from

it.

practice

The development of this perspective

constitutes Habermas' major innovation vis-a-vis the remainder of the
Frankfurt School.

Shapiro expresses

it

this way:

By locating the conditions of rationality in the social
structures of language use, Habermas moves the locus of rationality from
Rationality is a
the autonomous subject to subjects in interaction.
of
of
structure
rather
but
per
se,
individuals
of
property not
the
overcome
has
Habermas
notion,
this
In
undistorted communication.
capitalistic
If
theory.
critical
in
subject
ambiguous plight of the
technological society weakens the autonomy and rationality of the
subject, it is not through the domination of the individual by the
apparatus but through technological rationality supplanting a
7
describable rationality of communication.

7

Jeremy Shapiro, "The Critical Theory of Frankfurt",
Supplement *4th October 197^, P* 1095-

Times Literary

8

Praxis

is

no longer an

issue of a disappearing subject, but

rather of repressed communicative activity.

perceives the target of

a

It

is

here that Habermas

practically-oriented critical theory:

to

raise, through reflection undertaken in interaction,
that submerged

intersubjectivity.

It

that men and women will

is

only through the recapture of lost sociality

recognize themselves as both the products and

potential

shapers of history.

practical

rationality, form the touchstones for the possibility of

'fully rational

There
succeeds

in

This, together with the flowering of a

society.'

is

great controversy about whether or not Habermas

his ambitious endeavour

Habermas' work

a

is

-

but few question the fact that

both brilliant and provocative.

This, and the fact

that Habermas' work constitutes some 'rapprochement' of German

Idealism with the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, make timely
the growing awareness of his thought

in

this country.

This

dissertation has several aims:

1.

To contribute to the general dissemination of his thought.
As was
in

indicated above, there

is

a

growing literature (mostly

the form of articles) commenting on his work; but the

intrinsic complexity of that work, together with the fact that
it

assumes an acquai ntance wi th

a

broad philosophical and

sociological background, continue to limit general

accessibility.

The dissertation aims to broaden that access.

9

2.

To consider the major critiques that have been
offered of the
central

themes of his work

-

the theories of knowledge-

constitutive interests, communication, and social evolution

-

and, on this basis, to contribute to the discussion about
the

potential contained
praxis.
in

the theory for confronting the issue of

in

While this has been one of the major points of focus

the literature,

practical

few attempts have been made to draw out the

implications of his thought as

on its potential

for praxis.

a

way to reflect back

This leads to the third aim of

the dissertation.

3.

To develop

a

theory of education based on Habermas' work.

There are three considerations here:
a)

A Habermasian theory of education,

radical

aim and

in

content, will contribute to the body of thought known as

philosophy of education.

The significance of that

contribution will be considered according to the theory's
ability to

extend the critique of education which emerged

(1)

so dramatically in the late sixties and early seventies;

(2)

shed light on the apparent faltering of that critique

the

past few years;

and

radical

education.

b)

will

It

provide

(3)

a

further the search for

a

genuinely

mechanism by which to consider the

possibilities contained within Habermas' work for the
generation of

a

in

political praxis.

10

Because there are numerous implications for education

c)

throughout his work (both explicit and implicit),

a

systematic attempt to draw them out and constitute them
as
theory will provide

a

a

perspective from which to reflect back

on the theory itself.

The plan of the dissertation follows from its aims.
three chapters present the theory, following

outline.

a

broadly chronological

The fourth chapter attempts to develop

considering

a

Habermas an theory of education;
i

The first

it

a

framework for

both comments and

builds on the critiques of education proferred in the sixties.

The

final chapter outlines the rudiments of a theory of education based on

Habermas' work, and attempts an assessment of the work from that

perspective.

The conclusion summarizes the thesis, and indicates

fruitful areas for further examination and research.

CHAPTER

1

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE-CONSTITUTIVE INTERESTS

The Theory-Praxis Relationship

Habermas

theoretical endeavor

of such ka aedoscop c dimensions

is

1

i

that any single way of characterizing it must ultimately be

restricting.

The demands of

a

summary presentation, however,

necessitate some kind of perspective, and given the stated objectives
of the dissertation,

the most fruitful

theme would seem to be his

historically couched investigation of the relation has always been
crucial

for the Frankfurt School,

of any social or political

in

that

it

determines the project

Habermas analyzes this

theory.

relationship on the level of epistemology:

from this vantage point,

his work can be understood as a full-scale critique of the

supposedly logical distinctions between theory and action, description
and prescription, and the corresponding notion of a 'value-free'
sc ence
i

This perspective can be amplified, and its parameters set by

considering Habermas' contrast between the classical and modern
conceptions of political philosophy.

1

1

Classical

politics, he asserts,

12

"seems hopelessly old-fashioned to us" 1
in

which this

is

,

and enumerates three ways

so:

Politics was understood to be the doctrine
of the qood

1.

and just

life ...

The old doctrine of politics referred
exclusively to
"praxis" in the narrow sense of the Greeks.
This had
nothing to do with "techne", the skillful
production of
artifacts and the expert mastery of objectified
tasks.
In the final instance, politics was
always directed
towards the formation and cultivation of character;
it
proceeded pedagog ca y and not technically

2.

i

1

1

Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical
philosophy in general, cannot be compared in its claim
to knowledge with a rigorous science ... 2

3.

This was
of a state
a

a

philosophy thoroughly oriented to the construction

(the polis) which embraced an ethical

in

aspects of civil and legal governancy, "must be concerned for the

virtue of its citizens".

3

In

this,

it

was to be distinguished from

mere legal association facilitating commerce and exchange.

The transformation from classical

to modern political

philosophy involves the exact loss of this distinction.
political

1

Such

community, dependent on the active participation of its citizens

all

a

inperative.

Modern

theory takes its form increasingly from the dictates of

Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice

2

ibid,

p.

k2.

3

ibid,

p.

^7

,

Boston:

Beacon Press,

1971

P-

M

13

exper menta

science, and has "little more than the name

i

with the old politics".
out

1

i

4

In

in

common

the following quotation, Habermas

nes the shift he perceives to have occurred.

First, the claim of scientifically grounded social
philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for
the correct order of the state and society as such.
Its assertions
are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances,
are
to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless
of the
historical situation.
Second, the translation of knowledge into
practice, the appl ication, is a technical problem. With a knowledge
of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of
society, practical prudent action of human beings toward each other
is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly
calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions.
Third, human behavior is therefore to be considered only as the
material for science.
The engineers of the correct order can
disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine
themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings,
just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a
calculable manner. This separation of morality from politics
replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making
possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order. 5

In

other words, theory no longer contains

imperative.

It

a

normative

can secure the conditions of survival, but makes no

pronouncements as to the quality of life that ought to be lived by
the members of the society.

This

which modern social and political

is

certainly the tradition out of

thought has evolved.

Habermas goes on to point out, the demands of

a

However, as

highly industrialized

society have further affected the relationship between morality and

4

5

ibid

,

ibid,

p.

*4l

p

^3

.

.

Hi

politics.

The recent burgeoning of scientific
and technical

knowledge allow for greatly expanded control
over both the natural

environment and the organization of social
relations;

and within

this matrix, normative issues, once
circumscribed, are increasingly

subsumed under the category of technical problems
amenable to
technical

solutions.

Decisions "relevant to the praxis of life" 6

are increasingly removed from the sphere of public
discussion and

consideration, and rendered instead subject to the demands
of

efficiency and ease of administration.
alludes to the fact that, at this point

To underscore this, Habermas
in

history

the distinction

between 'technical' and 'practical', so fundamental to the Greeks,
barely discernible.

Theory, as

a

productive force of industrial

development, "changes the basis of human life, but

it

no longer

reaches out critically beyond this basis to raise life itself, for
the sake of life,

to another

level".

7

Twentieth century citizens no longer possess collective
practical control over the conduct of their lives.
does not seek

a

While Habermas

return to the days of the Greek polis, he does find

the contrast

instructive.

situation

which citizens come together, under conditions of free

b

7

ibid

in

p.

266.

ibid. p.

255.

,

The principle of the 'public sphere'

(a

is

15

speech and lack of privilege, to reflect on, discuss,
and rationally

decide upon the conduct of their
remains

1

i

ves)

,

prefigured

in

the polis,

continuing and informi ng theme throughout his work.

a

It

is

aga ns
i

this background of the historically changing

relation of theory and action that Habermas undertakes his analysis,

The parameters of that investigation are made explicit

in

this

quotat on
i

... How can the promise of practical politics - namel
y, of
providing practical orientation about which is right and just in a given
situation - be redeemed without relinquishing, on the one hand the
rigor of scientific knowledge, which modern social philosophy demands in
contrast to the practical philosophy of classicism?
And, on the other,
how can the promise of social philosophy, to furnish an analys is of the
interrelationships of social life, be redeemed without relinqu shi ng
the practical orientation of classical politics? 8
,

i

8

ibid,

p

.

kk

16

The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests

The Critique of Scientism

It

.

is

the gradual collapse of the

distinction between the technical and the practical which
Habermas
investigates
I

nterests

in

his first major publication Knowledge and Human

The focus of inquiry

.

is

the conditions which make

possible the attainment of valid knowledge:
to critique what Habermas

understanding
belief

in

1

i.e.

is

in

an effort

refers to as the current 'scientific self-

of modern science.

itself:

this

"Scientism means science's

the conviction that we can no longer

understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must
identify knowledge with science

." 9

Initially, modern science was not accorded this status.

While considered the clearest model for the attainment of knowledge,
it

was certainly not thought of as the only form of genuine knowledge.

With the rise of positivism, however, modern science began to claim

exclusive validity:

knowledge became "implicitly defined by the

achievement of the sciences ".

10

Inquiry into the conditions of

possible knowledge was rendered meaningless except insofar as

concerned itself with the principles of scientific method.

it

The

theory of knowledge metamorphosed into the philosophy of science.

9

Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
Beacon Press, 1971
Massachusetts:
P,

10

ibid, p. 67.

.

Boston,
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Given such hegemony, any other claim to
the status of genuine

knowledge

-

whether

it

be from theology, philosophy, sociology,

psychology, or even tradition

-

could be declared void, variously

labelled conjecture, fantasy, dogma and so forth;
hence, the scramble
on the part of the so-called

respectable counterparts.

'social'

sciences to emulate their more

Without the scientific imprimatur, all

other contenders are relegated to the position of suppliant,

a

"knocker at the iron gate" 11 before the castle of the Empirical
Wizard.

The scientific monopoly of knowledge has specific

implications for the relation between the technical and the practical
(and, consequently,

Empirical

applied

in

for the relationship of theory and action).

investigation produces technical knowledge which

then

the interests of expanded control over nature and the more

effective functioning of society.
moral)

is

issues,

if

Practical

(that

is,

normative and

they cannot be formulated as technical questions, do

not fall within the province of science, and therefore cannot be

considered 'rationally'.

They are "reduced" to

a

question of values,

not to be judged on the basis of reason, but "simply decided upon, one

way or another".

11

As Max Horkheimer described it,

Judith Wright, "The Cedars", Penguin Book of Modern Australian
Sydney, Australia,
968 p. 223
Poets
.

12

12

1

Habermas, Theory and Practice,

,

p.

265

18

... The acceptability of ideals, the
criteria for our actions
and bel lefs, the leading principles of ethics and
politics, all our
ultimate decisions are made to depend upon factors other
than reason.
They are supposed to be matters of choice and predilection,
and it has
become meaningless to speak of choice in making practical,
moral or

esthetic decisions.

It

13

would appear that, at least

in

science's self-understanding,

questions of theory and action, the technical and practical, are
rigidly separated.

Habermas argues, however, that not only

is

this

different to the Aristotelean idea that these are distinct domains of

knowledge (insofar as the doman of

'praxis'

is

no longer considered

amenable to reason), but that science's claim to proscribe normative
issues is in fact suspect.
of empirical

"

...

its underlying premise

is

the value

scientific theories, and this not simply hypothetically,

but normatively, that behaving in accordance with technical

recommendations

is

not only desirable but also 'rational' ". 14

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Habermas argues that science
does in fact make normative decisions, but under the guise of resolving

technical

problems.

The continued expansion of

a

highly

industrialized society requires increasing technical and administrative
control over the practical and normative aspects of social

life.

Because such aspects have been declared inaccessible to reason,

13

Max Horkhaimer, Eel ipse of Reason
pp. 7"8

14

Habermas, Theory and Practice,

p.

.

New York:

269

Seabury Press,

1

97^
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decisions about them are no longer made on the basis of
consensus attained by the individuals affected;

appropriated

in

the name of technical

rational

a

rather they are

control.

... When theory was still related to praxis in a genuine sense,
conceived of society as a system of action by human beings, who
communicate through speech and thus must realize social intercourse
within the context of conscious communication ... (A) theory which
confused action with control is no longer capable of such a perspective.
It understands society as a nexus of behavioral
models, for which
rationality is mediated solely by the understanding of soci o-techn ca
controls, but not by a coherent total consciousness - not by precisely
that interested reason which can only attain practical power through
the minds of politically enlightened citizens. 15
it

i

It

is

this jettison of the practical

technical which inspires Habermas'

for the sake of the

investigation of the conditions

which make possible the attainment of valid knowledge.

For if he can

establish that modern science's claim to represent the castellan of
such knowledge

is

ideological, that there are other equally legitimate

sources of knowledge, then there

is

a

possibility of resurrecting

rational knowledge which is also practical.

Simultaneously, Habermas

wants to demonstrate an epistemological possibility for
knowledge, for

it

i

s

on such

a

critique of scientism depends.
foundation, Habermas himself
'knocker at the iron gate'.

1 5

ibid., p. 255

is

a

a

cri tical

possibility that the success of his
Without that epistemological
threatened with being yet another

20

Jhe

C onditions

facts';
is

it

of

'Valid'

Knowledge

Scientism starts with 'the

.

pays no attention to how those facts are
constituted.

at this level,

It

that of the conditions under which knowledge
is

constituted, that Habermas focuses his attention.
proceeds via a process of reflection

a

,

Such an inquiry

process which, according to

Habermas, positivism disavows, presumably because its
results would

challenge the assumption that empirically garnered knowledge

is

the

only form of valid knowledge.

The notion of reflection
Habermas'
'

is

of fundamental

investigation, and as the meaning of the German

ref lektieren'

differs slightly, but very significantly, from the

English understanding of 'reflection',
the term at this point.
I

nterests

importance to

is

helpful

in

it

seems important to clarify

A translator's note from Knowledge and Human

this regard:

The difference between the German and the English usage of
'reflection' are a source of difficulty in accurately
translating into English the present work ... In English, the word
'reflect' tends to mean aside from 'mirror', either 'bend back' or
'recurve' or_ the mental operation of reflecting oil something (albeit
In German usage,
the self) that is external to the act of reflection.
particularly as developed by German Idealism ... the word 'reflect'
expresses the idea that the act in which the subject reflects ori
something is one in which the object of reflection itself recurves or
The process through
bends back in a way that reveals its true nature.
itself,
insofar
as it reveals
upon
which consciousness reflects back
the constitution of consciousness and its objects, also dissolves the
naive or dogmatic view of subjects; thus they themselves are reflected
Accordingly, 'reflect' can be used transitively
through consciousness.
16
in a cognitive context.
...

'to reflect',

16

ibid,

pp.

319*320

21

This nuance of meaning

difference lies,

it

is

quite difficult to grasp.

seems in the relationship between the act of

reflection and the object of that reflection.
the object remains unaffected;
In

The

it

is

In

the English usage,

accepted as already constituted.

the German understanding of the term, on the other hand,

almost as if the object

is

is

it

'activated' bu the process of reflection,

such that it reveals its history, the process of its constitution.

Whereas the former usage makes no separation between appearance and
essence, the latter considers the appearance of the object
relation to its genesis.

essence,
an

its true nature,

in

direct

Only under these conditions could its
be uncovered.

From this point of view,

'unreflected consciousness', for example, would be one which did

not question its

'givenness'.

This

is

in

clear opposition to

consciousness which understands the possibility of
presentation (as occurs, for example,

in

a

a

distorted

the defense mechanism of

rational ization)

It

is

this latter form of

'reflection'

in

which Habermas

engages when he explores the conditions of possible knowledge.
Clearly, knowledge does not materialize out of nothing;

it

is

fashioned by human beings on the basis of their experience.
the particular manner

in

which we organize our experience that

focus of investigation for Habermas, for

it

is

in

It

is

is

the

that process that we

objectify reality, and thereby establish the framework within which
knowledge

is

constituted.

22

The essence of human experience
"Man
It

is

both

is

a

is

captured

in

the statement,

tool-making and symbolizing (or speaking)
animal".

17

these two capacities which ensure the
possibility of the

continued existence of the species:

simply in order to survive, man

must appropriate and transform nature;
basis of meaningful

similarly, he must, on the

interaction with his fellow man, continually modify

and transmit the social structures in which he lives.

These

transactions, with nature and with other human beings, (Habermas
refers
to them as work and
is

interaction

,

respectively) must occur

if

the species

to continue.

Habermas wants to argue that this anthropological framework
is

simultaneously an epistemological one.

basic

In

other words, the two

orientations of work and interaction also form the presuppositions

of our knowledge.

Their fundamental character imposes

a

particular

organization on our experience, and consequently we objectify reality
subject to their demands.

Knowledge

is

similarly constituted:

it

is

generated according to the necessity of establishing greater control
over nature, and to that of engaging

in

communication and interaction.

Habermas refers to these orientations as 'knowledge-constitutive
interests', a 'technical' and
(He has,

in

fact,

a

'practical'

interest, respectively.

identified a third interest, that of the

Reflections on
Albrecht Wellmer, "Communication and Emanc pat on
the Linguistic Turn in Critical Theory", Stony Brook Studies in Phil
osophy Volume 1, 197**, p. 7*1
i

,

i

:

-

23

'emancipatory'

subsection.

-

its discussion will

See page 29

be deferred to the following

).

Habermas describes
process of uncovering these

in a

rather more formal

fashion, the

knowledge-constitutive interests:

...
have let myself be guided by the problem posed by the
system of primitive terms (or the 'transcendental framework')
within
which we organize our experience a priori and prior to all
science, and
do so in such a manner that, of course, the formation of
the scientific
object domains is also prejudiced by this.
In the functional sphere
of instrumental action we encounter objects of the type of moving
bodies;
here we experience things, events and conditions which are in
principle capable of being manipulated.
In interaction (or at the
level of possible
ntersubj ect ve communication), we encounter objects
of the type of speaking and acting subjects;
here we experience
persons, utterances and conditions which, in principle, are structured
and to be understood symbolically. 18
I

i

i

The Technical and the Practical

Interests

.

Elucidation of the

knowledge-constitutive interests can be furthered by examining them
terms of several criteria:

the interest itself;

action associated with the interest;
it;

19

the particular type of

the kind of knowledge generated by

and the cluster of disciplines which yield that knowledge.

table below summarizes the information.

18

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

pp.

in

The

19

7“8

Adapted from Gerard Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience
Henry Regnery Company, 1973
Chicago, Illinois:

24

Interest

Action

Knowl edge

D

technicalcogn t ve

work

information

natural and
technical sciences

i

i

interaction

practicalcogn t ve

nterpretat on
i

i

i

Techn cal -Cogn
i

the

i

i

t

i

This

ve Interest.

is

i

sc pi

i

i

nes

hermeneutic and
cultural sciences

Habermas' designation for

'interest' which expresses the necessary quality of man's relation-

ship with nature.

Man's survival depends on his ability either to

manipulate and control the environment, or to find ways of adapting
The 'interest' generated

himself to its capricious bidding.

confrontation

is

this

in

that of improving the productive forces of society,

and thus of extending the power of technical control over nature:

prefigures

a

it

20
situation of "human emancipation from material wants."

To achieve this, man must engage

in

labor, or work (more formally

an activity
referred to as instrumental or purposive-rational action),

which

is

information.

guided by technical

A successful

transaction with the natural environment

information which
ultimately possible only on the basis of
general izable and verifiable,
is

i.e., empi

r

is

is

leal -anal yt ic knowledge.

It

includes the construction of
the end result of a procedure which

hypotheses which can be tested,
theories, the deduction of law-like
and the monitoring and
operations of observation and measurement,

utilization of feedback.
20

gives rise
The cluster of disciplines which

and Interaction,"
John Keane, "Habermas on Work
88
Critique, Number 6, Fall 1975, P*

N ew

Germ an

25

to this kind of knowledge

that which encompasses the natural and

is

technical sciences.

clear from the above that, while Habermas engages

is

It

in a

meticulous critique of scientism, he does not intend thereby
to
discredit the scientific endeavor
generates.
ological

itself, or the knowledge which

What he does want to insist upon

rules which guide that endeavor,

ictions advanced by it
exploi tabi

1

i

ty)

(that

is,

it

that the method-

is

and the meaning of the pred-

their inherent technical

both refer to a specific aspect of reality, an

,

aspect deriving from the interest

increased technical control.

in

... Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality insofar as it
appears within the behavioral
system of instrumental action.
In
accordance with their immanent meaning ... statements about this object
domain are thus designed for a specific context in which they can be
applied - that is, they grasp reality with regard to technical control
that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all
times. 21

Pract ca -Cogn
1

i

i

t

i

ve Interest

.

This denotes the second moment of

human activity which Habermas has disclosed:

social

transmission via the process of encu turat on
1

behavior,
a

i

its

Ordinary everyday

.

our ability to act and interact appropriately, depends on
We have

wide-ranging and reciprocally-established understanding.

to know how to interpret other people's behavior,

own similarly intelligible.

2 1

life, and

The 'interest'

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

and how to make our

revealed here

p.

195

is

in

the

26

maintenance, expansion and transmission
of that understanding and,
as
such,

it

prefigures

a

situation of "mutual consensus within
constrained

harmony". 22

social

The activity which reflects this interest

referred to as communicative action).

For this,

is

interaction (also

language

is

an

essential mediation, just as tools represent the
mediation for labor.
It

through language that we can agree upon and institute
the norms

is

which define reciprocal expectations about behavior
Habermas refers to as establishing

'

i

(a

process

ntersubject ve understanding').
i

This points to an important difference between the rules which
govern
the two sets of activity:

whereas technical

rules depend on

scientifical ly -verifiable propositions, normative rules are contingent
upon

i

ntersubject ve recognition.
i

The knowledge relevant to this domain of interaction

interpretive kind.

As characterized by Keane,

it

is

is

of an

concerned to

answer the question, "How can the social world be rendered intelligible
and meaningful
a

in

to

its

interacting participants?"

such

a

way that they will

addition,

it

is

to indicate the disciplies which furnish this kind of

knowledge

Keane,
ibid.

inform attempts to fashion future modes of

Habermas employs the category 'hermeneutic

interaction.

sciences'

2 3

In

knowledge which seeks to appropriate cultural and historical traditions

social

22

23

1

oc

.

c

i

t

.

,

p.

88

27

According to Radnitzky, the term 'hermeneutics' was coined

in

the early seventeenth century, and was used originally to refer
to the

art of interpreting texts, especially those of a legal or religious
kind.

Since then, hermeneutics has come to be associated with issues

of interpretation and meaning.

Radnitzky characterizes these sciences

as

... making available the ends-in-view and intentions underlying
the actions of passed generations for the reflection and discussion in
which contemporaries try to reach an understanding of and an agreement
about possible objectives of action. 24

This

is

express opposition to the current attempts on the

in

sciences to model

part of the social

themselves after the natural

Such a self-understanding, according to Habermas, "defends

sciences.

sterilized knowledge against the reflected appropriation of active
traditions and locks up history

in a

museum". 25

Hermeneutic inquiry, then, discloses reality according to the
interest in preserving and expanding intersubjectivity.

structure,

against

a

it

is

an

inquiry oriented towards achieving

i

25

a

its very

consensus,

background of tradition about the possible aims and means of

act on

24

It

Radnitzky, op.

ci

t

.

p.

201

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

316

28

This analytic separation of instrumental and
communicative

action represents the core of Habermas' critique
of scientism.
it

is

For

the loss of awareness of this distinction
that has enabled

modern science to usurp the power of 'final arbiter'
'valid'

knowledge.

action based on

a

Similarly,
technological

it

in

the matter of

has promoted the formulation of

imperative, with

repudiation of any normative or practical

a

corresponding

imperative.

The isolation of a second, equally legitimate, form of

knowledge, a knowledge not gleaned through the methodology of modern
science, makes possible the erection of a bulwark against the onrush
of technology, and the resurrection of a 'practical politics' designed
to restore control
It

is

over their lives to the men and women who live them.

important to note in this regard Habermas'

insistence that the

analytic separation of technical and practical knowledge, work and
interaction, does not entail

dimensions are interrelated.
human emancipation

domination.

-

a

functional separation:

clearly the

Both activities contain the seeds of

from material want, and from constraint and

At the same time, as Habermas demonstrates in his

discussion of modern science, the derivation of technical knowledge
depends ultimately on the "ground of intersubjectivity

investigators are always already situated"

26

-

in

in

which

other words,

instrumental action must always be understood as embedded in

26

ibid., p.

137

a

29

thoroughly interactional framework.

Technical knowledge is indeed

indispensable to the development of the human race

-

however, provide the 'telos' of that development.

it

does not,

Habermas describes

that in the following:

... The goal is "providing a rational basis for
the precepts
of civilization":
in other words, an organization of social
relations
according to the principle that the validity of every norm of
political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at
in
communication free from domination. 27

The Emancipatory Interest

attainment of such
a

third

1

a goal

It

.

is

that Habermas discerns the manifestation of

knowl edge-const tut ve interest
i

interest.

the striving towards the

in

i

1

,

the emancipatory-cognitive

The two 'interests' just considered were discerned

particular spheres of action,

i

.e.

work and

i

ntereract on
i

the continued existence of the human species.

,

in

basic to

The emancipatory

interest is similarly situated in a 'transcendental' framework

-

the

medium of ordinary language.

responsibility*

* is not
... The human interest in autonomy and
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori.
What raises us out
language.
of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know:
Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us.
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal
28
and unconstrained consensus.
27
28

*

ibid

.

,

p.

284

ibid

.

,

p.

314

important to note that the phrase 'autonomy and responsibility
as is the phrase
is a translation from the German word Mund gke
The literal meaning of the term is 'a legal coming'emancipation.'
of-age.
It

is

i

i

,

1

30

This

is an

interest, then, concerned to enhance the autonomy
of

individuals and to abolish social domination and
repression;
to

it

aims

identify, clarify, and finally dissolve the
impediments to the

achievement of 'communication free from domination'.

Developments

in

the spheres of technical and practical

knowledge are not un -d rect ona
i

i

is

i

1

as Lenhardt has suggested,

:

29

it

obvious at this point in history that technology, as well as

improving food production and extending medical knowledge, also

creates the conditions for warfare and ecological disaster.
Similarly, the development of pract cal -moral knowledge has not
i

remained immune from distortion:

social

structures have historically

and variously produced "intolerance, pressures to conform,

mystification of the bases of power and inequality, outright deceit,
and pathological modes of communication". 30

It

is

this kind of

subterfuge which the emancipatory interest, for the sake of

establishing institutional structures which promote social and
political

freedoms, seeks to expose.

The activity in which this 'interest' most consistently

manifests itself
earlier).

29

It

is

is

reflection (especially as this was described

via this mechanism that human beings can come to

Christian K. Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental
Anthropology", Philosophy of Social Sciences Volume 2, 1972,
,

3 o

ibid.

p.

239

31

understand their own historical
self-constitution, an understanding
which releases them from the
'hypostatized present', which enables
them to comprehend the ideological
basis of the apparently 'natural'
and

'legitimate'

forces which structure their lives.

Such

a

process can transform the 'unreflected
consciousness', promoting new

perceptions and insights, and leading to the
possibility of

appropriately changed behaviour.

Habermas refers to the disciplines which yield
this knowledge
as

'critical

social

sciences', of which psychoanalysis

While superficially similar to

a

a

paradigm.

process of hermeneutic inquiry,

psychoanalysis takes as its object domain
external

is

to the focus of hermeneutics

-

a

dimension considered

that of systematic distortion.

Whereas hermeneutics explores the conscious intentions of
its subjects,

psychoanalysis attends to internally produced distortion, seeking to
render its meaning transparent.

The significance of such 'critical social sciences' emerges
in

Habermas' unique investigation of psychoanalysis and its

implications for social theory.

psychoanalysis as

a

process of linguistic analysis (in other words,

he is presupposing that all
i

a

ntersubject ve
i

,

is,

He attempts to reconceptualize

experience, whether internal or

principle, linguistically expressible),

in

process which methodologically incorporates the experience of self-

reflection.

From this perspective, symptoms, which are intra-

psychic expressions of

a

conflict between instinctual needs or wishes

32

and perceived social prohibitions against their expression, take the

form of
(that

a

is,

'privatized language':
repressed)

the unacceptable needs are banished

from the realm of public communication.

The

split-off symbol has not lost total contact with the public language,
but the

and

'grammatical connection' has gone underground.

The 'grammar'

'syntax' of the privatized language can now be identified in

dream symbols and symptom formation.

Through the dialogue

established between patient and analyst, the psychoanalytic method
seeks to have the symptom, the individual's private symbol,

reconstituted

in

the public language shared by both parties.

Not only is the meaning of the symptom obscure at a public

The

level, however, for it also remains oblique to the subject.

language of the unconscious

is

unaware of its formative role

dialogue

in

in

inaccessible to the ego as

in

is

to

the development of the symptom, and

maintaining its split-off existence.

particular

it

This means, however, that the ego continues

the outside observer.

its function

as

-

It

that between the ego and the id

is
-

this

which

psychoanalysis seeks to institute (the process of sel f-ref lection)
The analyst functions less as an interpreter of the symptomatic

behaviour, and more as
to comprehend his own

interpretations

3 1

in

a

teacher, one who "teaches

language".

the subject

Certainly the analyst offers

his struggle to help reconstruct the lost pieces

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

228

t

33

of the patient's history; but, and
this is a crucial aspect of Habermas

appropriation of Freud, the accuracy of that
interpretation

is

not

completely determined "by what the patient says
or how he behaves "
in

response to it.

The 'correctness' of the interpretation

corroborated "only by the successful continuation
of

a

is

self-

formative process, that is, by the completion of
self-reflection".
Habermas quotes Freud

in

32

33

this regard:

... A plain "Yes" from a patient is by no means
unambiguous.
can indeed signify that he recognizes the correctness
of the
construction that has been presented to him; but it can also
be
meaningless, or can even deserve to be described as "hypocritical",
since it may be convenient for his resistance to make use of an
assent in such circumstances in order to prolong the concealment of
a
truth that has not been discovered.
The "Yes" has no value unless it
is followed by indirect confirmations, unless the
patient, immediately
after his "Yes", produced new memories which complete and extend the
construction.
Only in such an event do we consider that the "Yes"
has dealt completely with the subject under discussion. 34
It

So the patient has to be able to 'know and recognize
in

the interpretation offered.

This points to

a

1

himself

fundamental

difference between this kind of activity and the kind generated by
technical

knowledge.

The latter discovers causal connections which

form the base for efforts at increased control over the natural

environment.

connections themselves, ultimately dissolving them, and

the causal

3 2

33

34

ibid

.

ibid

.

ibid

.

Analytic insight, on the other hand, directly affects

,

p

.

266

,

p.

269

I

3*4

overcoming their disabling influences.

Understanding those causal

connections simultaneously involves an explanatory power:

the

motivations become transparent, and the entire symptom construct
attains communicability.

The representation of the 'emancipatory interest

context

the interest

is

"passion for critique"

in
35

),

self-knowledge (Habermas calls

1

this

in
it

a

which arises out of the experience of

suffering, and which impels the patient, though never without

ambivalence, to seek and use therapeutic help

Inserted within a broader societal

in

the first place.

framework, Habermas

argues, the psychoanalytic paradigm clarifies, on the one hand, the
interest in emancipation from social and political constraints and
the establishment of structures which will

preserve that emancipation,

goal.
and, on the other, the obstacles to the attainment of that

role of self-reflection in the dissolution of symptoms

The crucial
is

paralleled at this level by the role of

a

critique of ideology.

to establish
This discussion maps the contours of Habermas' attempt

an epistemological
i

n

genera

foundation for critique, and for critical theory

1

From the Freudian point of view,

3 5

ibid.

,

p.

23*+

libidinal and aggressive

35

needs threaten the requirements
of self-preservation.

attempting to mediate these conflicting
demands,

is

The ego,

joined in its

task by the superego, representing
the intrapsychic form of an

external authority structure.

This external authority, according
to

Freud, has an economic base.

As he puts

it,

... The motive of human society
is in the last resort an
economic one; since it does not possess enough
provisions to keep
members alive unless they work, it must
restrict the number of its
members and divert their energies from sexual
36
activity

i

ts

to work.

The collective solution to the required
instinctual

renunciation

is

the establishment of

institutions:

this framework

secures the organization and division of labor, and
the distribution
of the goods produced.

framework

is

The stabilization of this institutional

ensured through

a

system of social norms which operate

either as coercive measures (e.g., sanctions against breaking the
laws),
or as a system of

'substitute-gratifications' which not only reconcile

individuals to their renunciations and offer some recompense,

but also

come to serve as legitimations for the prevailing norms themselves
they become "rationalizations of authority".
of civilization", as Freud calls them,

38

37

These "mental assets

include religions, value

systems, forms of art, and so forth.

q c

37

3 8

Quoted

in

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

,

p.

275

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

279

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

Quoted

in

,

p.

-

279

36

Given that the instinctual

renunciation required varies

according to the conditions of economic
scarcity,

it

is

Habermas'

position that increased technological
output should reciprocally

allow for decreased renunciation.

From this perspective, the degree

of repression asked of individual members
of the society is an

historically variable factor.

The degree of socially necessary repression
can be measured
control over natural
processes. With the development of technology,
the instutional
framework, which regulates the distribution of
obligations and
rewards and stabilizes a power structure that
maintains cultural
renunciation, can be loosened. 39
by the variable extent of the power of
technical

The class struggle can be understood
the point at which a surplus of goods
for the survival of the society)

is

in

this context.

(i.e. more than

is

produced, the society

At

necessary
is

faced

with deciding the mechanism and rationale of distributing that
surplus.

Insofar as that distribution

organized according to

is

a

class structure, then specific renunciations are required of one
class of the society.

Simultaneously, the normative framework has to

be structured so that the class

unnecessary)

in

question will accept those (now

restrictions, and, at the same time, accord the

existing relations of power their requisite legitimation.

3

9

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

,

p.

280.

37

At this
a

level

of analysis,

institutions can be comprehended as

"power that has exchanged acute external
force for the permanent

internal

compulsion of distorted and self-limiting
communication".

40

Similarly, the cultural traditions which cement
the unnecessary
loyalty to an anachronistic institutional framework
(insofar as
technical

progress renders out-dated the extent of repression

exacts) are the ideological
an oppressive social

level)

foundations which continue to legitimate

structure.

Self-reflection (on

has the capacity to penetrate this

particularly at that point

it

in

ideological

a

societal

smoke-screen,

time when further technological

advancements threaten to challenge the necessity of continued
restrictions.

It

can reveal

the

'distorted communication structures'

on which the continuation of the particular set of power relations

depends

Habermas'

identification of

emancipation implies

a

knowledge- constitutive interest

changed relation of theory and practice,

a

relation profoundly different from that generated, for example, by

a

in

technical

interest.

a

Whereas the criteria of 'success' for empirical

sciences are already inherent
of success for a critical

in

science

their hypotheses, the only criterion
is

successful emancipation.

Wellmer, for example, describes critical

4 o

ibid., p

.

282

theory as being:

38

•••subjected to

a double standard of
measurement’
it
rtU
f t e ref,ective
recognition of thoie who
speak and act. for itt,° and!) it can prove
itself only in
successful social practice which erodes
a fraction of actual
•

.

^

.

,

constraint.

Just as therapeutic help is only utilizable
once a patient
has acknowledged both his suffering and
his need for assistance, so

critical
social

theory can only help promote

structures

its historical

if

a

dissolution of oppressive

individuals recognize their social suffering,

contingency, and their 'interest'

its eradication.

in

And similarly, just as the accuracy of the
psychoanalytic

interpretation

is

determined finally by whether or not

it

elicits

further self-reflection on the part of the patient, so the
'truth'
of critical
a

theory

is

established only by its capacity to initiate

reflective process that results

in a

To this end, the critical

liberating praxis.

social

sciences are concerned to

"determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of
social

action as such, and when they express ideologically frozen

relations of dependence that can

41

42

in

principle be transformed".

Albrecht Wellmer, The Critical Theory of Society
Seabury Press, 197^, PHabermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

310

.

New York:

42
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The Critique of Marxism

Habermas'

theory of knowledge-constitutive interests was

developed co-extensive with, and very much

critique of Marxism.

This critique

aspects of his work;

it

is

in

relation to, his

one of the most controversial

was, and remains,

a

crucial

piece of his

theoretical substructure, even though his specific concerns have

developed far beyond the category of 'interest' as such.

The emancipatory power of reflection

is

denied in Marxist thought, according to Habermas;

at once asserted and

this ambiguity

can be traced to a basic categorical confusion in the theory,

a

confusion deriving from Marx's assertion of the primacy of labor

in

man's self-formative process.

The category of labor was central
his earliest writings.

self-constitution as

a

In

for Marx from the time of

opposition to Hegel, who conceived of man's

spiritual activity, Marx invoked

a

thoroughly

materialist basis for man's development.

Man is directly a natural being ... endowed with natural
powers of life - he is an act ve natural being ... As a natural,
corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a suffering, conditioned,
and limited creature, like animals and plants ... To say that man is a
corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural
vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of
his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real
...

i

sensuous objects.

43

43

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
International Publishers, 1972 p. 181
York:
Karl

,

18A*4

.

New

Marx wants to assert that the real
world

a world of nature,

is

and that man constitutes himself
through his interactional
activity

with that world of nature.
human existence that

is

That activity,

independent of all

perpetual necessity of nature

between man and nature,

The way

in

in

in

labor,

is a

"condition of

forms of society, a

order to mediate the material exchange

other words, human life". 44

which men produce their means of subsistence
(i.e.,

the mode of production) simultaneously
represents a particular mode of
life.

Moreover, the forms and content of knowledge
are directly

related to man's exchange with his natural environment:

... The fact is ... that definite individuals
who are
productively active in a definite way enter into ... definite
social
and political relations ... The production of ideas, of
conceptions,
of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with
the material
activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real
life.
Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this
stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour ... Morality,
religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding
forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of
independence.
They have no history, no development;
but men,
developing their material production and their material intercourse,
alter, along with this, their real existence, their thinking and the
products of their thinking.
Life is not determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by life. 45

It

44

45

Quoted

in

is

here that the ambiguity to which Habermas wants to draw

Habermas, Knowledge and Interests

,

p.

Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader
Norton and Company, 1972 pp. 118 - 119
,

.

.

27

New York:

W.W.

attention arises.

By making all

'mental

production' dependent on

"material production", by apparently denying
consciousness any

independence, history, development, Marx has,
according to Habermas,

committed a conceptual error which has profound,
and sometimes
fatal, consequences for the subsequent
interpretation and application
of his thought.

This insistence on the pivotal

implies, through
vital

its own

distinctions:

internal

logic,

role of labor

the ultimate collapse of

between instrumental and communicative action,

between technical and reflective knowledge, between
science and

critique.

It

technological

makes political emancipation finally dependent on
progress.

Habermas

considers

a

thought.

is

here drawing out the implications of what he

suppressed dimension,

a

"latent positivism" 46

Marxist

in

He is not suggesting that this represents the whole of

that thought, nor even

its basic

intent.

In

fact, for the most part,

Habermas argues, Marx's use of the term 'labor' had, as its referent,
the two elements of work

(forces of production) and interaction (sets

relationships arising out of the activity of production).

of social

Their dual

importance to the development of the species was

certainly recognized.

Clearly, too, Marx understood that

emancipation did not rest solely on developments
sphere

-

his numerous references to the need for a

pract ca -cr
1

'

i

i

t

revolution was to succeed, certainly attest to that.

activity',

if

He writes,

for example,

4 6

the technological

in

in

The Civil War

in

France,

Wellmer, The Critical Theory of Society, pp. 67-119

i

ca

1

42

... (Members of the working
class) know
n
A
out their own emancipation, and
W° rk
along wUh it That hhi„h
f
9her fo
to
which present society is irresistible .IT,
J
agencies they will have to pass
through long sUrugglT" throunh'a
senes of h.storic processes, transforming
c?rcums?anc«
;

™

'

.

and Ten.

”

Habermas does not wish to deny Marx's
seminal perception of
the fundamental character of man's
relationship to nature, nor of its

status as the activating force of
history.

He says himself, "It

is

the development of the forces of
production that provide the impetus
to abolishing and surpassing a form
of life that has been rigidified

and become an abstraction." *»

But,

to the extent that Marx takes

the activity generated in this engagement

(that

is,

instrumental

activity) as paradigmatic for all forms of human
activity, and

simultaneously, to the extent that he locates the
source of all

knowledge and consciousness

in that

same productive activity, then the

crucial differences obtaining between instrumental,
communicative,
and reflective activity are lost, and their specific
individual

contributions to the development of the species obfuscated.

Particularly alarming, as far as Habermas
enormous potential contained

in

of ideology thereby engendered)

change on its own account

is

48

Tucker

,

op.

c

i

.

,

p.

concerned,

is

that the

reflective activity (and the critique
for assuming a motivating force for

summarily eliminated.

This conceptual ambiguity

47

is

is

reflected, for Habermas,

558

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

43-

in

the

^3

fact that

in

Marx's writings, two versions of the
not ion that man

constitutes himself through labor can be discerned.
"at the categorical

49

level",

One one hand,

man's sel f-format ve history

is

i

construed as being mediated by productive activity
only.

On

the

other, "at the level of (Marx's) material

50

man's

evolution

is

understood as occurring

closely related, dimensions:
of social

relationships.

in

investigations",

two distinguishable,

if

productive activity and the structure

At this level, both dimensions are

considered fundamental to the movement of history.

This apparently small and subtle distinction of meaning has

troublesome consequences.

The epistemological

implications of the

reduction of reflective action to the level of instrumental action,
for example, are far~reaching:

the natural

become paradigmatic for science

in

assimilated, almost without trace.
in

sciences,

in

their turn,

general, and critique can be

Habermas suggests that Marx was,

fact, enamored of the scientific process, quoting him to the

effect that:

"Natural science will eventually subsume the science of

man just as the science of man will subsume natural science:
will be a single science."

Habermas,

49

ibid. P- 52.

5 0

ibid, P-

53

5 1

ibid, P-

A6

there

51

interpreting this as

a

"desire for

a

natural

science

Of

man",” finds

53
"astonishing"
"astonishing"”:

it

represents

it

:

a

major and

crucial misunderstanding of the
differences in objectives and

methods of inquiry between natural
science and critique.
extent that
a natural

To the

'science of man' approaches the
self-understanding of

a

science, human beings become objects,
to be viewed from

the same technical

perspective as other objects of nature.

Human

behavior becomes something to be observed,
tested and rendered 'lawI

1

ke

'

Its

*

meaning and intention

is

dismissed in the name of rigor,

and re-conceptualized according to what
can be measured.

The political

implications of this reduction

disturbing to Habermas.

If

society

is

are no less

understood as evolving via

the mediation of productive activity only, then
emancipation must be

dependent for its realization on progress

unlikelihood of such

a

correlation

present historical situation

-

is

in

that sphere.

clearly demonstrated

The
in

the

outstanding technological achievement

has not been matched by heightened freedoms for the general

population.

In

in

the external

n

the internal

i

fact,

realm

if
is

Habermas

1

analysis proves correct, progress

more likely to be accompanied by restriction

.

Nevertheless, the conviction that human emancipation

52

5 3

ibid

.

ibid.

*5

arrives' with the abolition of private
property has given rise, as

Wellmer points out, to two, equally
objectionable, conceptions of
socialist praxis:

capitalism

is

on one hand, the belief that the
breakdown of

inevitable (because of its own internal
economic

contradictions), can legitimate
is
a

unnecessary.

On the other,

a

position that revolutionary activity
can legitimate

it

political elite can attempt to 'legislate'

situation

a

in

which

socialist state into

a

existence without regard for, or participation by, the
members of
that society.

54

Finally, this same epistemological blind-spot explains, for

Habermas, the faltering nature of twentieth century Marxism's efforts
to understand and confront the con tinually evolving structures of

capitalism.

At

least one of the major distinguishing characteristics

of advanced capitalism, as was argued earlier,

ideological

the increasingly

is

role played by science and technology.

Marxism collapses critique into science,
light on that development; accordingly,

it

it

Insofar as

has no way to shed any

cannot penetrate and

expose the 'rationality' of assimilating society's development to the
logic of scientific-technical

progress; and finally,

has no

it

effective way to understand or protest the progressive de-politicization
of the public in the name of that

'rationality'.

scientifically-legitimated society,

54

a

Before

a

scientifically-formulated

Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation",

1

oc

.

c

i

t

,

pp.

78-79

46

Marxism must remain mute, lest its protest
seem romantic and
'old-fash oned
i

1

.

These sel f-

1

imi t

i

ng tendencies,

immanent in Marxist thought,

can only be transcended, Habermas believes, by
an explicit

reformulation of the notion of the self-constitution of
the human
species, such that

combines both "self-generation through productive

it

activity and sel f-format on through cr
i

That reformulation

i

t

ca -revol ut onary activity".
1

i

cogently articulated

is

i

in

the following quotation:

... While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint
of external nature and the development of the forces of production
determines the extent of technical control over natural forces,
communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of
man's own nature.
The institutional framework determines the extent
of repression by the unreflected "natural" force of social dependence
and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition.
A society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to
labor processes, that is, to the production of technically exploitable
knowledge ... Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature
succeeds to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced
by an organization of social relations that is bound only to
communication free from domination.
This does not occur directly
through productive activity, but rather through the revolutionary
activity of struggling classes. 56

55

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

56

Habermas, op.

ci

t

.

,

p.

53

p.

55
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Comment and Critique

Habermas' analysis of Marxism is,
a

it

generally conceded,

is

brilliant attempt to expose the conceptual flaws

in

that theory

which he believes have severely hampered its
ability to mount an
effective critique of the current functioning of
capitalist societies.
At the same time, however, his theory of
knowledge-constitutive

interests, on which that critique depends,
its own.

57

When

ranging critical

first appeared,

it

not without flaws of

provoked intense and wide-

review, from Marxists and non-Marxists alike.

must be said that,

theoretician:

it

is

in

this regard, Habermas is

gallant

a

he is entirely responsive to critical evaluation,

willing to acknowledge lapses and obscurities

stage of his work,

in

fact,

the major themes which emerged in that critique will

57

response will be explored

in

.

Some of

be detailed here,

subsequent chapters.

See particularly Review Symposium on Habermas
Sc ences
Volume 2, 1972, pp. 193~270
i

The next

took form very much in response to the

reception accorded Knowledge and Human Interests

and Habermas'

is

his argument, and

in

to undertake the appropriate revisions and clarifications.

critical

It

,

Philosoophy of Social

,

The following draws on the articles presented in the Symposium,
particularly that of Fred Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized:
Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests and its Aftermath" pp. 211-229

One major criticism that has
been levelled at Habermas

concerns his failure to deal adequately
with the implications
flowing from his differentiation
between instrumental and

communicative action.

Some reviewers suggest that he
has not

demonstrated the necessity for such
epistemological

a

distinction at an

level, but most recognize the
potential contained

that distinction for a critical

in

analysis of advanced capitalism.

One can indeed appreciate the care with
which Habermas separates

scientific and technological development from
that concerned with

communication and interaction

-

the problem is that the very precision

of that separation might ultimately undercut

its value.

Habermas

insists that his distinction is analytic rather
than functional

relationship;

but he does not go on to explain

manner the functional
spheres of action.

in

a

satisfactory

relationship that does obtain between the two
It

seems that

in

his pre-occupation with

logically separating the two dimensions, he leaves us with just
that
a

separation.

The danger involved here

of a sphere labelled

'productive activity

is

that the careful

1

subject to technical

,

isolation

rules and oriented to expanded control, can portend the tacit

acceptance of

a

thoroughly alienated workplace.

scientific and technological

After all,

rou

t

i

n

i

Taylor.
5 8

zat on
i

,

the

a

rationale has often been used for the

'innovations' which sustain that very alienation:

mechanization,

'scientific management' movement of Frederick

58

See the discussion of Taylorism in Harry Braverman, Labor and
Monopoly Capital:
The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth
Century.
New York:
Monthly Review Press, 97^ pp. 8 5 ~ 5^+
1

,

-

1

•

us

There are two (related) parts
to this critique:

first,

Habermas does not bring the methodology
and principles of modern
science under any kind of critical
purview;
his critique is restricted
to science's overreaching itself,
to its invading the sphere
of

communicative action.

He seems,

in

so doing,

possibility of specific socio-hi storical
This has alarmed social

to eliminate the

influence on those principles.

theorists, particularly those of

a

Marxist

persuasion, who have been arguing for an
internal transformation of

science and technology.
from its very essence,

From their vantage-point, science
projects,
images of domination and control, and
they

urge a revamping of its internal structures
such that

it

could become

more 'humane', more oriented to the demands
of social emancipation.
Herbert Marcuse, one of the major proponents of
such
pictures

it

in

a

transformation,

this way:

... (Science's) hypotheses, without losing their rational
character, would develop in an essentially different experimental
context (that of a pacified world); consequently, science would
arrive at essentially different concepts of nature and establish
essentially different facts. 59

Habermas has,
'new science'.

In

in

fact, expressly rejected this call

for a

explicit response to the above quotation, he has

wr tten
i

59

Quoted in Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
Massachusetts:
Beacon Press, 1970, P- 86.

.

Boston

50

... it is impossible to envisage
how, as lonq as the
organ, zat.on of human nature does
not change and as long therefore
as
h
£ t0 aC
eVe s ® lf ;Preservation through
^'
social labor and with the
aid of means that substitute for
work, we could renounce technology
3
° Ur techn °'° 9y
in fa '' our of a qualitatively
"
°
different one
’

'

Habermas accuses Marcuse, and presumably
others who argue
a

similar fashion, of falling prey to "the
promise, familiar

in

in

Jewish and Protestant mysticism, of the
'resurrection of fallen
61

nature'

The second aspect of this critique, clearly related
to the
first,

is

that,

insofar as Habermas equates

'work' with

'instrumental

activity', he does seem to abandon 'work' to the dominion
of those

scientific and technical principles.

Instrumental activity

concerned with increased control, he argues; given that,
clear how he could develop
in

the name of that

a

it

is

is

not

critique of those tendencies which have,

increased control, allowed for the institution

of such technological efficiencies as Taylorism.

His lack of

reference to actual working conditions, and how they have been

affected by technological

'improvements', strengthens the suspicion

that his analysis could allow for

a

totally mechnized and efficiency-

orientated workplace.

60

6

Habermas, Toward
ibid

.

,

p

.

86

a

Rational Society

,

p.

87

51

The apparent equation of work and
instrumental action raises

another difficulty.

suggests that individuation seems
restricted

It

to the dimension of communication and

interaction.

While few would

deny the current paucity of creative and
fulfilling work opportunities,

many are anxious to explore methods for
their restoration.
in

his zeal

to defend

the

internal

Habermas,

functionong of science and

technology, appears to offer little

in

this regard.

Finally, Habermas' emphasis on expanded control over
nature
as the
it

'end'

of instrumental

seems to imply

activity has been brought under fire

relationship to nature

a

in

which the latter

-

is

regarded merely as an object of manipulation (in one reviewer's
rather graphic terms, "as

whipped"

62

There

).

a

thing,

rarely

is

a

formulation of this relationship;
hostility.

a

bitch to be cajoled, raped, and

sense of engagement

in

Habermas'

rather, he suggests a mutual

He clearly understands the disruptive effects of an

untrammelled exploitation of natural resources, and certainly sees
the responsibility for this belonging to a technology-run-riot;

presumably, he envisions a remedy emerging not only from greater
public involvement and discussion, but also from the feedback generated
in

the scientific process

traditional energy sources

itself (such as the present evaporation of
is

providing).

But as Keane asks

in

discussion of this matter, "Does not the end of this ecological

62

Keane,

1

oc

.

c

1

1

.

,

p.

98

his

52

destruction presuppose the idea of a
natural science which,
very conceptual structure, seeks

nature?

a

in

its

non-repress ve mastery of external
i

The thrust of the question appears
to be that Habermas'

conception of science does not allow for
such an attitude.

A careful

reading of Knowledge and Human Interests
indicates

that the above critique is somewhat
overdrawn;

there

is

a

at the same time,

definite lack of explication of the
relationship between

the various spheres of action he has

suffers for it.

identified, and his analysis

There are certain clues, however, as to how
this

explication would be formulated, and some of the above
fears
assuaged.

For example, at one point in his comparison
of the

spheres of instrumental and communicative action, Habermas
refers to
the former as a "limiting case" of the latter:

... This limiting case has the following distinguishing
features.
Language is separated out of its embeddedness with
interactions and attains monologic closure.
Action is severed from
communication and reduced to the solitary act of the pupos ve-rat ional
utilization of means.
And individualized experience is eliminated in
favor of the repeatable experience of the results of instrumental
action.
In short, the conditions of communicative action do not
apply. 64
i

It

would appear, then, that Habermas understands instrumental

action as rooted

in

the wider framework of communicative action.

b 3

ibid.

6 H

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

193
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With this as a basis, an analysis could be
constructed which would

subordinate decisions about the utilization of science
and technology
to the more comprehensive purposes and objectives
of

the society.

Accordingly, for example, the workplace need not be abandoned
to the
ravages of technology;

the development of non-a

I

i

enated working

conditions could constitute an over-riding concern.

Technological

issues would be encapsulated within a wider-ranging normative frame-

work.

Tiie

and Habermas'

articulation of such

a

failure to attempt

it

many questions unanswered.
action

fundamental

is

revitalize Marxist theory

to

basis for a practical, and
It

seems likely that his work

does allow for a specification of the functional
tiie

two spheres;

no easy matter,

any substantial way leaves

in

to his attempt

critical, knowledge.

a

is

His separation of these two spheres of

and to provide an epistemological

ultimately

relationship

its articulation

is

relationship between

necessary both

in

sustain the thrust of his own critique of Marxism, and

order to
in

order to

elucidate the possibilities of an effective political practice.

A detailed discussion of such

for Habermas' work to have the

issues is obviously necessary

impact that he intends.

He takes up

this project, cultivating the seeds planted in Knowl edge and Human

Interests

explored

,

In

in

his

later investigations

Chapter Three.

-

the results of this work are

5*4

A second major focus
of critica, attention
has been the
category of 'interest'
itself - most reviews.
un e$5 sImp|y
,

approbatory,

»

comment upon its generally
unclear formation.

Much of that lack of
clarity stems from Habermas'
according to the
category what he calls a
'quasi-transcendenta.
status.
with this
characterization, he is trying
to capture the idea
that the
'

interests' are not simply
'anthropological', nor are they
simply
historical'

-

rather they are some
combination of the two.

They
derive from nature, but they
are also totally
reflective of the
social organization by virtue
of which human beings
raise themselves
out of nature.
Knowledge, from this perspective,
does not merely
serve to keep nature at bay;
it also treats of the
quality of that

self-preservation. 66

In

accordance with this

'

quas -t ranscenden ta
i

I
'

standing, the

interests' are not to be understood as
individually or psychologically
based

-

rather,

they are univeral, tied to the
species as a whole;

they are not empirically verifiable

-

they can only be deduced from

the self-formative history of the
species;

they are not

'subjective

elements' which have to be eliminated in
search for 'objective'

knowledge

-

rather,

knowledge possible.

they make the achievement of that
It

becomes easier,

in

'objective'

fact, to identify what the

See, for example, Fred Dallmayr, "Reason and
Emancipat ion:
Notes
on Habermas", Man and Wor
Volume 5» Fall 1972, pp. 79-109.
1

,

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,
pp. 312-313
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'interests' are not

than

,

it

to be clear about what
they are.

is

Habermas says of them,

*•* they can be neither
comprehended like empirical
,.
inclinations or attitudes, nor be
proposed or justified i-i, variable
values in relation to norms of
action
deep-seated anthropological interests'
in the attempt to'cl aHf'y
^he"
^onst.tunon" of the facts about which theoret
cal'
.

.

.

nl

i

This attempt to locate the 'interests'

"depth structures of human experience"
their enigmatic characterization.

history with one concept

is

68

in

what Dallmayr calls

does seem responsible for

The effort to straddle nature and

fraught with difficulty

structures are generally thought of as constant,
such, anathema to the point of view that man

is

-

anthropological

invariant, and, as

historically formed.

Attempting to render an 'invariant' accessible to
historical
transformation only compounds the difficulties.

As Dallmayr points out, Habermas

'both camps' as

it

were

-

and a-h stor ca
i

open to attack from

on one hand, he is accused of being

speculative and metaphysical;
too empirical

is

i

on the other,
69
1

the charge is that he

Such wide-ranging response

.

reflects the obscure nature of the concept, and indicates the

67
68

6 9

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

p.

21

Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Cri ticized" loc.
ibid.

,

p.

213

ci t.

,

p.

212

is
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difficulty involved

generating

in

a

comprehensive critique of

Lenhardt suggests that Habermas,
a

in

it.

his enthusiasm to create

mechanism by which to establish the
validity of the notion of

interaction vis-a-vis work, neglects
to render the notion of
'interest'
70

"fully transparent".

Lobkowicz argues,

a

little more harshly, that

Habermas merely asserts the validity of
the category, and then

marshals various insights to support
function
Place.

if
1

which could only perform that

the validity of the category was accepted
in the first

Whatever the truth of this situation, the concept

— rtai n1y
is

it

ln

is

need of clarification if Habermas'
epistemological

to be sustained.

This

to establish critical

is

thrust

especially important for his attempt

theory as

a

legitimate theoretical endeavour.

As before, Habermas has acknowledged that this
critique of his

category of 'interest' has justification, and has proceeded
to
recon cep tua lize it in the light of these concerns.

The third major criticism to which Knowledge and Human
Interests has been subject centres on Habermas' use of the psychoan-

alytic model as

a

paradigm for

a

critical social science.

The

objections have focused on the implications for political activity,
and have taken one of two forms:

70
71

Lenhardt,

loc

.

c

i

t

,

p.

the use of the model

is

seen as

239

Nickolaus Lobkowicz, "Interest and Objectivity", Ph
Social Sciences, Volume 2, 1972, p. 196.

i

1

osophy of
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either encouraging blind impulsive
militancy, or as defusing
revolutionary activity altogether.

The first objection crystallizes around
Habermas' argument
that

in

interest

the activity of self-reflection, knowledge
coincides with the
in

autonomy and responsibility (or emancipation).

"Self-reflection

is

at once

intuition and emancipation, comprehension

and liberation from dogmatic dependence". 72

postulation of such
theoretical

a

He writes,

Critics suggest that the

convergance collapses two different processes:

reflection on one hand, and decisions about concrete

political activity on the other.

Obfuscation of the difference, they

argue, can legitimize random and dogmatic activism.

73

Habermas,

who had expressed abhorrence over the militant activism of the
student

movement 74

,

has acknowledged the need for a more careful

separation

of these issues, and this concern figures largely in his subsequent

attempts to formulate the relationship between theory and praxis.

The second objection, that Habermas' use of psychoanalysis

actually deflects the thrust of political activity,
focused on his appeal

is

more clearly

to the therapeutic aspects of the model.

Several commentators have objected, for example, that the therapeutic

72

73

74

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized",
See Habermas, Toward a Rational

208.

p.

,

1

oc

.

c

i

.

pp.

Society, Chapters 1-3.

219-220.
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model assumes a shared concern for the
patient's welfare on the part
of both participants in the interaction.
be said to exist

in

Such good will can hardly

the clashes of opposing social groups.

contrary, their mutual conflict

is

entrenched, and not to be

spirited away through conversation and reflection.
class, for example, might willingly engage

other groups

in

On the

in

That the ruling

genuine dialogue with

the society seems preposterous, and

implies

misunderstanding of social and political realities.

total

a

Bu superimposing

the structure and intention of the psychoanalytic dialogue onto

social
i

r

interactions, Habermas runs the risk of transforming

reconci

1

i

abl e conflicts

into a breakdown of communication,

"temporary disruption of mutual comprehension".

a

75

Other commentators have pointed out the potential for

manipulation
for

in

the therapeutic model, and the consequences implied

its use at a social

level.

It

is

necessary only to recall the

caricature of the therapist who, through labelling his patient as
'resistant' can maintain

a

position as 'definer of the situation', to

understand the thrust of this critique.

To

a

certain extent,

it

would seem that much of the alarm

expressed here stems from misunderstanding of Habermas'
not at all

intention.

clear, for example, that he saw the resolution of the

It

is

75

Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized",

loc.

ci t.

,

p.

223

59

class struggle analogously to the
process of 'cure'
Still

in

psychoanalysis.

less it is clear that he intended,
as Floistad perceives it, for

social

scientists (to) act as social therapists".

76

At the same

time, the misunderstanding seems
tied, again, to a lack of
clarity
on Habermas'

part as to the implications for
political activity

contained

his use of psychoanalysis as a
paradigm.

in

In

subsequent essays, particularly the Introduction
to

Th eory and Practice,

77

he proceeds to articulate more clearly,
and

with appropriate qualifications, the usefulness
of psychoanalysis for
developing praxis.

(This

is

elaborated

The Introduction tried to set

a

in

later chapter).

a

framework for Habermas' attempt

to reconsider the relationship between theory and
praxis.

chapter has focused on how that attempt began:

This

the theory of

knowledge-constitutive interests sought to establish an epistemological
foundation for a critical theory which might inform praxis.
clear from the critical
initial

As

is

reviews of Knowledge and Human Interests, that

formulation was not entirely successful.

First,

category of 'interest' was not satisfactorily explicated;

the
his

exposition of the functional relationship of instrumental and

communicative action was deemed inadequate;

76

•

the use of

Guttorn Floistad, "Social Concepts of Action: Notes on Habermas'
Proposal for a Social Theory of Knowledge", Inquiry, Volume 13,
1970,

77

•

and, finally,

p.

180.

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

pp.

1-40
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psychoanalysis as a paradigm for

a

critical social science,
while

certainly provocative, met
with resistance from many
critics.

The

lack of a firm conceptualization
is reflected in the
frequent

misinterpretation of the notion of
an emancipatory interest.
Some
reviewers, for example, have
somewhat arbitrarily decided
that it is
merely an extension of the pract
ca -cogn
I

i

What

IS

missing here

is

i

t

i

ve interest

78

an understanding of the

importance for Habermas' position of
his attempt to secure critical
theory in an epistemological ground.
Knowledge and Human Interests

was

a

valiant attempt to do that

-

it

did not succeed, but much of

the analysis becomes the substructure
of his later investigations.

Themes from this first major publication
will emerge,

if

much

changed, throughout the rest of his work.

78

See, for example, Melvyn Alan Hill, "Jurgen Habermas:
Social
Science of the Mind", Philosophy of Social Sciences, Volume 2.

1972, p.

253-

~

CHAPTER
A COMMUNICATION THEORY OF SOCIETY

As was mentioned

in

the previous chapter, Habermas
has been

thoroughly responsive to the critical

^l terests

reviews of Knowledge and Human

He has n °t> of course, conceded every
point,

-

but he

certainly seems to have recognized the major
weaknesses detected

in

his theory, and has sought to sharpen his
constructs accordingly.

His direct response to critics, articulated most
carefully in
"A Postscript to Knowledge and Human

Interests 11

1
,

presaged

a

reformulation of his theory which both absorbed and transcended
his
original

insights.

In

a

certain sense many of the criticisms

levelled at Knowledge and Human Interests are obviated by his

subsequent work

-

for example,

to that book and so problematic
a

the category of
in

comparatively minor, though still

theoretical

'interest', so central

its conception,

now relegated to

is

influential, position.

Its

burden being reduced, the necessity for its clarification

recedes accordingly.

In

a

very broad sense, Habermas' present theoretical concerns

are best considered as

materialism.

1

a

reformulation of Marx's theory of historical

Viewed through the lense of the distinction between

Jurgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests ",
Philosophy of Social Sciences, Volume 3, 1973, pp.
89
5
1

61

1

62

instrumental and communicative
action, Marx's theory is
transformed
into a theory of social evolution
which, Habermas believes,
avoids
the difficulties he revealed in
that original theory.
It should be
noted at this point that 'evolution'
here is used in the sense of

"cumulative processes which allow

a

direction to be perceived"

2

-

the term does not connote in this
context an historically necessary

progression of events, but rather a logically
necessary one, built
around the dual processes of the
development of productive forces, and
the development of normative patterns
of social

'end-point', if

it

The

can be so characterized, of this logically

necessary evolutionary development
in

interaction.

is a

which theoretical and practical

form of social organization

issues are differentiated, and

rational decisions made, on the basis of reflective
activity, about

both of them.
Interests

,

This recalls

a

quotation from Knowledge and Human

used in Chapter One, and pertinent here:

... The goal is "providing a rational basis for the
precepts
of a civilization":
in other words, an organization of social
relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm
of consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in
communication free from domination. 3

This quote points to the importance of language and

communication

2

in

Habermas'

schema.

The achievement of 'communication

Jurgen Habermas,
"Towards a Reconstruction of Historical
Materialism", Theory and Society Volume II Number 3, 1975,
,

3

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

284.

p-

291.
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free from domination'

(the object of the
'emancipatory interest')

remains a unifying thread in
the transition from
the theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests to a
theory of social evolution,
for
fully rational decisions
can only be made in that
context.
In this
sense, Habermas' communication
theory of society, to be
considered in
this chapter, provides the
lynch-pin for the theory of
social evolution
it demonstrates, he
believes, the historical
possibility of a

rationally constituted social formation.
on the argument that the idea of
reason

That demonstration relies
is

embedded

in

the very

structures which make communication
possible (i.e. the structures of
intersubjectivity).

An investigation of those
structures, Habermas

believes, reveals normative principles
of speech which,

if

made

explicit, contain an image of a social
organization forged around the
traditional

ideas of truth,

freedom and justice (he refers to this
set

of normative principles as a 'communicative
ethic').
of view,

language contains

a

'rational

From this point

imperative'.

...
... make the strong assertion that
the idealizations
contained in the possibility of linguistic communication
itself are
not accidental;
and by no means do they express only a particular
historical form of reason.
Rather, the idea of reason ... is
contained necessarily in the way in which the species of
talking
animals reproduces itself.
Insofar and as long as we perform any
speech acts at all, we are subject to the linguistic imperative
of
what
should like to derive from the situation of possible speech
as
"reason". 4
I

I

4

Jurgen Habermas,
"Towards a Communication Theory of Society: A
Preparatory Conceptual Analysis", Lectures delivered at Princeton
University, 197^+, (unpublished manuscript).

The 'rationality' which

being uncovered here

is

is

a

substantially different rationality,
though equally legitimate,
than
that usually understood, and
reflects Habermas' conviction
that
"practical questions admit of truth".

5

While acknowledging Hume's declaration
of the impossibility
Of

logically deriving prescriptive
statements from descriptive ones,

Habermas does not subscribe, in contrast
to most subsequent
philosophical tradition, to the belief
that moral controversies

cannot be decided on the basis of reason.

Rationality, as we are

accustomed to understanding it, refers to the
process which contains
all

the hallmarks of Habermas'

efficiency, simplicity, etc.

'instrumental action':

a

goal

is

decided upon

i

1

i

ty

The additional conception of

rationality which Habermas offers

which

calculab

-

is

one that refers to

a

process by

this form of rational undertaking can

only occur if individuals engage in public and
unrestricted discussion
of the principles and norms which presently guide
the conduct of their
lives, or which have the potential

It

is

the normative basis for this kind of rationality which

Habermas seeks to lodge

In

5

to do so.

in

the structures of communication.

order to substantiate his somewhat awesome claim, Habermas

Jurgen Habermas,
Legi timation Cri sis
Beacon Press, 1975, p. 111.

.

Boston, Massachusetts:
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attempts to reconstruct the
essentia. ,y intuitive knowledge
which has
been mastered by all competent
speaking and acting subjects.
(The
notion of 'competence'

in

this context refers to a
dual ability

-

the

ability to master the linguistic
rules necessary for the
production of
6
speech acts
and the ability to secure
and maintain the
;

interpersonal context
a

in

which the communication takes
place.)

reconstruction will take the form of
an 'ideal type':

that

Such
is,

it

will presuppose an entirely
linguistic organization of speech
and

interaction, taking no immediate account
of the various ways

communication

is

which

inevitably distorted, either from
within its own

structures, or by external constraints.

motive and action would stand
Not only will

in

in

In

such an organization,

direct correspondence to each other.

this idealized version of an interaction
situation

disclose the normative principles referred
to earlier,

it

will also

enable the perception and conceptualization
of the mechanisms by which

communication becomes distorted.

(One of the criticisms of Habermas'

earlier work was that he provided no satisfactory
explanation of how
this might occur.)

The whole process

implications for praxis hinted at,

in

is

made clearer, and its

this quotation:

See Jurgen Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Praqmatics".
Theory and Society, Volume 3, Number 2, 1976, p.
55
1

.

The speech act is regarded as the elementary unit of speech (rather
than say, a single word).
It represents the smallest (verbal)
utterance sequence which is comprehensible and acceptable to at least
one other competent actor within a communications context.
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This quotation
the fact that

it

1

1

significant at this point

is

in

several ways:

reminiscent of his earlier work gives some

is

indiciation (to be clarified below) of the shift
from the

identification of knowledge-constitutive interests
to the

reconstruction of rules according to which we create
the possibility
of communication;
in a

second, and more specifically,

captures, albeit

complex fashion, Habermas' attempt to clarify and develop
the

notions of reflection and critique introduced
I

it

nterests

In

.

in

Knowledge and Human

the Postscript to that book, Habermas claims that his

original conception of reflection obscured the fact that there are
two

distinct aspects of this term:

on the one hand, there

is

reflection

on the conditions which make language, cognition and action possible
(this takes the form of a rational

and on the other hand, there

7

Quoted
loc.

ci

•

•

reflection on unconsciously produced

Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthropoloqy

in
t

is

reconstruction of generative rules)

.

p.

2^2.
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produced

constants

to which a particular
subject, or group of

subjects, has succumbed, and
which appear

circumstances.
occurs

in a

Reflection

in

in

the form of

this latter sense

-

psychoanalytic interaction, for
example

'objective'

the kind which
-

achieves the
"critical dissolution of
subjectively constituted
pseudo-objectivity".
It was this conception
which informed Habermas'
discussion of the
)

emancipatory interest

in

Knowledge and Human Intor^t-c

This differentiation, captured
in the terms 'reconstruction'
and

'criticism

1

,

further specified:

is

a
Criticism is brought to bear on objects
of experience
whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed,
whereas
reconstructions are based on "objective"
data like sentences
actions, cognitive insights, etc., which
are conscious
creations of the subject from the very
beginning.

Criticism is brought to bear on something
particular concretely speaking, on the particular
self-formative
process of an ego, or group, identity - whereas
reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems
of rules
which can be followed by any subject at all
provided it has
the requisite competences.
b)

Criticism is characterized by its ability to make
unconscious elements conscious in a way which has practical
consequences.
Criticism changes the determinants of false
consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct
know-how,
.e. the intuitive knowledge we acquire when we
possess rule-competence, wi thout involving practical
consequences. 9
c)

i

0

9

Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interest",
loc. cit ., pp. 182-183.
ibid

.

,

p.

183

*
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This rather extended
discussion of reflection
has been

undertaken because

It

Is

basic to the elaboration
of Haber*.,,

commun ca 1 on theory
(Insofar as this theory
I

1

„ an attempt to
reconstruct the generative
rules which make
communication possible
-d thus to derive a 'communicative
ethlC), and consequent ly
ha,’
Important Implications for
the development of
praxis.
For the
critical sciences Identified
In Knowledge and Human
.

on the successful

reconstruction of general rule,
of competence - a,
was suggested above, such
a reconstruction
provides a theoretical
basis Tor identifying and
explaining systematically
distorted
communication.
Moreover, It provides a
standards against which
critique of Ideology can be
developed.
The course of that

a

reconstruction, and of the derivation
of a 'communicative ethic'
based on it, Is abridged In
the following extract from
Thomas
McCarthy; detailed elaboration
or each step In the argument
will
follow

In

the remaining section of the
chapter.

The analysis of speech shows it
..
‘I*
to be oriented toward
ho Idea of truth.
The analysis of 'truth' lead,
to he not on o? a
discursively achieved consensus. The
analysis of 'consensus shows
ths concept to Involve a normative
dimension. The analysls’of the
notion of a grounded consensus ties
it to
speech station wl'lcll Is
rue from all external and
Internal constraints;
that Is, In which
the resulting consensus Is due
simply to the force of the better
argument.
Finally, the analysis of the Ideal
speech situation shows
V ' assumptions about the context of
Interaction in which
,
speech
Is located.
The end result of this chain of
argument Is that
,

,

'™
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the very structure
of speech involves
the anticipation
life in which
of a form of
autonomy and responsibil
ity are possible. 10

1 o

Thomas A. McCarthy.
"A Theory of Communicative
Competence",
n
Paul Connerton (ed.), Critical
S ociology
New York:
Penguin Books
Ltd., 1976, p. J»05.
i

,

The exposition which follows is
drawn argely from Habermas'
lectures on communication theory which
were delivered at Princeton
University in 197
/

4 .

L
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^P eech :

Habermas

'

Lts Orientation

to Truth

attempt to demonstrate
that rationality
inheres

In

the structure of
communication rests on a
specific understanding of
the nature and function
of language.
That understanding runs
something
like this:
man's capacity to express
in symbolic terms
his responses
to the physical and social
environment in which he finds
himself is

fundamental to his continued
existence as a species.

expressions, and the conceptual

These symbolic

interpretations attached to them,

become mediating factors which
structure man's view of the
environment
and provide the basis for
his action with regard to
it.
They are the

medium for the transmission of
cultural tradition, and thus
constitute
the essence of the socialization
process.

Moreover,
the

language provides the basis for the
emergence of

'self', and thus for the development
of

to this position,

becoming an 'object to itself;

it

is

that

is

dependent upon its first

is,

it

must first recognize

internalize the attitudes of others towards
itself.

develops the capacity for 'self-reflection'

and subject.
in

-

it

In

this way,

can be both object

This process takes place through communication

,

for it

that form of behaviour that an individual can
become an object

to h mse
i

According

(most significantly formulated by
George Herbert

Mead), the development of the 'self'

and

individuation.

1

f

Now this focus on the primacy of language

in

the

71

socialization process and,
as part of t-h**
that „
process, the development
of the self, lacks
some appeal.
While we might more
wil,i ngly accept
an individual becomes
'socialized'

^

vja the
Qf
we are rather more
attach ed to the idea that
the 'self' is anr
a
to the activity of
communication.
Habermas' position
(which
represents a symbolic
nterac t ion st point of view,
on the other hand,
that the 'self' can only
be accounted for
i

i

in

communication processes.
depends on language.

terms of

Consciousness, or
.elf-interpretation,

"Language

is

the ground of
intersubjectivity,

and every person must
already have set foot on
it before he can

objectivate himself

in his

first expression of life,
whether in words,

attitudes or actions". 11

There
the

is

a

dialectical

relationship operative here,
between

linguistically structured processes
of socialization and

individuation.

On the one hand,

language

is

the medium in which

meanings are shared, identifications
established, and 'community'
secured.

On the other,

language allows individuals to
maintain

some distance from each other, and
thus to "assert against each
other
the inalienable

1

12

Habermas
ibid.

identity of their egos." 12

Knowledge and Human Interests

,

p.

1

57

72

The communit V that is based

on the ntersubject ve
validUv ;;\
vahdity
of linguistic symbols makes
both possible:
reciprocal
i

i

id entification and p r eservation of the non- idem t-y
Q f one with
another
the dialogu e relation, a dialectical
re
1
h5
genera) and the individual, without
which ego identity cannot be
conce ved
s rea
zed .
Ego dent tv and common ca tlon
n ordtna rv
^
language are complementary concepts.
-

T

L 1

-

,

i

,

,

i

i

i

Language, then,

is

a

co-operative act.

i

arises, says

It

Mead, “out of co-operative activities
such as those involved

parenthood, herding and the like".
individual experience;

it

is

14

is

It

sex

not in any way an

not to be analyzed as

communicating private meanings.

in

a

process of

Again to quote Mead, “We want to

approach language not from the standpoint of inner
meanings to be
expressed, but

in

its

larger context of co-operation

taking place by means of signals and gestures.

within that process".

i

the group

Meaning appears

15

For language to arise,
'

in

then, there has to be an

ntersubject ve constitution of meaning' as Habermas calls

is,

i

it:

that

two or more subjects have to agree on the same meaning for a

particular symbol before communication becomes possible.

Thus,

communication, by its very nature, contains an orientation towards
the achievement of mutual

13
14

ibid.

,

is

157-158

pp.

Quoted in H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of
Pragma t sm
New York:
The Bobbs-Mer r
Company 1968, p. 241
i

1

understanding, an understanding which

ibid.

.

i

1

1

,
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made explicity through the consensus
of the participants.
is

not simply arguing that communication

at mutual

is

a

tool

Habermas

by which we arrive

understanding, but, more basically, that
consensus

already implied

the very notion of communication.

in

is

"Our first

sentence expresses unequivocally the intention
of universal and

unconstrained consensus."

16

By

implication, communication

is

not

just a matter of producing linguistic utterances
about states of

affairs;
of

it

also involves the continual generation and
maintenance

interpersonal situations

understanding,

This

is

is

which intersubjectivity, or mutual

in

made possible.

what Habermas calls the "double structure" of speech;

every speech act consists of

propositional content (the states of

a

affairs about which communication

taking place) and an

is

illocutionary component (which establishes the nature of the
interpersonal

relationship existing between the participants). 17

This "double structure"

is

illustrated by the fact that the same

propositional content can appear with varying illocutionary force:
for example, "I assert that p";
"I

i

promise that p".

A speech act

ntended relationship between

16

17

"I

a

hope that p";
is

"I

command that p";

said to be successful

speaker and

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

,

a

p.

hearer

is

"if the

brought about

31^*

Note the similarity between this and the work of Watzlawick et
See Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin and Don. D. Jackson, The
London:
Faber 1968.
Pragmatics of Human Communication.

a

1

.

1U

if

H

understand and
'a accents
t-ho contents
accepts the
uttered in the
communicative role which is
indicated by S;
f ot
>r example,
as
promise, an assertion, or
10
an order".

a

The intuitive knowledge
(or competence)
mastered by
individual must include, then,
not oniy the ability
to appiy
linguistic rules for the
satisfactory generation of
sentences, but
also the ab.l.ty to
structure the interpersonal
situations in which
ordinary language communication
is possible.
This dual ability is
referred to as the 'communicative
competence' of the subject.

The notion that communication
contains an impulse towards

consensus
is

is

the foundation for a more
specific claim:

oriented to truth.

(Such a claim

is

germane for Habermas'

attempt to demonstrate that
rationality inheres

communication.)

consists

in

that speech

in

the structures of

For the consensus that makes
communication possible

the mutual acceptance, on the
part of interacting

participants, of certain claims to validity
which are attached to all

communicative utterances:

We Can S eak ° f truth here on,
‘:;.
y in the very broad sense
?
Of th
of
the legitimacy or justifiability
of a claim that can be fulfilled
ThUS We Say
for exam Pl e
that an option or assertion
true,
that a ^hope, wishu or guess is correct or
justifiable;
that
a promise or announcement has been
properly made; that advice has
i

’

18

Habermas, "Some Distinctions
p.

156.

,

in

Universal Pragmatics", loc. cit.

•’
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honestly been given;
that a measure has been
properly taken
description properly made. 19

In

everyday interaction, such claims
are usually considered

to have been fulfilled;

someone makes us
if
in

a

if

unless we have evidence to the
contrary,

promise, we assume that s/he intends
to keep

someone expresses
doing so;

a

hope or wish, we assume that s/he

someone asserts that something

assume that s/he actually believes what
s/he
It

is

a

is

is

if

it;

sincere

the case, we

professing to believe

is

only on the basis of such assumptions that
mutual understanding

and communication continues to be possible.

Habermas distinguishes four classes of claims to
validity,

which are built into the structures of all possible
speech:

they

converge, he maintains, "in the single claim to rationality".

20

Assertions and explanations about states of

ljru_th*

affairs or objects

in

the world

imply a claim to truth

example, the statement "Saccharin causes cancer

carries such

a

claim with

the propositional

for

rats"

A truth claim is attached to

it.

content of

in

-

a

speech act:

universal validity claim (i.e., that

it

is

that

it

is

a

built into the

structures of all possible speech) stems from the fact that

19

2 o

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
ibid.

,

Lecture

5,

p.l.

,

Lecture 2,

p.

7-
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every speech act possesses some
propositional content
(whether explicit or implicit).
if the

The claim

not fulfilled

is

state of affairs either asserted
or represented

in an

explanation does not exist as stated.

2.

Le gitimacy

All

.

normative oriented utterances (such as

orders, promises, advice)
a

imply a claim to legitimacy.

speech act to be successful,

accordance with, and

in

normative background

-

it

must be performed

the recognition of,

must be embedded

it

if

in a

socioThus, for

teacher metes out some form of punishment to

a

student who has misbehaved
a

in

particular

a

culturally accepted set of social practices.
example,

For

a

class, s/he does that against

in

normative background which legitimates that interaction.

The illocutionary force of speech acts ensures that this claim
is

universally built into the structures of speech, for

this which establishes the interpersonal

between participants.
fulfilled

if

not accepted

it

relationships

The claim to legitimacy

is

not

the prevailing norm underlying the utterance is
-

for example,

if X

denies that

Y

has a right to

give him an order.

3

•

Vera c ty
i

.

is

All

claim to veracity:

utterances that are intentional
that

is,

a

imply

speaker who expresses some

intention does so with an associated claim that that

a

intention

is
s,

in

1

the trans

rr"

——

fa<-*
tact,

itself in speech'
C"
P

21

1

•

if
t not as
explicitlv
W
C| y»

or a promise

contained

-

meant.

Veracit-v
verac.ty,

f

c*

•

k.

if
if

the speaker

is
5

speech.

b

i

i

]

t

i

v

u„
50

ex Pressed

makinn9 an
mak,n
assertion

isa lso universally

•

in

,
k
the

,

f

the

speaker in the manner

\j
+ u
With
every communicative
utterance
;

•

the speaker combines
the claim thatL
e spec f c situation.
i

example,

a

The
h e claim
cla,m is not fulfi||
ed

which they were
represented.

Comprehen s

ty representing

.

intentions implied did
not exist
«.st
in

says Habermas,

S.m.lar intentions
are

thus t-h^
the cla.m to
veracity

in all

77

This claim

c
it

is

can be
he understood
a
in
not fulfilled,

for

if

speaker and listener
do not have command
of the
same language, or if
language disintegrates,
such as in the
distorted
ngu st c pa t terns
associated with psychosis.
I

i

i

i

The Significance for
our perception of
and relationship
to the
world of these four
claims to validity
emerges insofar as they
a'low us to make
linguistic reference to
certain crucial aspects
of
our social life which
we intuitively recognize "the objectivity of
external nature, the
normative character of
society, the intersubjectivity of language, and
the subjectivity of
internal nature".

«

2 1

22

Habermas,

ibid.

,

p.

"Some Distinctions

161

.

in

Universal Pragmatics", loc,
cit.

.
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Habermas clarifies this

"reality sui generi"

23

and establishes the primacy
of speech as a
in

the following extract:

In speech, there is
consistent references to all four
external nature, society, internal
nature, ^speech
itself.
Thus, we grant objectivity to those
experiences which can
be expressed explicitly as
propositional content
Objectivity Is
ara
r
‘ he
ode in wh !‘ h objectified^,
“:
it^pears
n speech.
spL^h
Truth
u
:
is the claim
we maintain with respect to the
objectivity of experiences. The societal
reality of values and norms
oners '"to speech through the illocutionary
components of speech
acts, as it were, through the performative
attitude of the speaker
while internal nature manifests itself in
speech through the
intentions expressed by the speaker.
We have introduced normativity
and subjectivity to denote the way in
which the domains of a nonobject f ed society and a non-obj ect f ed
internal nature appear.
Legitimacy and veracity are the corresponding
validity claims.
In
this way, the universal structures of speech
not only secure
reference to objectified reality, but also allow
for the normativity
of utterances as well as for the subjectivity
of uttered intentions.
Finally,
use
intersubjectivity" as a term for the commonality
between competent actors which is brought about
through the understanding of identical meanings and the acknowledgement
of universal
claims to validity.
The claim which can be asserted with regard to
intersubjectivity is comprehensibility - this is the validity
claim
which is specific to speech itself. 2 *

...

domains

-

i

i

i

I

2 3

2 4

ibid

.

,

p.

1

6

ibid

.

,

p.

1

60

i
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discourse and the Consensus Theory
of Truth

To re-cap tu ate for a moment,
Habermas wants to claim that
i

1

a

consensus-oriented interaction can be
maintained only under the
assumption that the speaker raises
four val idi ty claims

s

i

mu taneous y
1

1

he claims truth for a proposition

•••

content of the sentences used

in an

utterance

•

"

2 5

i

P

'

Semat C
'

the course of conversation, we
assume that these various

In

claims are being fulfilled.

As was pointed out, however, one
or more

of the claims can be disputed, at which
point, communication breaks

down.

In

that circumstance, various measures are
required if the

underlying consensus

is

to be re-established, and

interaction resumed.

The specific forms of resolution vary according
to the claim

question:

the comprehens b
i

i

1

i

in

ty of a statement can be redeemed

in

the

course of further interaction, designed to sort out, for
example,

differences

in

linguistic usage.

The claim to veracity

is

similarly

redeemed through further interaction, designed this time to ascertain

whether the speaker

is

actually co-operating, or merely pretending to

do so in the interest of some strategic intent.

25

ibid.

,

pp.

159-160.
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It

somewhat more complicated,
however,

is

quest, on are claims to truth
or .legitimacy.

their validity, Habermas
says, requires

The establishment of

form of interaction which
he labels discourse

opinion or the correctness of
the norm.

the claims

shift to a very specific

a

communication, the sole purpose
of which

if

is

,

a

kind of meta-

to judge the truth of
the

While this process seems
not

unreasonable where truth claims are
concerned, the idea that
normative
questions can be rationally determined
sits less easily.

Habermas
argues, however, that we cannot
explain the binding character
of
norms without recourse to the
conviction that consensus on a
particular
norm could be effected "with reasons".
No matter how counterfactual

the activity of discourse may be,
without such recourse we have

no way to account for the "decisive
difference between obeying

concrete commands and following
We behave according to

a

i

ntersubjec t vely recognized norms"
i

27

system of normative co-ordinates as_if
those

norms could be "discursively redeemed"
(i.e. "grounded in consensus of
the participants through argumentation" 28
)

Discourse, then,

reservation

is

2

7

28

a

necessary.

form of communication

in

which

expressed concerning the existence of facts, and
the

appropriateness of norms.

2 6

is

if

Habermas, Legi
ibid.

,

p.

1

ibid.

,

p.

105.

0*4.

t

"Thus,

imat ion Crisis

,

facts are transformed into states

p.

105.
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of affairs which may or
may not be the case, and
norms are transformed
Into recommendations and
warnings which ma be
correct or appropriate
y
but a, so incorrect or
inappropriate". *•
Depending on whether the

discourse

aimed at establishing the
truth of an opinion or
the
acceptance of a norm, Habermas
refers to a 'theoretical'
and a
3
'practical' discourse respectively.
The goal, however, is the
same:

coming to

is

rationally motivated decision
about the particular claim.
Habermas describes this admittedly
"unreal form of communication"
a

thus

... Discourse can be understood a<; t-h^f fn™
1 0"
removed from contexts of explr?en«
aS UreS
'
the bracketed validity claims
of
assertions rrecommendations or warnings
assertions,
are the exclusive object of
discussion;
that participants, themes and
contributions are not
restricted except with reference to the
goal of testing the valid tv
' "° force exce t that of
P
the better argument
IS exercised,
i^exercised^^n^th^
and that, as a result, all motives
except that of the
co-operative search for truth are excluded.
If under these conditions
6
US
anses
then this consensus expresses a
"rational
»

that

is

and'a^nln".:"

'

i

™

,

"

In

existence of

other words, the idea of discourse presupposes
the
a

1

genera

1

i

zab e
1

'

interest, shared by all participants.

Such a supposition does not deny the existence of
particular

interests, but the search

is

aimed at identifying the general

which underlies (or overrides) more individual orientations.

2 9

30

31

Habermas, Theory and Practice
ibid

,

p.

19

.

-

Habermas, Legi timation Crisis, pp.

107-108

interest
This

82

allows a differentiation
between sets of norms
which, in that they
represent particular interests
only, contribute to
the stabilization
of relationships of force,
and sets of norms which
express the genera,
will, a "common nte r es t
ascertained without deception".

”

i

If

n-ust

the notion of

'discourse'

is

to have any credibility,

be developed within the
framework of a

Truth, according to such

a

it

'consensus theory of truth'

position, can only be discursively
decided.

can attribute a predicate to an
object if and only if every
other
person who could enter into discourse
with me also would attribute
"I

the same predicate to the same
object." 33

This
is

is

no minor argument that Habermas
is making here

-

he

explicitly setting himself against several
current theories of

truth which command wide allegiance.

which contains

a

His paper, "Wahrhei tstheor ien",

3 “

detailed explication of his own theory of
truth and

extensive critique of other theories, has not
yet been translated.
Consequently, the following will concentrate on
presenting the rudiments
of his theory,

rather than attempting to situate

it

in

relation to

other such theories.

32

ibid

-

*

P-

108.

“

Truth

3 3

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory

3 4

is

here being used as a paradigm for all validity claims.
,

Lecture

5,

p.

8.

See a discussion of Habermas' theory of truth in Thomas McCarthy,
"A Theory of Communicative Competence", loc. cit.
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to in

The need for a 'consensus
theory of truth' was
first aliuded
the "Postscript to Knowledg
Human interesrc as

e

Aj part
of his effort to clarify
the nature and function
of the know, edge-

constitutive interests, Habermas
now seeks to distinguish
clearly
between a theory of object
constitution and a theory of
truth.

other words, there

is

a

difference, he argues, between
making

a

state-

ment about the objects of our
experience and claiming that
the
statement so made is true.

A theory of object constitution
seeks to explicate the way in

which reality

is

experienced

constitutive interests

is

-

here, the role of the knowledge-

central.

theory suggests that the way

in

As will

be remembered,

this

which we apprehend the world

is

a

function of our relationship to natural
processes (instrumental
perspective) and our relationship to other
human beings

(communicative perspective).
means that the experience

acknowledged
in

-

it

does not

that experience.

is

Objectivity of experience
i

ntersubject vel
i

y

imply that the quality of truth is

35

in

cit.

is

arrived at

which the prevailing

the force of the better argument.

Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human
loc.

inherent

Truth does not derive from the conditions
which

through consensus resulting from discussion
is

this sense

shared and

underlie the objectivity of experience, but rather

influence

in

I

nterests

11
.

84

The objectivity of experience
means that everybody can
count on the success or failure
of certain actions;
the truth of a
proposition stated in di
U S
ea S that ever Vbody can
be persuaded
by reasons to recognize ^h! r M! ?
the truth claims of a
statement as being
justified. 36
.

Aga

in:

Experience supports the truth claim of
assertion s; we hold
° this claim as long as no dissonant
experiences occur,
But this
truth claim can be satisfied only
through argument.
A cl aim founded
in experience is not yet by
any means a justified claim. 3 7

Clearly,

if

truth

is

discursively (and thus rationally)

achieved, there has to be some way to
differentiate
'rational' consensus from a 'false' or

simply a logical

'i

rrat ional

'

'true'

a

one.

or

This

not

is

requirement, but an aesthetic one as well, for

if

such a differentiation cannot be made, the
possibility of an enforced

consensus

is

left entirely open.

his exploration of this, Habermas begins by reducing
the

In

truth condition that was earlier established, viz., the
potential

assent of all others.

only

a

In

the first place,

few persons whose participation one can enlist

pa rticular assertion's claim to validity;

one has

36

ib d
i

3 7

there are,

in

-

second y
1

,

in
in

reality,

judging

the more confidence

the competence of those particular people to make the

P-

170.

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory

,

a

Lecture

5,

p.

7.
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appropriate evaluation, the more
likely
be accepted.
I

me

Hence,

may assert p of x
in

that the judgement will

is

the truth condition now
assumes the form:
if

this assertion".

the meaning of

it

every other competent judge
would agree with
••

'competence'

The prob|em now> of cour$ej
in

to eltib)|ih

this connection.

After considering various options,
Habermas concludes that
this must also be decided discursively.

no independent criterion by which to

d

i

|

st

i

n

other words, there

ngu sh
i

a

t

rue

f

is

rom a false

consensus which would not itself require
discursive justification.

39

... The truth of a statement cannot be
decided without
reference to the competence of those who might
possibly judge, and this
competence cannot be decided without an evaluation of
the veracity of
their expressions and the correctness of their
actions.
The idea of
true consensus requires that the participants
in discourse be able to
distinguish in a reliable manner between being and illusion,
essence
and appearance, and is and ought;
for only on this condition can they
be competent to judge the truth of propositions,
the veracity of
utterances, and the legitimacy of actions. Yet in none of
these three
dimensions can we specify a criterion that would allow an individual
judgement of the competence of possible judges or participants
in
deliberation.
Rather the competence to judge can itself be judged
only on the basis of the very consensus for whose evaluation
criteria
were to be found. 40

Despite this inability to ascertain

judgement, human beings do behave as

3

39

ibid.

,

p

.

ibid., p.

9

1

k.

i

a

reliable criterion of

they can arrive at agreement

86

in the

course of conversation, and
certainly credit themselves
with
the capacity to distinguish
a genuine consensus
from a deceptive one.
Habermas argues that this can
only be explained by
hypothesizing that
in every discourse,
participants presuppose what he
calls an 'ideal
speech situation'.
In other words, they
interact on the assumption
that they are discussing under
conditions which guarantee that
the

consensus they achieve will be a
genuine one.

*'• My thesis is that only
the anticipation of an ideal
..
..
sDeech
situation guarantees that to any consensus
attained in fact we may
attach the claim of rational consensus.
At the same time
this
anticipation is a critical standard with
which every factually
n
US
int0
and examined to
see
sel whether
wh«her it is a " sufficient indicator of "““‘Ion
real agreement. 41

^

r-

In

other words, participants

in

a

discourse operate with the

assumption that agreement can be reached simply
on the basis of the
force of the better argument, and not because
of accidental or
intended constraints on the discussion.

Naturally, such an anticipation

of a communication structure free from constraint
must be a counter-

factual one, but to the extent that Habermas can
successfully demonstate
its

logical

necessity,

it

can exert great pressure as a critical

standard for discussions and decision-making.

argument

is

itself

if,

-

anticipated

4 1

ibid.

,

A major supporting

offered at the level of the univeral properties of speech
in
in

pp.

fact,

the

ideal

speech situation

the activity of discourse,

15-16

it

is

logically

should also be possible

87

to demonstrate that

it

is

theoretically actual izable by
means of the

mastered abilities of speaking
and acting subjects (i.e.,
their
communicative competence).
It should again be noted
that what is
being explicated here is an _ideal_
situation - it disregards, for
the
moment, the question of whether and
to what extent systematic

distortion actually occurs.

88

A

'Communicative

Ft-

hie'

Reference has been made
throughout this chapter
to the notion
0f the
^-w " unicati ve competence of the ideal speaker.
The fol lowing
quotation, in which Habermas
distinguishes his concept
from the more
narrowly conceived
Unguisti^ompete^ of Chomsky's,
„
serve
to summarize what
has been said so far.

«

an appl ca t ion
inWted^y^emp? r^caf^condf
° Kt ons
competence.
On the contra™
i

I

ordinary-language communication
is Uself
competence of the ideal
speech, i.e., the application nf 1*° °principle
'

i

1‘tZ

^

1

1

^l^un ca f on as
of linguistic
0
0 ^" 1
"!
part
plr^cf the 9 eneral
'

j

^

‘

words

a

»

situation

in

i:^'

JirbisHrH-

which

"t*

1

qualifications of speech and symbolic
interaction (ml 6 -u u av [°ur)
which we may call communicative
^
competence
Thu<;
competence means the mastery of an
ideal speech s tuatTon

^

•

\

!

i

competence* ,s Chomsky's name for the
mastery of an
abs
J
°f
based on an innate language apparatus
rana
a?
regardless
of how the latter is in fact used
in actual speech.
'

is competence is a monologic
capability;
it is founded in the
spec es-spec f c equipment of the solitary
human organism ...
consider this model to be monological
because it consistently
attributes the inter-subjectivity of meaning that is, the mutual
sharing of identical meanings - to the
fact that sender and receiver
each an entity for itself - are previously
equipped with the same
program.
i

i

i

I

Jurgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative
Competence", in
Peter Dreitze1
Recent Sociology Number 2, New York: Macmillan
’

19/0, p.

*+

3

ibid

131

138

.

.
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These "basic qualifications
of speech and
symbolic
interaction" correspond to
"general structures which
appear in every
possible speech situation,
which are themselves
produced throuqh the
performance of specific types
of linguistic expressions,
and which
serve to situate pragmatically
the expressions generated
by the

linguistically competent speaker". '*
of linguistic expressions
as

Habermas refers to this set

'pragmatic universals', and

it

is

through their analysis that he
proposes to reveal the normative
principles that are embedded in
the structures of communication.

Habermas has identified five classes
of pragmatic universals
which, taken together, represent

a

speaker's communicative

competence

Personal Pronouns

'•

(and the

of which we can bring about

They provide

a

way for

a

i

r

der vat ves) wi th the a
i

interpersonal

i

i

relationships.

subject to identify him/herself

in

relation to an Other.

2

Forms of Address

.

and of introduction (such as offering

greetings) which indicate the structure of the roles
assumed
by speakers, hearers, and potential

too,

4 4

help to establish interpersonal

participants.
relationships.

McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence",
P-

*472.

These,

loc.

cit

”
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D eictic

Expressions

(expressions of place and time,

articles, demonstratives, etc.) which
provide

a

way to

identify the objects in the world
about which we wish to

converse.

"In each language, mechanisms are
available

which allow us to classify, serialize,
localize, and
temporal

i

ze the objects of possible experience." 45

Performat ve Verbs

(such as assert, promise, order,

j

etc.) which determine the sense of the
utterance (insofar as
it

is

to be understood as an assertion, a
promise, and so on),

the relationship of the speaker to it, and
the relationship

obtaining between speaker and hearer.

N on-Performative

I

ntentiona

l

Verbs

(such as wish, want,

feel, etc.) which reflect the intentions, attitudes, and

experience of the speaker, and thus function as

a

representation of subjectivity.

A complete theory of communicative competence would require

careful examination of the five different classes of expressions.
So far, however, Habermas has concentrated his attention on the

per forma t ves
i

,

and this,

for several

reasons:

|»

Habermas, "Some Distinctions
p

.

1

61

in

Universal Pragmatics," loc

.

c

i

t

,

91

-

First, they are involved,

implicitly or explicitly,

in

every speech act (through
the illocutionary
force of
utterances), so they can be used
to classify speech
acts
genera

in

1

Second, this choice reflects
his commitment to the
belief
that the ability to structure
situations of intersubjectivity

fundamental

is
-

to communication.

Finally, this class of speech
acts

determinations involved
nature, society,

in

internal

validity claims of truth,

comprehensibility; and
a

fale consensus

-

all

(3)

(1)

is

seminal

to making the

the domains of external

nature, and language;

(2)

the

legitimacy, veracity, and
the distinguishing of a true from

three of these intersect in the

situation of discourse.

The classification of performative verbs
proceeds as follows:

Constat ives

(such as state, assert, describe, explain)

which express the meaning of the cognitive employment of
sentences.

Regu a t ves
1

i

These speech acts imply

a

claim to truth.

(such as order, demand,

forbid, propose,

oppose) which express the meaning of the pragmatic employment
of sentences.

They refer to the normative infrastructure

which the communication takes place, and thus imply
to

1

eg

i

t

i

macy

a

claim

in

92

B£EreSentatlVe5

'

s

-h

believe, hope, fear, disclose,

betray, pretend) which are used
with propositional contents

containing intentional verbs (e.g.

like, wish, want)

to

explicate the meaning of the
self-representation of the
speaker to the hearer.

These speech acts imply

claim to

a

verac ty
i

Co mmunicatives

(such as say, express, ask, mention)

which serve to express the pragmatic
meaning of speech as
such.

They explicate "the meaning of utterances
qua
6

utterances".

comprehens

It

fundamental
internal

i

bi

1

i

As such,
ty

was stated earl ier that this class of speech acts
to distinguishing the domains of external

nature, and language.

certain degree of 'giveness'
subjectivity,

-

one

in

1

a

ies

in

as objectivity,

intersubjectivity.

nature, society,

is

a

a

normativity,

As Habermas points out,

the

validity claim attached to each

the fact that we can thereby set our experience of each

different perspective

-

a

perspective which includes the

possibility of the negation of the form
domains present themselves.

46

is

We experience these domains with

importance of grasping that there

domain

they imply a claim to

In

in

which those different

other words, we are now able to

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory

,

Lecture 4,

p.

27.

93

consider the possibiiity
that what we think
turn out to be illusion;

Rework

normat
in

fact,

is

true can,

fact,

that although we behave
according to a

which we consider iegiti
m ate, that legitimacy
may,

rest upon coercion or
mystification (i.e.,

verified

in

it

would not be

in the

process of discourse); and,
finally, that even though
a speaker appears to
represent his true intentions
or attitudes, he
">ay,

in

fact, be consciously misleading
his

suffering

from self-deception.

distinctions

-

* 7

The abi

listeners, or be
I

ty to make such

i

between being and illusion,
between

between essence and appearance

-

is

essential

is

and ought, and

to successful

communication, and absolutely fundamental
to engaging

in

discourse.

The employment of constat ves makes
possible this
i

distinction between being and illusion

-

such speech acts separate a

public world of intersubjectively
acknowledged interpretations from
private one of personal opinions and
impressions.

a

The employment of

regu at ves allows for a distinction
between the seeming and the
I

actual

i

validity of the normative background against
which people behave

towards each other.
a

It

particular social order)

merely parades as such.
a

enables judgement as to whether what
is

grounded

in

(e.g.,

general approbation, or

The employment of representatives allows for

distinction between the "completely individuated being" and
the

"linguistic utterances, expressions and actions

4 7

is

Habermas, "Some Distinctions

in

in

which the subject

Universal Pragmatics" loc. cit.,

'

p.

164.

9*4

ppears, and that
That

is,

in

turn can become the
object of propositions". 48

representative speech acts
allow for

a

Hicf
st net
i

i

ion between

essence and appearance.

^

Final ly, these three
distinctions,

^

poss.ble the central
distinction between a
rational (tree) and an
irrational (false) consensus.
The distinction, in
turn,

reflects on
of speech itself, which
is expressed by
means of the last
class of speech acts, the
commun cat ves
the mean

i

At this point,

situation

is

it

is

is

.

possible to specify how
an idea, speech

possible by virtue of the
speech acts that every

competent speaker can perform.
of an ideal

i

It

will be recalled that
the design

speech situation requires that
the communication structure

free from internal constraint
(it must also, of course,
be free from

the coercive pressure of
external

bracketed for the moment).

carefully,

f or

it

is

influences, but this

is

being

This will be worked through
fairly

here that Habermas identifies
the normative

principles he perceives as embedded

in

the structure of communication.

He begins this way:

hOU,
Uke t0 demonstrate that the communication
struct,,
r/;;tself
\f produces
!J
structure
no constraints if and only

if there is a
symmetrical distribution of the opportunities
for all possible
participants to choose and perform speech
acts.
For then
there is
not only universal interchangeability
of dialogue roles, but also
48

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory

.

Lecture

4

,

p.

30.

95

effective equality of opportunities
to take these rolesc
that
^
Lneti
s
perform sopprh
ir-%ii
opportunity to employ commun caU ves!
that* s" ^bring about^
.

i

•

'

ii

>

.

^

^^
to

i

rcS

constatives (and the group of reguiatives
and warnings) - that is, if there
is an equal distribution
opportunities to make interpretations,
assertions, explanations and
justifications, and establish or refute
their claims to validity - then
t
is possible to create a basis
on which no prejudice or unexamined
opinion can permanently be kept from
examination and critique 4""9

™
IT^o^n^ions

These two requirements guarantee unlimited
discussion

-

but

according to Habermas, an ideal speech situation
also requires that
that discussion be free from domination.

In

other words, we have to

assume, and need some way to ensure, that speakers
deceive neither

themselves nor their listeners.
that the ideal

of action

As Habermas points out,

this means

speech situation reciprocally requires characteristics

"The freeing of discourse from coercive structures of

:

action and interaction, which
situation,

is

required for the ideal speech

obviously conceivable only under conditions of pure

is

communicative action."

50

Thus, participants in discourse are required to have the

same opportunity to employ representative speech acts,

interpret and express their needs,
as possible

so

to

intentions, feelings, as clearly

(including the translation of non-verbal expressions into

linguistic forms).

49

i.e.,

ibid.

,

Lecture

ibid.

,

p

.

1

8

This 'unimpaired self-representation'

5,

PP-

1

7~

1

implies

96

characteristic:

a- g

participants.

reciprocity of behavioral
expectations
Privilege. in the
sense that son* nor

solect.vely expected
or applied,
use of

relative

m s are

is

excluded.

speech acts secures
this

tquai
Equal opportunity
oon r

requires

-

in

that

is

ab.l.ty to allow and
forbid, to „ake and
extract promises, to
account for one's conduct,
and demand that
others do the sa me
.

Taken together, these
"counterfactual conditions
of the
ihea. speech situationcontain the mag e of an
idea, for. of life.
These are the nor„,ative
principles to which Habensas'
entire analysis
has been tending.
i

1

.

In the case of
unrestrained discussion (in
u
prejudiced opinion cannot be
taken up or criticized)
possible to develop strategies
for reachinq^
unconstrained consensus;
,

:

it1

’

On the basis of mutuality
of unimpaired selfrepresentafon ( wh c h includes
the acknowledgement of
the
self-representation of the other ns woin
•:
6
to achieve a significant
rapport despite Jhl inviolable'
stance between the partners,
and that means
communication under conditions of
individuation.
i

•

.

i

In the case of full
complementarity of expectations
(which excludes unilaterally
constraining norms)
the
c aim o
universal understanding exists,
as wel *as the
necessity of universalized norms.
1

,

These three symmetries represent,
nc denta
a
ngu st
y
conceptualization of what are traditionally
known as the ideas of
truth, freedom and justice. 52
i

51

52

ibid

-

,

P*

i

I

1

1

i

i

ic

19.

Habermas, " Toward a Theory of Communicative
Competence"
PP. H3-1W (emphasis added).

loc

c

i

t

,

97

Thus, the ideal speech
situation finally intersects
with an
ideal action situation
(the concept of 'pure
co^unicative action').
The consensus theory of truth
is matched by a
consensus theory of
legitimate action:
"each theory presupposes the
other". 51

Just as we assume that the validity
claims attached to

speech are being fulfilled, so we
assume, unless there

is

evidence to

the contrary, that a person with
whom we interact is cognizant of,
and accountable for, his actions.

We assume that

if

pressed, s/he

could explain why s/he took a certain
course of action rather
another.

Habermas develops this assumption further,
by distinguishing

two (again counterf actua

1

1

)

expectations:

The expectation of intentional ty

*

than

i

person will comply with

a

We expect that

.

certain set of norms

intentional and conscious fashion.
that that expectation

is

If

unfounded, and

attribute unconscious motives to

a

in

a

an

circumstances suggest
if

we then begin to

person's behaviour, then

we have left the "level of intersubjectivity"

treating the other person as an object.

54

and are

At this juncture,

communication has been interrupted (it may, of course, shift
to meta-communication, or

53

54

it

may break off altogether).

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
ibid

.

,

p.

22.

,

Lecture, 5, p. 20.

98

2

.

We expect that

a person
will comply with only
those norms that s/he
considers

Justified;

furthermore, we assume
that that person
would
feel capable of
discursively justifying
that norm if it became necessary.

These two expectations,
then, refer to a
consensus that is
(ideally) attainable in a
pj^cUcal discourse.
"The meaning of the
claim to validity of norms
of action consists ...
in the promise that
the factual behaviour of
subjects can be shown to be
the responsible
action of accountable subjects." 55
cor re at ve y we can
Correlafiv.lv
assume
i

i

1

that

if,

in a

situation of discourse,

ourselves or others, that,

in

was demonstrated, either
to

it

following

,

a

particular norm, we were

not meeting the two stated
conditions, then we would abandon
that
norm, and change our behaviour

appropriately.

Habermas

is

communicative action
it

of

55

were real.

...

adamant that, even though this
model of pure
is

counterfactual

,

we cannot avoid behaving as

on this unavoidable fiction
rests the humanity

intercourse among men who are still men."

ibid

-

Quoted
Leg

i

t

56

P-

23.

in

Thomas McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction" to
Habermas

imat ion Crisis,

p.

xv.

if
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Ideology as Distorted Communir^
on
i

So far, the discussion of
discourse has proceeded by
way of
its
is

idealization;

the careful delineation of
such an idealized form

necessary, since its anticipation
provides the ground for

judgement as to whether or not the
consensus arrived at in discourse
IS genuine.
Little reflection is required,
however, to realize that
that idealized version is, as
Habermas describes it, counterfactua

Communication
a

is

not a disembodied activity:

it

I

takes place within

matrix of concrete psychological,
social and political structures

which impinge upon

it

to varying degrees.

In

the present historical

situation, the possibilities of achieving
the kind of mutual

understanding or intersubjectivity to which
Habermas has been
referring are increasingly pre-empted;

we are confronted, instead,

either with situations of enforced consensus,
or with the insistence
that consensus is simply unattainable on an
ever-growing number of
issues.

According to Habermas, technological rationality
reigns

supreme;

communicative rationality

is

suppressed.

to communicate according to the potential

indicated in our

communicative structures takes on, as Shapiro puts
nature";

57

Our inability

it,

a

"second

we accept without question increasingly deformed systems

of communication.

5 7

Jeremy Shapiro.
"Reply to Miller's Review of Legitimation Crisis",
Telos, Number 27, Spring 1976, p. 173.

100

This analysis leads directly
to the question of
ideology,
for the iatter is defined,
from Habermas’ perspective,
as a set of

normative beliefs which are
adhered to, even though
subjecting them
to discourse would demonstrate
that they were neither
legitimate nor
desirable.
Yet his analysis
to this point has

implied that

normative structures prevail only
so long as they are
considered
legitimate.
So the process by which
patently unjust and irrational

assumptions come to hold sway over our
everyday reality, and indeed
function to stabilize existing relations
of power and domination, is
a

phenomenon which requires explanation.

Habermas

is

in a

powerful

position to do just this, and

here, as Wellmer points out, that the
superiority of his theory of

is

communicative competence over other linguistic
philosophies
evident.

58

Because

it

it

enables

a

the self-interpretation offered by a society and
its

members;

it

transcendence of
individual

theoretically preserves the possibility that individuals

deceive themselves about their social
and

is

treats of the immanent relationship which

every society has to the idea of truth,

intention of their behavior.

remain attached to the se

1

f

relations and about the meaning

Other linguistic philosophies

-presentat on
i

:

they have no recourse other

than to what people actually say about themselves.

58

it

Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation",

loc.

In

cit.

so doing,

101

Habermas argues, they make the
inadmissable assumption that
"the
linguistic organization of social
interaction has attained a
state
of

'perfection".

59

By contrast, Habermas'

theory provides an inherent
communic-

ative ethic, compared to which, the
structure of social
only ever fallen short.

relations has

He articulates a perspective
which can

identify and probe the inconsistencies
between verbal expressions,
non-verbal expressions, and actions;

which can pinpoint

a

systematic

inhibition of communication, whereby specific
areas of concern are

excluded from public discussion;

and which can expose as false or

enforced, an apparent consensus about societal
beliefs, values and
norms.
of

On this basis, Habermas can develop an
impressive critique

ideology and false consciousness.

As mentioned several

times

in

the first chapter, Habermas

understands advanced capitalism as entailing the collapse of
the
practical

into the technical:

science and technology assume the

predominant ideological force.

The management of

and multi-faceted economic and social

according to the imperatives of

a

system which

a

59

Quoted

level,

in

operating

is

capitalist dynamic requires the

suppression of moral and practical questions, and on
political

highly complex

a

more explicitly

the downplaying of a genuine democratic process.

Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation", loc. cit.,

p.

92.

102

social

issues are more easily
contained and controlled
by rethem 'technical' issues,
for which technical
solutions,

label

designed by 'experts', must
be found;

the public, offered
the

compensations of increasing prosperity,
mobility, income security,
and a variety of educational,
social and medical benefits
for certain
sectors, is steadily de-pol t
ic zed
- people
'

function.

i

'

lose their political

i

Except for occasional participation

processes, public input into
decision-making
This shift must be made plausible
there has to be

a

-

in

electoral

deemed irrelevant.

is

compensations certainly help, but

more strongly legitimating world-view
to which

'rational' appeal can be made,

if

popular loyalty

is

to be maintained.

Historically, such legitimation has come
from the institutional frame-

work of the society, from traditions and
values which have provided
personal, social, and political meaning
to activity.

The present

historical circumstances, however, cannot
wait on the slow,
inexorable, march of such traditions;
itself

in

its present

it

must,

if

it

is

form, create its own legitimation.

this out of science and technology;

if

to maintain
It

does

systems theory, with its

specification of points of intervention, prediction of
consequences,
and so forth,

is

representative of the new ideology.

It is the singular achievement of this ideology to
detach
society's self-understanding from the frame of reference of
communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction and
replace it with a scientific model.
Accordingly, the culturally
defined self-understanding of a social life-world is replaced by the
self-reification of men under categories of purposive-rational action
and adaptive behaviour. 60

Habermas, Toward

a

Rational

Society

,

pp.

105-106.

103

Where once the institutional

framework contained and

fashioned scientific and
technological developments,
the relationship
is now reserved.
Moral and practical
action bends to the
winds of
techno ogy
1

It

is

the function of

ueo ogy
ideoloav

,

than to maintain
then
popular

loyalty to the prevailing
social order and Its
self-presentation.
To achieve that, it must
both withhold substantial
numbers of
normative issues from pub,
ic discussion, and, at
the same time,
justify that withholding.
This analysis of ideology
involves a
certain de-emphasis of content;
Habermas argues that content
alone
cannot explain the binding
force of ideology, nor its
immunity from
public consideration and debate.
Rather its force is independent
of
its

semantic content:

ideology has

communication that are located
itself".

in

its

roots

in

"obstacles" to

the structure of communication

Habermas explains further:

The validity of these (ideological)
world views is
8 C
n '“ tion structure that
excludes discursive willformation"
Earners to communication which make a
fiction
precT seW Tf'tuJ
precisely
of the reciprocal imputation of
accountability, support at
the same time the belief in legitimacy
that sustains the fiction and
prevents its being found out. That is
the paradoxical achievement of
ideologies, whose individual prototype
is the neurotic disturbance 62

™™

Such barriers to communication function
to suppress the

discovery and articulation of

'

genera

1

i

zab e interests', and
1

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
Lecture 6,
Quoted in McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction",
,

62

l

oc

.

p.

cit.

it

is

here

19.
p.

xv.

10*4

that a critique of

ideology finds Its
mark.

principles revealed

in

the

using
Usinq the
th
normative

strum.
r«c ofr
tructures
communication

(the

'communicative

baseline, critica, theory
can generates
comparison with the normative
P r,nc,p,es operative
at the present
time.
Such an investigation
would be yguided
iaea, Habprm
Habermas suggests, by
the question,

... How would the membpr<; r»f =
s V stem
stage in the development
at a given
of productivp fn ^ C S
3Ve co ’' ect ively and
bindingly interpreted their
needs (inH hh,chL norms
accepted as Justified) If
they have
2
^
deC ded
organization of social Intercourse
thro"
U9
s urslve wi
with adequate knowledge of
-forma t ion
the limitin 9 Cond,t f'°"
s ^nd functional
imperatives of their soctety?
i

.

’

1

^

!

'

1

”

Through reconstructing the
progressive deformation of
pure
intersubjectivity and corresponding
suppression of discussion and
dialogue, critical theory can
expose the false base on which
the
legitimacy of the social order
rests.

advocacy role
in

It

is

here,

in

this

that Habermas is describing
that the 'interest'

emancipation most conspicuously
reasserts itself.

stimulated by the gap between what

is

posited for us

|

in

t

is

our

communication structures, and the form
which our communication and
action takes at the present time.
Critical theory can create an
awareness of the difference between
formal and substantive democracy.

(j

3

64

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,
ibid

.

p.

117.

p.

113.

105

Comment and Critiq ue

Consideration of the viability of the
communication theory of
society, both in terms of its status as
and

in

overall

terms of the theoretical

burden

scheme will be undertaken, via

for education,

in

a
it

a

basis for political action

must bear in Habermas'

discussion of its

the later chapters of the dissertation.

implications
Before

proceeding, however, to the last major theoretical
element of
Habermas' work (his theory of social evolution,
which incorporates
and extends the theory presently under discussion),
some clarification

and comment, preparatory to the final assessment,
seems desirable.

This

is

especially so because of some rather consistent

misinterpretations on the part of reviewers of particular aspects of
the communication theory.

It

is

true, at the same time, that such

misinterpretation reflects genuine ambiguities and problems
theory,
will

in

the

while these will be indicated here, more extensive discussion

await the final chapters.

Habermas' understanding and use of language, and his attempt
to formalise the

'normative imperative' contained within it,

highly complex, and draws on

a

points of linguistic theory.

considerable acquaintance with the fine
Consequently,

a

complete appreciation

and evaluation of that attempt could only be undertaken with

secure grounding

in

attempted, at least

that tradition.
in

English;

is

Such an appraisal

a

has yet to be

reviews have so far been more global,

106

focussing on the larger
concepts, such as discourse,
employed in the
theory.
The foil owing remarks are
in keeping with
that focus.

It
in

is

important to recall at the
outset that Habermas' aim

this theory is to reconstruct
the conditions which make
language,

cognition, and action possible.

As such,

necessary practical consequences,
and

is

the theory has no

certainly not intended as

stands to offer specific directives
for political action.
does offer

is

a

baseline,

a

what

it

it

standard against which to consider
the

nature and activity of communication,
both historically and

contemporaneously:

it

the lacuna revealed between
what- s-poss bl

is

i

i

and what-exists-now which provides
the impetus for political action.
The failure of several
theory

is

reviewers to grasp that Habermas'
communication

not intended as a political

misdirected critiques of his work.
criticisms, for example,

social

and political

has prompted several

One of the more common

that Habermas has, once again,

is

he was charged with doing

program

in

Knowledge and Human Interests

conflicts to the level of

a

breakdown

(i.e.
)

as

reduced
in

commun cat ion
i

Such

argument

is

a

that

critique rests on the assumption that Habermas'
if

we all

began

'communicating correctly', social

and political domination would disappear.

simplistic, sense, this

is

true;

if

it

In

a

certain, very

were poss ible to achieve

social organization which guaranteed to every individual

both the

a

107

ability and opportunity to speak,
to express opinions and
needs, to
question, and to demand accountability
and responsibility from
others,

it

does seem likely that a genuine,

would be operative

in

the society.

if

cumbersome, democracy

But Habermas is certainly
not

suggesting that social transformation

is

effected through sorting

out the mechanics of correct
conversation. 65

The confusion emanating from the
mistaken assumption that
the communication theory is

intended to represent a political

programme can be clarified by reconsidering
what prompted the theory
in

the first place, and principally, Habermas'
motivation for

attempting to separate the realms of communicative
action and
discourse.

It

took form as an explicit response to objections

raised about his theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests.

In

any essay which articulated the shift from his earlier
theoretical

formulations, he wrote the following:

... In the investigations up to this point,
have brought
out the interrelationship between knowledge and interest without
making clear the critical threshhold between communication (which
remains embedded within the context of action) and discourses (which
transcend the compulsions of action). 66
I

He wants to make it clear,

65

b6

then,

that while knowledge

See James Miller, "Review of Legitimation Crisis", Telos, Number
25, Fall 1975, pp. 210-220.

Habermas, Theory and Practice,

p.

19-

108

maintains some relationship to action,

it

is

not on the

level

of a

"direct derivation from the imperatives
posed by the praxis of life". 67

Obviously, the opinions and norms which
become the subject of

discursive interaction do arise from various
forms of experience
and action: and, similarly, the knowledge
which emerges for discourse
has specific contexts of application,
again related to the realm of

experience and action:

... statements about the phenomenal domain
of things and
events (or the deep structures which manifest
themselves in terms of
things and events) can only be translated back into
orientations for
goa -d rected rational action (in technologies and
strategies);
statements about the phenomenal domain of persons and
utterances (or
about the deep structures of social systems) can only
be translated
back into orientations for communicative action (in
practical
knowledge). 68
1

i

While

it

is

evident, then, that there

between action and discourse (and,

is

incidentally,

a

it

strong connection
the

is

knowledge-constitutive interests which provide the unifying links),
that connection does not "remove or resolve ...

the differences between

opinions about objects based on experience related to action on the
one hand, and statements and facts, founded on discourse that
of experience and unemcumbered by action on the other".

The differentiation explicitly responds to

60

6 9

ibid.

ibid

.

pp.

20-21

a

is

free

69

major critique

109

of

arid

Hum^n—[_nt^rest£, namely,
that this

formation

has

collapsed the differences
between theoretical reflection
and
decisions about action.
The former (i.e., theoretical
reflection),
requires a "relentless discursive
validation of claims to validity" 7 “
(and corresponding dissolution
of opinions and norms
which are shown,
again discursively, to be
unjustified);
through such a process,
'truth'

established.

is

The latter (i.e. decisions
about action)

requires "the risk of taking sides,
and thus, precisely, the

relinquishment of the neutral

”

role of a participant in
discourse".

This sharp demarcation of the domains
of action and

discourse has elicited critical comment
from
It

is

difficult, so the argument goes,

a

number of reviewers.

to conceive of an

interaction situation which, as Habermas
would have it,
of experience and unemcumbered by action".

conceptually difficult to grasp, but

it

Not only is this

suggests an intense

formalism, unappealing to more aesthetic
sensibilities.
at

logic

-

precise, ruthless

in

"free

is

its progression,

It

and quite removed

from the concerns, motives, and emotions of ordinary
people.

reminiscent,

in

in

that

respect,

replicate the very divisions he sought to transcend.

7 1

'bid

.

ibid.

,

p.

15.

It

is

fact, of the scientific rationality which Habermas

set out to expose in the first place:

70

hints

it

appears to

He has been so criticized.

Hirschberg.

|„ his discussion
of discourse aimed at establishing
the legitimacy of norms,
writes
that the conceptualization of
such a form of interaction
implies

an dd SOrt ° r col,ec tive
existential declsionism ts
?
throughu’’a rational
discussion in discourse it were
posslble’to
3
03
W h the paSt a " d aH its
^anlngs, and all
needs
‘J
tS
° tC
Sha P ed the P r «tlces of the
past ... But
Bu^do
r?r
t
does
it make
any sense to suanesr that
be made about the way in which
needs, wants, and desires are
to™
expressed and fulfilled In the future which
Is not affected by
and
subject to, my wants, needs, and desires. 72
If
if

fin

’

’

'

'

^

•

.

'

Hirschberg goes on to argue that

"* t 1e eson that Habermas (has) excluded wants, desires
interests, from discourse is that he accepts
the positivist
understanding of these concepts;
that is, that wants, needs, and
desires are blind, irrational, that they spring
from the ever
inconstant and inscrutable emotions, that they do
not listen
so to
speak, to reasons. 73
^

["

,

It

the

is

greatly overstated, however, to say that Habermas denies

impact of the needs, wants, and desires of participants
in

discourse.

He explicitly writes

Distinctions

in

involved

72

in

an article entitled "Some

Universal Pragmatics" that the restrictive condition

is

Larry Hirschberg,
"Some Criticisms of Jurgen Habermas'
Cognitivist Linguistic Ethics", unpublished paper, p. 11.

that the actual process
of experience (including
the
communicative experiences
m the performance of speech
is considered irrelevant
acts)
and that experimental
and^tha?
contents may be
brought into "discourse" from
outs.de, but may not be
74
generated within
it.

Moreover,

in

his discussion of the
development of ego

identity, he is adamant that
internal experience and its
expression
are fundamental:
"ego- ident ty demands not only
the cognitive mastery
of general communication levels,
but also the ability to
bring one's
needs to the fore in this communication
structure". 75
i

It

is

not at all

clear then that he considers such
needs, or

the emotions attached to them, blind
or

irrational.

He ^s suggesting

that the conditions of discourse require
participants to examine the

extent to which their privately experienced
needs, wants or desires
are

'

genera

1

i

zabl e

of this process

(or universal),

'

rather than particularistic;

involves examining the ways

in

part

which those experiences

are distorted, whether as a result of unconscious
influences, or

because of more specifically cultural pressures such
as derive from
norms of privilege.

discourse

-

These issues can, Habermas argues, be tested

participants are not asked to abandon emotion and

motivation, but rather to engage
their "subjective desires
74

7 5

in

a

process of transferring

into general izabl e desires".

Habermas, "Some Distinctions
p.

in

Universal

76

Pragmatics"

loc

cit

165.

Jurgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", Telos,
Number 2*4, Summer 1975, p.
.

76

Habermas,

in

Leg

i

t

i

mat ion Crisis

,

p.

109.
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e,n ° nly occuf

through th. m . dlum of
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I

anguage

f
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uruetures
llngulitlc

p»yehic P
Into

h

r
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of

in

r °\r«l!od-•««•
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ri

f

°d

Intor.ibjoct Wl ty
l”ii
Into Intentional contenll ?„ Ce ? * re
?!
rnn®.
coiHltlon Into statements, needs and
failings Into normative
expectations (precepts and values).
Thiss tran»fni«m
transformation produces
the a sst net
nr Ion,
on
r _i,
rich
In consequence, between
the subject vl tv «,l
opinion, wanting, pleasure and pain,
on the one hand and th!
utterances and norms that appear with a
claim to generalit y 0 n the
other.
Generality means objectivity of
Knowledge and f^iftlmacv of
valid norms.
Both Insure the community or shared
meaning that is
constitutive for the soclo-cul tural
life-world. 77
’

i

(1

1
I

l

i

l

I

i

i

i

I

What seems missing

In

this transformation, and

that HI rschberq's critique exerts
some pressure,
the emotion attached to private
experience.

consideration

community,

of

here

the quality of

Is

There seems little

anger,

Indignation, sorrow, excitement;

the particular and the universal, of

Is

It

Is

Habermas' discussion of the concept of discourse
for

In

the expression ol

Intersection

It

through the grid.

the quality of
At

the

Individual and

Internal experience which slips

the same time, Habermas

with the retention and expression of Individual
wider framework of community:

in

Is

clearly concerned

Identity within the

"An autonomy which robs the ego of

a

communicative access to Its own Inner nature, also signals an
unfreedom."

77
/H

Ibid.

,

P-

/

"

10.

Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity",

loc.

c

I

t

.

,

p.

55.
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Concern expressed over
the loss of individual
experience
d.scursive interaction is
ref, active of the
broader problem of the
relationship of the individua,
and the communiry in
Habers

i

n

schema.

Seizing on language as the
medium

in

which both individuality
and

community are preserved, he
has endeavored
theoretical

leve,

to work out at a

some middle ground between
a social

theory based on

particulars and incorporating
the dim hope that some
form of
universality may materialize
(such as liberalism), and
one which
imposes a form (a un, versa!
),n the expectation
that individuality
will eventually emerge in
the shuffle (such as
totalitarianism).

In

attempting an explicit reformulation
of this

relationship, Habermas must contend
with all

the problems

involved.

For people steeped in the
traditions of liberalism, the
idea of a
'general izable interest', incorporating
and transcending particular

interests,

is

anathema.

In

the face of a culture in which

individual experience can claim

unassailable, Habermas

consciousness to

a

is

a

primacy which

arguing for

a

is

virtually

shift from a monologic

dialogic one, but which at the same
time,

maintains the autonomy of the individual.

In

this framework,

discourse requires that experience, beliefs
and values, rather than
their validity being simply assumed, be
assessed and validated through

argumentation.
neither

is

commun ty
i

the

Private meanings are no longer sine qua-non;
but
individual

submerged

in

the over-riding quest for

m
Habermas'

intention in drawing this sharp
distinction between

communicative action and discourse

is

clear

conceptualize an interaction situation
argument

is

in

-

he is attempting to

which the force of the better

the dominating factor in
decision-making.

without such

a distinction, without arguing
that the discussion must be
"free of

experience and unencumbered by action",
the ideal speech situation
runs the risk (from Habermas'
point of view) of collapsing into
a

contest between vested interest groups.

Yet

it

is

also clear that the

theoretical status of this conception,
as well as its practical

possibility, are highly contentious.
must specify the shifts involved
to discourse, and

in

At the very least, Habermas
the transition from interaction

the process by which the knowledge
generated

the latter is translated back into the
realm of action.

in

McCarthy,

mindful of the difficulties associated with
Habermas' precise attempt
to separate these two spheres,

piecemeal model"

79

suggests the substitution of

a

according to which "the move from action to

discourse would not amount to the total shift of communication
structures which Habermas seems to describe

it

as being".

80

How

this shift would affect the issues with which Habermas is
concerned,

however

,

has not been considered

clarification

is

in

any depth.

Until

further

forthcoming, there will continue to be confusion

over the exact relationship between theory and action

in

Habermas'

thought

79

« o

McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," loc. cit.,
ibid.

p.

^93

H5

Cone us on
I

It

is

was asserted early

in

i

the chapter that the idea
of reason

inherent in our communication structures

not explicating a "particular historical

one which

is

"contained necessarily

that

is,

Habermas

is

form of reason" but rather

the way in which the species
of

in

talking animals reproduces itself".

-

This contention defines the

thrust of his entire theory, and its mere
assertion

is

not sufficient.

Accordingly, Habermas needs to demonstrate
that both the models which
reflect this idea of reason

-

the

ideal

speech situation, and the

model of pure communicative action, have been
presupposed and

anticipated throughout human history.

The historical variations

cultural prescriptions regarding behavior

in

compel, for Habermas,

... only one possibility of defending the claim
to
universality that
have put forth for the model of pure
communicative action.
First, we would have to show that the
structural change of world views obeys an inner logic, such that the
systematic variation of a basic pattern can be reconstructed. Over
and above this, it would have to be possible to derive from the
social evolution of world views a un versa
s t c morality based on
the basic norms of speech and the ideas of the responsibly acting
person developed in the model of pure communicative action. 01
I

i

1

i

i

He faces a similar problem with the situation of discourse,

and

it

is

one that

is

more historically tangible.

has not been a universally

o

1

Clearly, discourse

institutionalized form of interaction:

Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory

,

Lecture

6.

pp.

11-12

in

classical Greece, discourse
was considered

a

legitimate activity for

the purpose of examining
mythical and religious world
views;
but
was not until the seventeenth
century, for example, that
technical

knowledge was subjected to
discursive examination;

it

and

it was around
the same time period that
discourses were institutionalized
such that

claims to validity relevant
to political decisions
could be considered
With this development, Habermas
says, a "political public
sphere came
into being, and in connection
with this, representative forms
of

government

-

bourgeois democracy". 02

argue that the ideal speech situation

anticipated

in

Thus,
is

always presupposed and

a

in

prominent aspect of social

Similarly, he has to be able to explain
why the ideas of

the bourgeois revolution remained
just that

point

Habermas wants to

our communicative activity, he
has to be able to

explain why discourse has not always
been
systems.

if

-

ideas, which at this

history, are virtually devoid of substance.

The theory of social evolution attempts
to establish the

universal character of the ideal speech situation
and the model of
pure communicative action.
mental

It

does this by locating their develop-

logic within a concrete historical, social and
political

context.

As such,

the original

it

draws on,

incorporates and extends many of

insights of Knowledge and Human Interests

.

It

is

ambitious, almost flamboyant project, amounting to an attempted

11

?

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

p.

26.

an

117

reformulation of Marx's theory
of historical materialism,
represents the last major
theoretical component of
Haberma s
evolving oeuvre to be considered
in the dissertation.

It

still

CHAPTER
A THEORY OF SOCIAL
EVOLUTION

Habermas

theory of socia. evolution,
which draws on his
earner work in know.ed e-consti
9
tutive interests and on
communication
theory, represents an attempt
to re-conceptua
ze Marx's theory of
historical materialism.
For Marx, the fundamental
element in the
'

1

i

developmental history of the
species (and thus for the theory
of
historical materialism generated
by it) is the concept
'mode of
production', that is, the particular
way in which human beings

produce their means of subsistence.
to the development of the
actual

Mode of production refers both

productive forces (labor,

equipment, etc.) and to the organizational
forms

in

capital,

which the

activity of production goes on (referred
to by Marx as relations of
production).

He makes this clear

in

the following:

-.-The mode of production must not be considered
simply as
being the reproduction of the physical
existence of the individua s
Rather it is a definite form of activity of
these individuals, a
definite form of expressing their life, a
definite mode of life or
their part ... What they are, therefore,
coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and how
they produce. 1
,

.

A particular mode of production

1

is

characterized by

a

Karl Marx,
The German Ideology
in Rober C. Tucker, The MarxEngels Reader
New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1972, p. 114.
,

.

118

113

particular relationship between
the forces of production
and the
relations of production.
A shift from one mode
to another (e.g.,
from feuda. to capitalist)
occurs because of the dynamic
nature 0 f
that relationship:
the forces of production
give rise to certain
forms of social organization,
which,

production.

in

turn, modify the forces
of

According to Marx, when the latter
develop to

a

point

where the existing social
organization can no longer effectively

contain them,

a

'crisis' ensues, the result of
which

is

that the

forces of production break those
binds and produce, finally, a

higher

form of social organization.

Habermas, drawing on his early
differentiation between
instrumental and communicative action, has
attempted to reformulate
this theory.

The necessity for reformulation stems
from Habermas'

conviction that Marx's theory, as

it

stands,

(1)

potentially implies

the reduction of social organizations
to productive forces; and
is

susceptible to an

'

economi

s t

c
i

'

interpretation

the relations of production can be seen as

mediated.

t

ranscendab

an

1

e)

other words,

is

true only for

particular (and therefore

stage of the theory of social evolution rather than

intrinsic feature.

A social
in

a

in

inevitably economically

Habermas wants to argue that this

modern societies, and represents

-

(2)

system can be characterized, according to Habermas,

terms of its ability to perform two essential

tasks:

"system

120

integration" and "social

integration".

The former refers to
the

necessity for a social system
to maintain its existence
vis-a-vis the
wider environment; the latter
refers to the need for a
social

system to provide meaningful
norms and values, such that

interpretive schema, via
a

secure social

members of that society can be
achieved.

a

system of

identity for individual

Thus Habermas re-labels

the Marxian notions of forces
of production and relations
of

production

-

the inaccessibility of this
re-conceptual ization to

economic or any other reduction

is

apparent

in

this quotation:

We speak of social integration in
relation to the systems
n
n
Speaking and actin 9 subjects are
socially
rented
elated.
Social systems are seen here as
fe-world s that are
symbolically structured. We speak of system
integration wit-h a view
of the specific steering performances
or se t-regu ated system.
Social systems are cons idered here from
the point of view of their
capacity to maintain their boundaries and their
continued existence
by mastering. the complexity of an
inconstant environment.
Both
paradigms, life-world and system, are important.
The problem is to
demonstrate their interconnection.
From the life-world perspective
we themat.ze the normative structures (values
and institutions) of a
society ... From the system perspective, we thematize
a society's
steering mechanisms and the extension of the scope
of contingency
If we comprehend a social system as a
life-world, then the steering
aspect is screened out.
If we understand a society as a
system, then
the fact that social reality consists in the
facticity of recognized,
often counter factua
validity claims is not taken into consideration.
r

.

Y

T°

1

i

I

1

This

1

,

information allows Habermas to articulate more

rigorously the nature of the 'crisis' which heralds the shift to

mode of production.

2

Habermas, Leg

i

t

In

this version, changes can occur at the

imat ion Crisis

,

pp.

A-5

a

new

121

systemic leve, without
necessarily threatening
the continued existence
of the socia, system,
i.e., without assuming
the status of
a

.crisis',

only when members of a
society feel endangered
at the level of
their social existence by
those structural changes
(i.e. when their
social integration is
threatened) that one can
properly speak of a
't

is

cns.s'.

It

occurs at

a

particular intersection of
objective

and

subjective forces.

l

existence'only'to^hrex^enl

^

™

9r at]on
.

^danger continued

is, when the consensual
foundations ^o^normative'sJructuJes'a^’ that
8 S°
much impaired that the society
becomes anomir
r!*
Stat8S a5S 8
the form of a disintegration
If
S

It

is at

tut ionl?

™

'

this point that the various
pieces of Habermas'

theoretical puzzle begin to fall

into place.

For the theory of

social evolution sets out to give
a concrete cast to the
historical

progression of the two, interrelated
dimensions along wich the human
species unfolds:

the development of the forces of
production

(which

ensures system integration), and the
development of normative

structures of human interaction (which
pertains to social

integration)

The former depends on technical knowledge
which, according to
Habermas' analysis,

incorporates "empirical assumptions that imply

truth claims, that is, discursively redeemable
and fundamentally

criticizable claims".

3

4

lbld

-

>

P-

ibid., p

.

3.

9.

"

The latter calls on pract ica -mora
I

122

knowledge, and concerns itself
with the interpretation
of needs and
the legitimation of actions.
This operates "through
the medium of
norms that have need of
5
justification"
ca 1 on
j
u^k
Habermas captures this
whole complex succinctly:
"The extension of (the
social system’s)
autonomy is dependent on
development in ... two dimensions the
i

i

.

development of productive forces
(truth) and the alteration
of
normative structures
(correctness/appropriateness)." 6

Unlike the determining relationship
between the forces of
production and the relations of
production postulated by Marx,

Habermas insists upon

a

more contiguous relationship.

There

is

a

definite connection between the growth
of scientific and technologica

knowledge and the movement of soc o-cu
tu ra
i

1

1

life,

but each

dimension follows an independent logic
of development.
that

logic

is

a

tracing of such

rationally reconstruct
a

to be translated

i

bl e

one, and

pattern that concerns Habermas

in

inability not to learn".

7

,

P-

10.

ibid.

P-

1

ibid.

P-

15.

1

.

the

his latest work

in

terms of

a

From this point of view, "the fundamental

mechanism for social evolution

ibid.

is

into English, Legitimation Crisis.

Habermas has characterized these patterns
learning process.

it

Moreover,

7

is

to be found

in

an automatic

The growth of technical knowledge

-

123

generally
th

'

S

'

if

earni " 9 meChaniSm:

^continuous, process
3" d

-

stimulated by

developments reach the
point

where the existing soda,
or 9 an, nation cannot
incorporate the. without
maj ° r diSrUPti °"- ‘ he
to a new mode of
production follows.
At
this point, however, the
postulation of a learning
mechanism

responsible for the growth of
technical knowledge

assistance

is

no longer of

in

explaining the particular
for. of social organization
which is subsequently
instituted in order to
accurate the expanded
productive forces.
It is not totally
determined by the forces of
production;

nor can

of chance.

Rather, Habermas argues,

it

be satisfactorily
explained as the result
it

reflects the result of

learning in a different dimension,
the normative rather than
the
technical.
It requires knowledge of
a pract lea -mora
kind, a
I

knowledge "which can seek its
embodiment

structures of

8

interaction".

In

in

I

Habermas'

directional pattern.

schema, then, world-views also
follow a

Particular developments which would
have to be

traced include the foil ow

i

ng

^ansion

of the secular domain vis-a-vis
the sphere of
the sacred;

1
*

A tendency to develop from far-reaching
heteronomy to

2.

increasing autonomy;

8

Habermas, "Toward
loc.

ci t.

,

p.

293.

a

Reformulation of Historical Materialism"

I

2^

3.

k.

IS

.h.

Increasing reflexivity of
the mode of belief whirh ,
00
6en
SeqUence:
m y th as immediately
lived
sv<;J
f"
f
e tat i°n
teachings;
°r! ?
revealedreHgion9
rational religion;
ideology. 9 *

5.

:?

;

’

The kind of learning involved
here

•intersubjective’ or -reflexive-

discourses

in

learning:

is
it

referred to as

-takes place through

which we thematize practical
validity claims that have

become problematic or have been
rendered problematic through

institutionalized doubt, and redeem or
dismiss them on the basis of
arguments". >•
This is contrasted to non-ref
lexive earn ng wh ch
occurs when normative validity claims
are simply accepted or rejected
I

in

i

,

i

lieu of discursive examination.

This indicates the movement from a
situation in which tribes
understood themselves as differentiated from
the (threatening)
universality of the cosmic order but allowed
no sense of individual
identity for the members of the tribe, through
to the development
of universal istic moral systems
(that which is left from the
universal religions such as Christianity and
Judaism - here the
connection to (3) is apparent). The latter
provides the basis for
a world society which, at the same
time, allows for individualistic
ego identities.
9

i

”

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis pp. 11-12.
The similarity of this discussion to Kohlberg's work
on moral
consciousness is fully acknowledged by Habermas, and he explicitly
incorporates Kohlberg's work in his discussion of the development
of ego identity.
See Chapter 5.
,

10

ibid

-

»

P-

15.
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A particular societal

organization can be placed on an

evolutionary continuum according to whether
theoretical
'ought');

from practical
and

learning.

(2)

issues

(

i

.e.

,

it

( 1 )

distinguishes

quest ions of 'is' and

at a stage of non- ref ex ve or reflexive

is

1

A 'fully rational

of political consequence

society'

i

(i.e. one

in

which all norms

are made in a situation of communication

free from domination) would be one in which
theoretical and

practical

issues were differentiated, and reflexive learning
the

mode of operation.

Such a society does not yet exist.

The

present social organization has achieved the former condition,
but
has excluded practical questions from discursive consideration
on
the grounds that they are not "susceptible of truth".

11

Accordingly, "the institutionalization of general practical
discourse would introduce

a

new stage of learning for society".

12

Habermas has identified four major social formations:

primitive,

t

rad

i

t

i

ona

1

,

liberal capi ta

1

i

st

,

and advanced capitalist.

An examination of these four stages of social evolution will

illuminate the theoretical principles discussed

in

this section.

The primary focus will be on the latter two stages, for

consideration of these forms

,

and an

it

is

a

inquiry into the crisis

potentialities of advanced capitalism, that will help locate the

1

1

ibid
2

.

ibid.

,

p

.

1

6

possible sources of the shift
to an historically

organization (the 'fully rational
society').

socia

,
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The Analysis of Social Fo
rma

ln

£L mit!ve
'

social

formations

.

i

ons

both social and system

integration are secured through
the social rea
family and tribe.

ionshi ps of

the face of an overwhelmingly
hostile

In

environment, mythical

t

»

world images are generated
which

provide the necessary schema of
interpretation.

disruption
is

is

less

likelvMKeiy,

externally engendered

-

'rricic'
crisis

,

in

Internal

a-u-

this circumstance,

natural disasters, wars

and so

,

forth.

The transition to a traditional social

formation

is

characterized by the growing domination of
one class by
another.
a

is

paralleled at an institutional

separation between secular and sacred powers.

control
in

This

its

is

level

Political

now transferred to the state (or kingdom)

turn,

is

by

,

which,

dependent on an infusion of mass loyalty for

its continued existence.

The family loses economic functions

and some of its socializing functions.

In

line with, and

consequent upon, these institutional changes, tasks of social

1 3

The word "myth" here is not used in its present popular sense of
something widely believed but contrary to fact.
Rather it is used
as Carl Sagan employs it:
"as a metaphor of some subtlety on a
subject difficult to describe in any other way." Carl Sagan,
Dragons of Edon:
Speculations on the Evolution of Human
Intel
gence.
New York:
Random House, 1977, p.8.
1

i
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and system integration
are now performed by
different

structures.

While the steering capacity
of this social formation
greatly enhanced, this

achieved at substantial cost.

is

The separation of classes

is

one of which owns the means
of

,

production and thereby dominates the
other, allows for
burgeoning economic growth

,

but finally becomes a source
of

conflict ultimately threatening
to social
For

increase

in

integration.

the productive forces
automatically raises

the extent of exploitation
suffered by the oppressed class;

there

is a

resultant loss of legitimation afforded
the

prevailing social order, and

'crisis'

a

,

one that

is

internally determined, develops.

In

the next stage, that of

liberal

oppression of the working class
'de-pol iticized'
in

,

and domination

its previously naked

form.

capitalism, the
rendered opaque

is

is

This

it

is

now no longer visible
is

achieved through the

appearance of an apparently 'rationalized' market system
which formulates
of

a

wage relationship based on the principle

exchange of equivalents'

,

i.e.

,

income received for work

performed now attains the status of 'equivalent'.
such a principle anchored

in

the

legal

supposedly guarantees the individual

With

system (which

the right

to a

fair

129

wage)

,

the conomic system can relinquish
its dependence on

legitimation from the socio-cul tural
system
begins to generate its own legitimation.

:

rather,

it

'Exchange of

equivalents' becomes the ideological
motif for the entire
social

system

-

the economic system thereby assumes
socially

integrative tasks.

This represents the emergence of the modern
state;

uncoupling from tradition means that

it

its

can now waive the

constraints of value-orientation and function instead
on the
basis of

a

"strategic-utilitarian"

maximization of profit, which

is

14

orientation,

i

.e.

,

'rationally' based and

justified on the grounds that benefits accrue to the entire
social

system.

Marcuse describes this well:

—

The liberalist rationalization of economic life ... is
essential ly private
It is tied to the rational practice of
the individual economic subject or of a multiplicity of
individual economic subjects.
In the end
of course
the
rationality of liberalist practice is supposed to demonstrate
itself in the whole and characterize the whole, but this
whole itself is outside the sphere of rationalization.
The
harmony of general and private interests is supposed to
resu It of itself from the undisturbed course of private
practice.
On principle, it is not subject to criticism, nor
does it fall within the bounds of rational projects for
practice. 15
.

,

14

15

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis

,

p.

,

21.

Herbert Marcuse, Negations:
Essays in Critical Theory
Massachusetts:
Beacon Press, 1968, p. 17-

,

Boston,
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This complex masks the reality,
however, that class

domination still exists

-

surplus value still accrues
to

those who own the means of
production.
interest

is

the private

of a few which is still
fundamental.

obscurity

is

universal

interests (pointed to

which

It

heightened by bourgeois ideology's
appeal to

buttressed by un versa

is

The

i

in

I

i

the guote from Marcuse)

,

st c value systems such as
i

those expressed in the 'Protestant
ethic'.

On the one hand, this particular
social

major developments
etc.) and
is

all

at

in

formation allows for

both productive forces (technology,

in

normative structures (for the first time,
there

least an appeal

to un versa
i

men are free and equal

,

1

i

st c value systems, e.g.
i

have equal

,

rights before the law,

equal opportunity for participation in the economic
system,

and so forth.

Such development stops short of Habermas'

'communicative ehtic'

,

however, as

quote, for the project as
rationalization").

a

whole

is

clear from Marcuse's

"outside the sphere of

is

On the other hand, howeve r, contrary to

both appearance and ideology, class domination

operative.
erupt ion

,

Its

concealment at

a

political

much disguised, elsewhere

economic crisis.

-

at the

is

level
level

still

forces its
of
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That economic crisis is
the fir<;f
in world history of
a system crisis

In

other words,

it

is

.

Perhap
?

h

onl v) example

the continually recurring
economic

cr.ses associated with liberal
capitalism which bespeak the
submerged class antagonism.
(
t is important to
note in
I

this regard that, since the
economic system has taken over
the task of social

integration, crises

directly threatening to the latter.

in

the former are

The social system

far more vulnerable than ever
before to disturbances

integration.)

represent;

system

Crises, under these circumstances,
acquire

the "objectivity of

events". 17

in

is

inexplicable, contingent, natural

They cannot be apprehended for what
they
they have become inaccessible to
reflection.

As long as the clash of interests remains
unrecognized in

this way, Habermas refers to a "forcefully
integrated"

action system.

Such forcefully integrated action systems are, of
course,
need of an ideological justification to conceal the
asymmetrical distribution of chances for the legitimate
satisfaction of needs (that is, repression of needs).
Communication between participants is then systematically

16

1

7

Habermas, Leg
Ibid.

i

t

imat ion Crisis,

p.

30.

in

~
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t

•• •

parties and be settUdt
y c action.
tZl'”?'."
Instead it
assumes the ideolnnirai
r
66 " the
intentions that subjects
Ives to be carrying
out and their as we cav beMeve%hemsIwif
ir
V6S °
fundamen tal
interests.
As soon as
ncompat b! °i ryT
C °" Scious
conflict becomes manifest,
and
r reconc ili abl e
'Berests are
recognized as antagonistic
>»
interests
'

T,T'

irb^"

•

,

,

'

i

i

>

i

Habermas argues that the
frequency and volatility of
these
economic crises finally impels
the
state to intervene in

increasingly obvious fashion
(this marks the shift to
ad vanced capitalism ):

it

is

at this juncture that

the

opportunity emerges for those
antagonistic interests to
become conscious again.

The distinctive feature of the
shift from liberal

advanced capitalism, according to
Habermas,
of the state

system.

is

to

the intervention

into the process of reproducing
the economic

With the high degree of capital
concentration

associated with advanced capitalism (resulting
from the rise
of national and multi-national
corporations), weaknesses

begin to appear
system.

in

The state

the overall
is

functioning of the economic

forced to intervene to provide some

measure of stability for the business cycle (through
such

mechanisms as price supports and guarantees;

ibid.

,

p.

27.

government
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consumption, such as defense and space exploration;
regulating the flow of capital; and generally attempting to
juggle the competing imperatives of steady growth, foreign
trade, employment, etc.);

to shore up the social

infra-

structure necessary for continued economic expansion (such
as transportation, education, vocational

training, health,

to provide corrective measures to counter

housing, etc.);
the dysfunctional

effects of the economic cycle (such as

unemployment, welfare, pollution control, etc.) and to

contribute

substantial manner to "(heightening) the

in

productivity of labor" as Habermas puts

it.

19

This last aspect of increased state intervention
is of

market

in

the

major significance for Habermas' analysis of

advanced capitalism;

it

involves a major revision of Marx's

formulation of the labor theory of value.

The latter,

pressure because
Habermas argues, has come under increasing
that the rate of
of the apparent failure of Marx's prediction

profit must show

a

provides no insight into what, for Habermas

it

1

l o

ibid

.

,

p

.

ibid., pp.

55

•

56-57

policy

in

an

is

capitalism
absolutely crucial aspect of advanced
"governmental

moreover,

long-range tendency to decline;

-

education, technology and science".

2

1

13 *»

Habermas

revision of the classical

addresses both issues:

he

labor theory of value

introduces (following O'Connor 21

)

the category of "indirect surplus
value", produced by

"indirectly productive labor", or "labor
applied to itself
with the aim of increasing the productivity
of labor". 22
This "indirectly productive labor"

is

organized and managed

by the state rather than private
enterprise, and

involves

the promotion and support of scientific
and technological

research, and of

information and

system of education which produces similar

a
a

highly qualified labor force

-

both

elements function to heighten the productivity of labor.
Such governmental activity, according to Habermas, alters

"the form of production of surplus value"
theory of value, this fact

constant capital and
This revision makes

a
it

is

expressed

in

-

"in terms of the
the cheapening of

rise in the rate of surplus value". 23

theoretically possible that an altered

form of the production of surplus value can compensate
for the tendential

fall

in

the rate of profit;

moreover, the analysis allows for the possibility

2 1

See James O'Connor, The Corporations and the State
Harper and Row Publ shers
197^, pp. 39~^*2
i

9 9

2 3

Habermas, Leg
ibid

.

,

p.

55.

i

t

,

imat ion Crisis

,

p.

56.

,

New York:
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that the surplus value so
produced is sufficient to
ensure an

'appropriate'
level

rate of profit, and at the
same time, a rising

of real wages.

Habermas argues, however, that this
increasing regulatory role
on the part of the state finally
works to crack the

ideological cement which supported
the functioning of the

liberal-capitalist system, that

is,

the bourgeois

ideology

of a self-regulating market based
on fair and egual exchange.
This

because

is

it

amounts to a "re-coupling of the economic

system to the political", ** which

in

turn

increases the need

for legitimation on the part of the
members of the social

system.

Because of the erosion of tradition under
liberal

capitalism, the only source of legitimation
ideological

structure referred to above.

is

the bourgeois

An appeal

structure becomes dangerous, however, for insofar as
evident that the actual

to that
it

is

functioning of the economy differs

from its ideological base and that the results far from

approach the promise of that ideology, mass legitimation
threatened.

is

In

the

interests of continued functioning

of the present economic and social

system,

legitimation

must be secured without the contradictions becoming
1

themat zed
i

2

‘t

ibid

.

,

p.

36.

1

.
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There

is

massive pressure, then, to

public sphere:

de-pol

i

t

i

c ize

the

'

genuine participation in
administrative

decision-making must be avoided.
says Habermas,

'

in

This has been achieved,

two major ways.

First,

politicization requires justification.

the de-

This

currently

is

undertaken through an appeal to
technocratic systems
theories

-

the complexity of the entire
system,

the need for

technical expertise, national security
and so forth, are all
invoked in the service of justifying
the necessity for

administrative decisions to be made independent
of the
motives and interests of the general
population.
de-pol

i

t

icization

Second,

countenanced by two "motivational

is

syndromes" which underlie the legitimation
afforded to the
social

system.

consists

in

25

The first

an attitudinal

is

civic privatism *,

which

stance of concern with the

performance of the political system and its various rewards
(such as money,

interest

in

active participation

supplemented by
a

leisure time, security, etc.), but little

a

f am

i

1

i

a

1

in

-vocat iona

that system.
1

This

is

privatism which denotes

family-focused orientation, emphasizing consumption and

leisure, and a career orientation which accords with the

expectations generated by educational experience.

25

ibid

.

,

p.

The

37.

These two "motivational syndromes" will be considered at greater
length in the section on Motivation Crisis
(See page 1^6)
.
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designation "privatism" for
these attitudes clarifies
the
supportive function they hav e
with regard to the process
of
de po iticization:

they are attitudes which
stop short of

1

active political

interest or

i

nvo vement
1

So long as the contradictions
and antagonistic interests
do
not become part of the public
vocabulary, crises can be

managed without threat at the level
of social

integration,

and the requisite amount of
legitimation continues to be

furnished to the economic and
political system.

Habermas'

argument suggests, however, that the
juggling will become
more difficult:

the

inevitable increase

in

state

intervention into the social system threatens
to

politicize

1

the public.

On the one hand,

that

1

re-

increased

intervention generates an increased need for
legitimation;
on the other,

insofar as the state begins to seem more

active, and to the extent that

it

intrudes into

traditionally 'private' areas (particularly cultural
areas),
the potential

for public participation, questioning, and

protest expands.
It

is

here,

in

that Habermas

The basis for legitimation may be eroding

these

'soft spots' of advanced capitalism,

locates the source of potential crises.
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Possible Crises Tendpnr ies
of Advanced Capital
sm

The complexity of the system
of advanced capitalism
is
manifested in the several
sources of crisis which
Habermas discerns:
he locates three
sub-systems which operate as
points of origin (the
economic system, the political
system, and the socio-cui
tural
system).

Such a three-fold classification
is significant, for

it

captures schematically the tendency,
specific to late capitalism,
for the initial disturbance
to be suppressed, and then
transferred

through the various sub-systems.
forms unrecognizable

in

When

it

emerges,

terms of the original

it

appears in

problem.

The three

sub-systems, the various forms of crisis
manifestation and their
relation to system and social

integration are represented

in

the

following table:

Classification of Possible Crisis Tendenc es

5

i

POINT OF ORIGIN

SYSTEM CRISIS

Economic System

Economic Crisis

Political

Rationality Crisis

System

IDENTITY CRISIS

Legitimation Crisis

Socio-Cultural System

*

Source:

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis

Motivation Crisis

,

p.

1^5.
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Habermas' analysis of the
development of advanced
capitalism,
and his specification of
the possible crisis
tendencies in this

particular social formation,
are widely considered
to be of major
«•
significance.
It allows him to suggest
that economic crises
need
not, as Marx had predicted,
develop first into social
crises and then
mt ° political ° nes > but rather can
be displaced to either
the

political or the socio-cul tural

system.

Moreover, the

classification suggests that crises,
while interrelated throughout
the
sub-systems, can originate in other
than the economic system.
The
political

impact of the analysis lies in
its capacity to identify

pressure points which may prove
amenable to sustained political
act ivi ty.

While Habermas had undertaken an extensive
analysis of all
four crisis tendencies,

the major focus

in

this dissertation will

on the crises of legitimation and motivation.
for several

reasons:

First,

This choice

is

be

made

these crises represent distinctive

aspects of advanced capitalism, assuming

a

significance which they

have not had prior to the development of this
particular social

formation.

Second,

to the ongoing

Third,

it

is

it

is

investigation of the nature of advanced capitalism.

these crisis tendencies which contain most potential

terms of their promotion)

2 6

here that Habermas has contributed most

See,

for political

praxis, and thus are of most

for example, Trent Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the
Relations of Production", New German Critique, Number 5, Sprinq

1975

,

pp.

107-128.

(in

1

relevance for

40

discussion of education.

a

Briefly, then, the economic crisis stems
from the changed

economic circumstances (such as the massive
concentration of capital

associated with the development of national and
multi-national
corporations) and from the continued underlying
pressure created by
class antagonisms

problems).

(which erupts in the form of periodic economic

Habermas distinguishes four categories of state

activity prompted by the imperatives of the economic
system:

1

•

The prerequisites of continued existence must be realized
(for example,

the market system must be protected from

self-destructive side effects
an

2-

27

-

anti-trust legislation

is

instance of this);

Market complementing adaptations (for example, the legal
system needs to adjust to new forms of business organization,
f

3*

i

nanc ng
i

etc

,

.

)

;

Market-replacing actions (these occur
weaknesses of economic forces
is

-

the most

reaction to the
important example

the state's contribution to altered forms of production of

surpl us va ue)
1

2 7

in

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 53 _ 5^-
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The state must ’•“pond to the
dysfunctional consequences of
the economic system, and particularly
those which elicit

politically effective reactions on the part
of such groups
as environmentalists, unions, etc.

The rationality crisis follows directly from
the economic
problems just enumerated:

it

emerges when the administrative system

fails in its task of juggling and fulfilling the
contradictory

imperatives of the economic system.
of problems

the market

in

rationality crisis
crisis, as

is

is

It

represents the displacement

into the administrative system.

The

also intimately related to the legitimation

clear from the chart.

With the political system

representing the connecting link, the rationality crisis

is

output, while the legitimation crisis

The following

is

one of input.

one of

makes their relationship clear:

The state apparatus is ... faced simultaneously with two
tasks.
On the one hand, it is supposed to raise the requisite amount
of taxes by skimming off profits and income and to use the available
taxes so rationally that crisis-ridden disturbances of growth can be
avoided. On the other hand, the selective raising of taxes, the
discernible pattern of priorities in their use, and the
administrative performances themselves must be so constituted that the
need for legitimation can be satisfied as it arises.
If the state
fails in the former task, there is a deficit in administrative
rationality.
If the state fails in the latter task, a deficit in
legitimation results. 28

28

ibid

.

,

p

.

62

The

legitimation

advanced capitalism, for

propelled by the internal
seminal

importance

crisis
it

is

central

to Habermas'

here that all

analysis of

the contradictions,

logic of the system itself,
emerge.

indicated

is

is

in

Its

this quote from Schroyer:

"Only
the legitimation crisis is
the crisis of system
reproduction and
social industry thematized
together; this is the logically
necessary
in

condition for

a

revolutionary situation." 29

The political

continue functioning

in

system of advanced capitalism,

in

order to

such a way as to maintain the
continued

expansion of the social system, requires
an input of mass loyalty
(that

is,

it

requires widespread belief

in

its

right to exercise

certain kinds of power and authority with
impugnity).

Whereas

under liberal capitalism that loyalty
was cemented on the basis of

democratic principles supported by the ideology
of
ing market,

a

freely function-

advanced capitalism can no longer draw on
this.

It

has

had to create a precarious balance between
depoliticization, which

preserves nominal participation but little interest

in

political

activity, and the administrative requirements of
furthering the

system as

whole.

a

That balance

is

increasingly difficult to

maintain.

For, as has been suggested,

2 9

state intervention

is

both

Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production",
loc

c

i

.

p

.
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H3
necessary to continued
capitalist growth, and
potentially
radicalizing in the same
moment.
The more the state
intervenes

to

ensure the continued
expansion of the system, the
more it requires
legitimation of the activity in
the form of approbation
from the
members of the soript-usocety, at the same time,
however, that intervention

works precisely to place the
structure and rationale of
depoliticization into question.
Habermas contends that as
long as
traditions and motivations are
bound to norms that require

justification (even though that
justification might be rarely
invoked), there arises a natural
boundary beyond which the state

cannot pass without thereby
precipitating public discussion and

questioning of these normative
structures.
of the public sphere

is

This re-politicization

exactly what the state must avoid.

Efforts at avoidance take the form of
an attempt to remove
the actual

functioning of the administrative system
from public

perception and appraisal, and to replace
functioning.

it

with

a

symbolic

Through the use of judicial hearings,
consultations,

investigations, and so forth, an appearance of
public participation
and

involvement can be generated.

In

this process, certain other

issues can be diverted from public attention, and
thus from discussion
and decision-making.
as "the political

3 0

This

is

an

instance of what Habermas refers to

system (taking) over tasks of ideology planning".

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,

p.

70.

30

kk

Here, however, the
state rues up against
an impermeable
barrier
because, according to
Habermas, there cannot
be "admi n s t rat ve
i

production of waning".
that the cultural

system

•>

is

,n support of

i

this pivotal assertion

pecuiiariy resistant to
administration

Habermas argues that culture,
traditions, far from being
created out
of the minds of advertising
executives, evoive in an
"unplanned,
like manner

,

it

is

this unfolding property
which enables

cultural traditions to
"guarantee the continuity of

a

history through

which individuals and graoups
can identify with themselves
and with
one another
Again, "traditions can retain
legitimating force
only so long as they are
not torn out of interpretive
systems that
guarantee continuity and identity". »
There are clearly limits,
as
.

far as Habermas

is

concerned, to the attempt to
compensate for

legitimation deficits through resorting
to conscious manipulation.

Legitimating forces cannot be arbitrarily
imposed without some form
of backlash.

That backlash, as suggested above,
emerges

activity the state seeks to suppress:

in

precisely the

public discourse.

For the

state's attempt to implant legitimating
norms reveals the contingency

31

32

33

3

ibid..

ibid..

ibid

.

ibid

.

,

p

.

71.
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of normative structures as a
whole.

what was previously seen as

natural and legitimate, now
appears as possibly fortuitous.

Once

that nature-like character has
been destroyed, traditions
can only be

re-anchored through

a

process of public discourse, and,
presumably

those which cannot be discursively
redeemed, would be abandoned.

A legitimation crisis can be averted
if the state can

continue to satisfy the demands stimulated
by its increasingly
visible role.

These are often demands which might
otherwise have

remained more quiescent:

for more commodities, welfare benefits,

compensation, health and housing, occupational
satisfaction,
forth.

and so

When such expectations cannot be fulfilled,
or when former

provisions are withdrawn (as occurs when there

economic and business sectors for fiscal

is

pressure from

restraint), the potential

for a crisis of legitimation rises sharply.

It

is

reflected

in

the

beginning withdrawal of motivational commitment to the continued

functioning of the system.
legitimation and motivation

The intimate connection between
is

revealed at this point.

A legitimation crisis ... must be based on a motivation
that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared
by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on
the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the soc io-cu tu ra
system
on the other. 35

crisis

_

1

3 5

ibid

.

pp.

74-75

1

U»6

The mot ivat ion cris
'civil'

concerns changes

is

in

the syndromes of

and 'familial-vocational'
privatism, referred to earlier
as

the major motivational-

legitimation system.

inputs from the socio-cul
tural

Civil

system to the

privatism, on which depends
the

successful de-politicization of
the public sphere, consists
interest

in

the performance of the political
system, but not in active

participation
sphere

is

in

in

the process.

supplemented by fami

This orientation towards the
political
1

i

al

-vocat ional privatism, which

concerns family-oriented consumption
and leisure, and career interests
wh,ch meet both status needs and the
expectations generated in the
process of education.

Habermas argues that, because of the internal

logic

of

advanced capitalism, these motivational
patterns are gradually being

destroyed

-

their basis;

first, because of the loss of traditions which
provided
and second, because, as he puts

it,

"there are no

functional equivalents for the spent traditions, for
they are

precluded by the logic of development of normative
structures".

These two arguments will be considered

3 6

in

3

turn.

Habermas is aware that his discussion of 'motivation' takes a
comparatively narrow view of that concept. He has stressed the
need for more extensive work in this area, particularly with
regard to the soc io- og ca and psychological aspects of
motivation and its relation to culture. He has recently attempted
this, drawing particularly on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg.
See
Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", loc. cit.
1

ibid

.

,

pp.

75.

i

1

H7
The progressive erosion of traditions
which support the

above motivational orientations stems,
Habermas maintains,
from the very nature of those
traditions:
a

they represent

mixture of capitalist and pre-capitalist
elements.

for example,
full

Thus,

the bourgeois revolutions contained
demands for

citizen participation

the political

in

process.

The

continued growth of capitalism demanded, on
the other hand,
less than active participation on the part
of the populace

-

this was secured by drawing on such pre-capitalist
traditions
as respect for the authority of the ruling
group.

Similarly, fami
values:

1

i

a

1

-vocat ona
i

1

privatism

is

a

mixture of

individualism and utilitarianism on the one hand,

and traditions generated by religious structures on the

other.

As traditional world-views, and particularly those

of a a religious nature, cease to be motivationally

effective, bourgeois culture's dependence on them becomes

more evident, and their decline more threatening to social
identity.

2

.

38

There are four aspects of Habermas' argument that the
socio-cul tural

system

is

ultimately unable to reproduce the

requisite privatistic syndromes.

3 e

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 78.

1^8

First, he argues that not only
are the pre-bourgeois

traditions which support civil and
fami

l

ial

-vocat ional

privatism declining, but they are
being "non-renewabl
dismantled"

3

\

Such traditions are increasingly
at

variance with the expansion of
instrumental action:
other words, there

is

concomitant decrease

a

communicative action.
encroachment include:
practice;

in

Indications of this instrumental
sc ent zat on of professional
i

i

i

growth of the service sector, such
that human

relationships assume a commodity form;

administrative

regulation of spheres of life previously
regulated
informal

in

fashion;

politics;

in

an

commercialization of culture and

and the expansion of scientific and

psychological

techniques into areas such as child-rearing,

thereby affecting the socialization process as

a

whole. 40

With this increasing rationalization, traditions lose their
ability to offer meaningful

interpretations and break up,

retaining only subjective appeal.
relation to truth, and assume
too,

i

s

4 0

relativist cast.

the utopian vision contained

traditional world-views.

39

a

ibid

.,

p.

79

ibid

.,

pp.

79-8O

Moral values lose their

in

Lost,

religious and

Second, Habermas asserts that
elements of bourgeois ideology

directly supportive of the desired
motivational patterns are
also being dissolved because of
rapid social change.

example, the achievement ideology

-

the belief that social

rewards accrue on the basis of
individual merit
if

it

For

-

requires,

to be compelling, a situation of
equal opportunity

is

for all members of the society
to participate.

the market was charged with this task;

Formerly,

more recently, with

the obvious failure of the market
mechanism, the educational

system has assumed the burden of supposedly
providing equal
access to societal

rewards.

This fiction

is

increasingly

difficult to maintain, particularly at the
present time when
educational achievements are clearly unrelated to
later

occupational success, and the spectre of unemployment
for

college graduates

is

very real.

Possessive individualism, another ideological support
mechanism, also encounters difficulty
bel ievabi

1

i

ty.

in

maintaining its

The conviction that the economic system could

function on the basis of free competition such that the social
good would be promoted through the untrammelled pursuit of
the individual

good can no longer hold sway.

currently experienced needs are of
individual

a

social

Many
rather than an

nature, and are simply not amenable to treatment

as commodities:

housing, mass transit, health care, energy,
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and so forth.

Moreover, there are growing
segments of the

population who do not directly earn
income, and are thus
less directly affected by the
socializing effects of the

market:

the aged, students, welfare
recipients, and so

forth.

Reduced working hours and consequent
leisure

concerns also function to sever the
population from direct
contact with the forms which gave life
to the old
i

deol og es
i

Third, Habermas argues that certain residual
elements of

bourgeois ideology
-

-

such as science and universal morality

are, or have the potential of becoming,
dysfunctional

the motivational

for

patterns they are supposed to reproduce.

The growth of science and technology, for example, while

it

certainly spearheads the expansion of purpos ve- rat ona
i

action, also has some potential as

consequent employment

in

a

weapon of critique, and

the establishment of universal

discursive standards of rationality.

originally enlisted

in

i

The moral system,

the service of the bourgeoisie, has

now evolved to the point where

it

turns back on the life-

giver and exacts the price of its abandonment.

Originally,

bourgeois morality was based on principles, which derived
large part from the universal
and Christianity).

longer functional

religions

in

(principally Judaism

When certain of those norms were no
for the expanding capitalist enterprise,
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the more congenial were
lifted out of traditional

and formalized in a body of
law.

structures

Morality based on

principle still makes an ultimate
claim to universality;

in

their application, the separation
between the two sets of

norms becomes more overt.

developmental

At

least according to the

logic of systems of social norms,

resolvable only when the val idity of

is

discursive wi

I

I

-format ion

ah

this conflict

norms

is

tied to

The memory of the universally

.

applicable system of morality promulgated
by liberal

capitalism cannot, Habermas maintains, simply
be erased:

the moral system can no more simply
erase the memory of
collectively attained state of moral consciousness,
once
practical discourses have been permitted, than
the
scientific system can retreat behind an attained
state of
accumulated knowledge or block theoretical progress
once
theoretical discourses have been institutionalized. 41
...

a

Habermas

is

certainly aware that

a

motivation crisis could be

avoided by the complete "uncoupling" 42 of the cultural
system.

"By

'uncoupling

1

,

I

mean

a

situation

in

which

culture remains an object of private enjoyment or of
professional

interest, and

under conservation as

a

is

even admi

n

4 2

4 3

ibid..
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ibid.

P-

ibid.

.

.

87-88
90.

strat vel y placed
i

kind of free preserve, but

separated from socialization processes."
4 1

i

43

is

This would
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allow,

in

turn

,

for the freeing of the
administrative system

from its dependence on
legitimation from members of
the
social system.

Against this possibility, and this

is

the fourth step in the

argument, Habermas argues that
-fundamental convictions of

communicative ethics" and "experimental
complexes of

counter-cultures" 44 have already achieved
motive-forming
power.

In

other words, the progressive
instrumental

rationalization of inner nature has not
proceeded to the
point where resistance to the dominant
ideology

impossible.

This

indicated, for Habermas,

is

substantial ly increased trend towards
critical
the "socially tendered patterns of

discerns this happening

in

is

the

in

reflection of

interpretation" 45

its most concentrated

developmental stage of adolescence, and

it

.

He

form at the

exerts pressure,

he believes, against the likelihood of a
continuing

"conventional outcome"

following indicators

in

46

of this stage.

He

lists the

support of this assertion:

expansion of the educational system is lengthening trainig
periods and making possible for increasing proportions of the
population a psycho-social moratorium in early adolescence
(from the thirteenth to the sixteenth year) and an extension
of this phase (in extreme cases, to the age of thirty);
4 4

4 5

46

ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
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-

improved formal schooling
of cogni t ive capaci
t ies
increases the probability that
dissonances between proferred
patterns of interpretation and
perceived social reality will
arise and intensify the problem
of identity;
-

development of egalitarian famil
y structures and spread
of child-rearing techniques
typical of the middle classes
promote processes of socialization
that tend to burden youth
with adolescent problems;
-

loosening of sexual prohibitions
made possible by
pharmaceutics works itself out (as
does the temporary
" d
'! ferentiated according to strata - from
direct
directly
economic pressures) in such a
way that
at '° n
rOCeSS 5 free ° f anxiety,
with an expanded
?
?
scone V,f
scope
of experimentation, become
more probable for
adol escents

T

These factors, together with the fact
that

it

is

at

the stage

of adolescence that people develop
the communicative skills

necessary for discourse, prompt Habermas
to look to this
sector of the population as

a

"promising locus for

developing motivation and legitimation crisis"

4

4 8

ibid
n

.

,

p

.
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•

Boris Frankel,
"Habermas Talking:
Soc ety Number 1, 197^, p. 57.
i

,

An

Interview",

Theory and

15*4

Comment and Critique

The theory of social evolution
this stage of its development.

It

is

is at

difficult to assess at

once highly speculative and

content-laden, providing one of the
richest analyses of advanced

capitalism currently available.
upon its further specification:

A detailed assessment must
await
this discussion will

focus on some

of the more suggestive themes and,
at the same time, will

highlight

some of the troublesome issues.

First,

evolution

is

the general

beset with many difficulties.

immediately embroiled

progress

in

in

a

theory of social

Any such attempt

is

the controversy surrounding the idea of

history, and most particularly, the mechanism underlying

such progress.
issues, but

attempt to delineate

Habermas does not address himself to these broad

it

is

difficult to mount

a

substantial critique of his

work on this basis, for the issues seem virtually irresolvable
at
this point.

It

is

clear, however, that his articulation of

possible new stage of social organization, based on

a

a

communicative

ethic, depends entirely for its substance on the evolutionary theory
he has outlined.

To the degree that the latter remains clouded

in

terms of any empirical content, the former must remain on the level
of speculation.

The necessity for further specification of the theory of
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socia, evolution is particularly
crucial with regard to
Habermas'
attempt to demonstrate the
developmental nature of systems
of

normative knowledge.
his work, but

This

is

one of the most suggestive
aspects of

requires extensive elaboration

it

to be actualized.

if

its potential

is

The relationship between the
development of

normative knowledge on the one hand,
and that of the productive
forces on the other, needs further
explanation, particularly at the
point of

'crisis', and subsequent shift to
a different stage of

social organization.

The associated postulation of
separate

learning mechanisms is similarly of
potential significance,

particularly

in

the area of developing an effective
political

praxis, and its exposition would be enriched
greatly by the

adducement of relevant historical data.

Held and Simon note at

least one consequence of the failure to locate
the thesis in a

more concrete social and historical situation:

Habermas wants to talk of a logic of development of
communicative interaction and world-views that cannot be reduced
to
the logic of the development of work and productive
forces.
In so
doing, his argument carries with it a certain tendency
to legitimate
certain forms of distorted belief structures, and hence, repression,
in history as having been necessary at various
evolutionary stages/
It becomes extremely important for Habermas to
elaborate when, in
any given society he considers, a specific form of ideology is
legitimate and when it is surpassed, that is, what is the relationship
between necessary and unnecessary social repression in changing
social epochs? 49

4 9

•

David Held and Lawrence Simon,
"Toward Understanding Habermas",
New German Critique Number 7, Winter 1976, p. 1^1.
,
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As was stated earlier, however,
Habermas' analysis of the
social

formations of liberal and advanced
capitalism
It

to extend

represents

a

substantial

is

a

compelling

improvement over previous attempts

the original Marxist understanding
of capitalist

development, and
another.

in

particular, the transition from one
stage to

His classification crisis tendencies

in

advanced

capitalism not only expands comprehension
of its functioning, but
also greatly enlivens the possibilities of
an effective political
prax

s

i

Particularly significant for twentieth century
Marxism
the articulation of the legitimation crisis, for,

analysis proves correct,
might be gained.

thematize

it

is

if

is

Habermas'

here that some political

leverage

Insofar as problems of legitimation threaten to

issues of both social

and system integration,

become the major 'soft spots' of advanced capitalism.

they

Recent

United States history seems to bear out Habermas' diagnosis.

Certainly the
gradual decline
soc a
i

1

civil

in

last fifteen years has been marked by a

the belief

and po litical

in

the legitimacy of the dominant

institutions

in

this country.

disturbances characteristic of the late sixties was only the

most overt expression of that disillusionment.

stated the
Nixon:

The wide-spread

problem clearly

"What

is

at

issue

is

in

a

1

Daniel

Moynihan

969 memorandum to then President

the continued acceptance by the great

157

mass of people of the legitimacy and efficacy
of the present

arrangements of American society and of our process
for changing
50

those arrangements."

The concern was justified, for there had indeed been an

astonishing loss of faith

in

the American political

began with American involvement

in

system.

It

the Vietnam War, continued through

the revelations of Watergate, and lingers even now with disclosure of

C.I.A. activities against Chile and Cuba.

Perhaps for the first

time in its history, American action in the cause of freedom can

muster little

in

the way of patriotism or commitment.

has proceeded equally at the domestic level:

affluence exerted

a

where once continued

strong integrating force, there

hand, a growing demand for quality
and of occupation.

-

Disenchantment

is

now, on one

of consumer goods, or life style,

On the other hand,

the recent economic crisis

has served to further undermine the conviction that not only will

prosperity continue to increase, but that all social needs will be
attended to

in

the process.

profits, and cutbacks
ideological

in

Exorbidant prices, rising company

social

services combine to expose the

self-presentation of the economic system.

Habermas' analysis of the process by which the state tries

with decreasing success to negotiate the conflicting imperatives of

50

Quoted in Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication
Oxford University Press, 1973, P- 5«

.

New York:
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"-Politicization and continued
economic expansion has
received
support

other sources.

front

c.aus Mueller,

SLCo^unication, has thoroughly
researched

in

his booh The Politics

the political and
legal

changes of the past ten
to fifteen years with
Habermas' analysis
explicitly in mind.
Drawing on a Habermasian
idea of 'distorted
communication', which he defines
as "all forms of
restricted and
prejudiced communication that
by their nature inhibit
a full

discussion of problems, issues
and ideas that have public
relevance"”,
he sets out to demonstrate
how the political

attempted to limit public
communication
'nterests prevail.

He attests to many

efforts to control
the public.

in

system has systematically

order that its own

instances of the government's

the nature and extent of
information available to

Representative of his citations

is

the following

paragraph.

m

T 1e P
S a0d po,icies of constrained
communication were
candiHi
I
cand.d y stated
by Justice Lewis F. Powell, two
months prior to Ms
appointment to the Supreme Court by Nixon,
in a confidential
memorandum that was circulated by the
United States Chamber of
Commerce among high echelons in the
business community.
It was
recommended in this memorandum that
individuals and groups with
V eWS ° f American h^iness should
be "penalized
’"us nessmen should influence universities for
?
reasons
Of MHbalancing
?
Of
faculties, and textbooks should be "evaluated"
as part
n a
": ou 5 effo ^' in which "the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of
American business (ought) to be marshalled
against those who would
estroy it
Television programs should "be monitored in the
same way
tnat text-books should be kept under
constant surveillance
This
applies not merely to so-called educational
programs ... but to the
ally "news analysis" which so often includes
the most insidious type
of criticism of the enterprise system. 52

ZliH^ni'?'"
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Mue ller, op.
ibid., p. 89
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Mueller, too, notes the shift to an
attempted 'technocratic'

legitimation which, severed from traditional
norms and principles,

creates a symbolic void which must be filled
by some new rationale.
Efficiency, with consequent increased affluence,

is

the logical

legitimating principle, but as Mueller, like
Habermas, points out,
this means that the individual's belief in
legitimacy

more closely to the actual performance of the
system.

is

tied much

The state

is

then far more vulnerable to economic and social
disruption.

Mueller's generally scholarly analysis concludes at
the same point as
does that of Habermas.

It appears that (this) particular constellation
of economic,
and political forces ... renders advanced capitalist societies
vulnerable or soft' at a point which hitherto seemed secure:
the
transmission from one generation to the next of values and socially
and politically motivating symbols which induce acceptance of

social

53

authority.

Certainly the motivational
are widespread.

There

is

reactions to this constellation

probably, as Mueller notes, much greater

unwillingness to participate

in

the value systems which support the

functioning of advanced capitalism than at any previous time.

There

are any number of indices to suggest this, beside the more overt

examples such as student protest, communal
foods, etc.

In

addition, there are signs such as increased worker

absenteeism, on-the-job sabotage,

5 3

ibid.,

p

.

11.

living experiments, health

increasing numbers of people seeking
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part-time employment, and the break-up
of traditional family
structures.

All

these tendencies intersect at the
point where they

undermine the dominant concerns for
affluence and status.
bespeak

a

They

desire to return to relationships and
work situations wh ch
i

are non-exploi tat ve, and which can find
expression
i

in

forms and

interpretations other than those provided by the
dominant social
model

s

What

is

not clear, however,

is

the extent of the damage.

While there are indications that, as Habermas puts

it,

"fundamental

convictions of communicative ethics" and "experimental
complexes of

counter-cultures" have achieved motive-forming power, there
to suggest at this point

that that changed motivation will

is

little

have any

significant effect on the present functioning of the social system.
The recent economic disruption, for example, has clearly exerted
renewed pressure on young people to acquire skills that will enable
them to find

a

job

the dominant social

-

other words, there

in

models.

is

pressure to return to

Similarly, while the number of wedges

driven into the gap between American rhetoric and its reality
increases almost daily, the general public reaction seems to be one
of possive acceptance.

The crisis of motivation, then, seems not

yet to be having a sustained political

This leads to

a

impact.

consideration of one of the most seminal

aspects of Habermas' discussion:

the assertion that "there is no
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admin

i

st

ra

t

i

ve production of

meaning-.

importance because according
to Habermas,

ThIs

„

of fundamenta

,

imposes a natural iimit
on the state's ability
to impose legitimating
structures on the
members of the society.
As people 'run out',
so to speah. of
meanmg, the state attempts
to compensate by providing
'value', i.e.,
it

’

more commodities.

When 'value'

notivationa, crisis will be

in

runs out, according to
Habermas, a

full

swing, and

it

is at

presumably, that the crisis will
assume a political
however, such a crucial assertion,
one which

is

this point,

form.

Again,

fundamental

to the

argument that the crisis of
legitimation and motivation must
increase,
necessitates more extensive investigation
and analysis.

One other feature of the analysis
which has received

relatively scant attention from reviewers,
despite its centrality
to Habermas'

formulations,

is

his revision of Marx's labor theory
of

value, and particularly, the argument
that there has been an

alteration

in

the form of the production of surplus
value 55
.

clearest statement regarding this appears
Rational

his book Toward a

Society:

The institutional

pressure to augment the productivity of

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
55

in

His

,

p.

70.

One exception to this is Peter Laska's article "Habermas and
the
Labor Theory of Value",
New German Critique No. 3, Fall 197
pp. 15^-162.
See also John Keane,
"On Belaboring the Theory of
Economic Crisis:
A reply to Laska"
New German Critique, No. A,
Winter 1975, pp. 125-130.
,

/
4

,

162

labor through the introduction of new technology has
always
existed under capitalism ... With the advent of large-scale
industrial research, science, technology, and industrial
utilization
were fused into a system.
Since then, industrial research has been
linked up with research under government contract, which primarily
p romo t es scientific and technical pr og ress in the
military sector.
From there, information flows back into the sectors of civilian
production. Thus, technology and science became a leading productive
force, rendering inoperative the conditions of Marx's labor theory of
value.
It is no longer meaningful to calculate the amount of capital
investment in research and development on the basis of the value of
unskilled (simple) labor power, when sc ent f c- technol og ca progress
has become an independent source of surplus-value, in relation to
which the only source of surplus-value considered by Marx, namely the
labor-power of the immediate producers, plays an even smaller role. 56
i

Habermas

i

i

i

not alone in perceiving the enormous contribution

is

to continued capitalist ascendancy which government

and education makes

-

in

i

to the effect

capitalist nothing,

exploiting it",
and social

57

a

financed research

such changed circumstances,

necessary to go beyond Marx's foot-noted comment
Cap ta

1

in

it

seems

Volume

1

of

that "science, generally speaking, cost the

fact that by no means hinders him from

and to consider in much greater depth the economic

impact of science and technology.

But Habermas does not seem entirely certain as to the nature

of this relationship.

It

is

not clear,

remained committed to the statement

Habermas, Toward
57

a

Rational

Volume
Capi tal
Marx,
Publishers, 1967, P- 509Karl

,

1.

that he has

the quotation above that

in

Society

for example,

,

p.

10A.

New York:

International
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"scientific-technological progress has
become an independent
source
of surpius-vaiue"; whiie
he has nowhere repudiated
it, there have
been suggestions of
modifications.

Thus, for example, he
has been

increasingly insistent that
technological

innovations are always

dependent on labor for their
actualization, and thus for
their
ability to contribute to the
generation of surpius-value.
obviating
somewhat the force of the idea
that scientific and
technological
progress is an independent source
of value.

in

spite of such modifications,
however, the most immediate

result of the revision would seem
to be that the direct
connection

between labor and the creation of
surplus-value, so central

Marx's analysis, has been abrogated.

congealed labor, and, as such,
most precise kind
1

-

it

In the

represents

to

Marxian schema, value
a

social

is

relation of the

the antagonistic relationship between
capital and

abor

This draining of labor from the category of
value,

theoretical necessity stemming from the revision,

terminological
and

level

in

is

contained

in

economists Marx criticized
in

fact,

a

a

lessened regard for the labor

such categories.

on a life of their own, much as

said,

matched at

Habermas' use of the categories of 'science'

'technology', and this suggests

which

is

a

in

In

Habermas' work,

they take

'commodity' did for the political

Das Kapi tal

.

It

could similarly be

that Habermas' characterization of the relationship

16 A

between science, technology and surplus-value
assumes "the fantastic
form of a relation between things" 58

Interestingly enough, one of

.

Habermas' major contributions to an understanding
of advanced

capitalism

his examination of the extent to which science
and

is

technology have become ideological forces;
however, their social and historical

he continues to deny,

form.

The uncoupling of labor and surplus-value simultaneously
represents, as suggested before, the uncoupling of labor and
capital,

resulting

in

serious dilution of the antagonistic nature of the

a

relationship which obtained between them

in

Marx's analysis.

Habermas

analysis, capital

greatly;

and the limit to capitalist accumulation

perceived

in

a

work day

in

's

rel iance on

Under

surplus labor diminishes
-

which Marx

the fact that every worker had to spend at least part of

necessary labor

fact, as we have seen,

this

seems no longer operative.

-

in

important piece of Habermas'

an

is

And,

argument that the source of the crisis necessary for capitalism's

demise

is

no longer to be found

in

the economic sphere, but rather

the sphere of legitimation.

As part of this shift, Habermas argues,

no longer possesses that form;

compromise.

58

Marx, op.

Central

c

i

.

,

p.

to this

72.

it

is

the class struggle

has metamorphosed

into a class

the idea, available if we accept

in
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Habermas

revision of the labor theory
of value, that within
an
expanding capitalist
system, the surplus can be
sufficient to ensure
both a rate of profit
satisfactory to capital and,
at the same time,
a rising level
of real wages.
»

From Marx's point of view,
the relationship between
capital
and labor can only be
one of fundamental conflict,
"an antinomy'
t'9ht against right" 59
For Habermas, advanced
capitalism can bring
about a situation in which
that "right against right" is
transformed
.

'"to a bargain of mutual

conflict

is

in

benefit.

While he

is

adamant that the

fact latent, the outward appearance
hints, for him, at

the possibility of less-than
violent transition to a higher form
of

social evolution:

"From this perspective, class conflict
loses its

revolutionary guise,
is

(and) a progressive democratization
of society

not excluded from the outset,
even within the economic order of

capital ism" 60

.

This

perhaps the most significant implication of Habermas'

is

revision of Marx's labor theory of value:

it

theoretically allows

for a shift from the latter's conviction
of the need for revolution
to

the possibility of a non-violent graduated
progression toward the

'fully rational

59

ibid

.

p.

society'.

235-

Habermas, Theory and Practice,

p.

233.

It

has been a common criticism of
Habermas* work that his

theoretical constructions leads to a
position of theoretical

conservatism.

While this seems

a

premature judgement,

certainly true of Habermas, as of his colleagues

in

it

is

the Frankfurt

School, that he has been unable to address
satisfactorily the

question of which group

previously shouldered

in

in

society now bears the revolutionary burden

Marxist theory by the working class.

His earlier work on the emancipatory interest

transcendence of class interests as such

-

involved a

we must penetrate, he

wrote, "beyond the level of particular historical class
interests to

disclose the fundamental

interests of mankind as such, engaged

process of self-constitution" 61

in

the

Given this position, and his

.

commitment to 'communication free from domination* for all men and
women,

becomes not only difficult, but also inappropriate, to

it

identify

a

'revolutionary subject*.

Habermas claims privileged

access to truth for no man, nor for any particular group or class of
men.

Such a position

is

frustrating

if

one

is

interested

direct derivation of political praxis from Habermas' work.
issue

if

the charge of political

conservatism

is

This leads, finally, to the question of Habermas'

Habermas, Toward

a

Rational Society,

p.

113

-

a

It

is

to be successfully

countered

6 1

in

an
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-conceptual ization of the relationship
of theory and praxis.

His

initial

formulation, based largely on
the model of a psychoanalytic
dialogue, was widely criticized,
as will be recalled from
Chapter
One.
The development of his
communication theory, together
with the
outline of a theory of social
evolution, allow him to make
a more
precise determination of this
relationship.
He summarizes the
original critique made against him

in

the following way:

... from the conservative side,
the misgivings readily arise
that a transferring of the
doctor-patient model to political praxis
of large groups would encourage
the uncontrolled exercise of
force on
f Self " ap P°! nted elites,
who close themselves off against
notPnt
i°
tS
d ° gmat C claims of
Privileged access to true
insights
h
T°the
°" the ° tr
ther s,de
the misgiving arises that the
same
mnH
model
leads to a rationalistic denial of the
militant element in the
n
0 W th P° ]l ,cal .°P ponents
because the pacifist illusion
arises Jhat
ariIls
that th
the criticalf insight will by itself
destroy the
dominating dogmatism of existing institutions. 62
'

J

’

.

'

,

Drawing on the differentiation between reconstruction
and

critique on one hand, and action and discourse on the
other, Habermas
now attempts to specify his understanding of the
relationship between
theory and praxis;

he remains, however, particularly concerned to

retain the centrality of the activity of reflection he found
so

striking

if,
in

62

in

the psychoanalytic model.

He describes

it

in

this way;

The meditation of theory and praxis can only be clarified
to begin with, we distinguish three functions which are measured
terms of different criteria:
the formulation and extension of

Habermas, Theory and Practice,

p.

16.
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critical

theorems which can stand un t-n c#~
e
n ° f P r ° CeSSeS of
enlightenment in which such^heorlms
are
aDDi
ppliedd andd can be tested in a unique
manner by the initiation of
processes of reflection carried on
within certain groups toward which
these processes have been directed;
the selection of appropriate
strategies, the solution of tactical
questions, and thetrue
econd authentlc insights; and ° n
the third
:

;

•

.

ati

ni

s™“^i"

-

0 ii:»

>

From this perspective, the theory can
have as its referent
all

members of the society, and this, despite
the fact that numbers

of them (and particularly members of the
ruling class) do not

participate

in

the activity of its generation.

In

such a situation

of course, genuine confirmation of the theory
remains unattainable
until

such time as all

are able to participate

in

the interaction

situation of discourse.

distinguishing discourse from what he calls the

In

organization of processes of enlightenment
the latter

(initially)

'can

by their situations of

1

,

Habermas argues that

be confined to the groups distinguished

interest" 64

.

The theory serves primarily to enlighten those to whom it is
addressed about the position they occupy in an antagonistic social
system and about the interests of which they must become conscious in
this situation as being objectively theirs.
Only to the degree that
organized enlightenment and consultation lead to those groups toward
which this is directed actually recognizing themselves in the
interpretations offered, do the analytically proposed interpretations

63
64

ibid.

,

p.

32.

ibid.

,

p

31

.

-
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b

e

:nn t^:ts

:Uu:;!:„

capable of action"”

0

an

d0eS

e

attributed
a«u:t; vV bbecome
ec
f
the ^al interest of a
group

^

The organization of enlightenment,
then, can be considered

successful

to the extent

that

it

initiates processes of reflection.

Failure to achieve this suggests
that the theory

is

in

need of

correction.

The third aspect of the relationship
between theory and
praxis concerns the organization of
political action.

Habermas

is

very clear at this point that such
organization cannot be directly

derived from the theory.

-'While the theory

legitimizes the work of

enlightenment, as well as providing its own
refutation when

communication fails,

...

it

can by no means legitimize

a

fortiori

the

risky decision of strategic action." 66

Habermas' major concern here

is

to demonstrate that the

generation of theory and the organization of action are two separate
processes, despite their mediation via the organization of
en

1

i

ghtenment

.

political action;
head, as

6 5

6 6

it

Theory cannot be subjected to the requirements of
nor can

it

be asserted dogmatically over the

were, of the people to whom

ibid

.

,

p.

32

ibid

.

,

p.

33.

it

is

addressed.
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Habermas

(almost painfully)
aware of the
necessity for
''tak
a partisan positionwith a,
the conseguences
thereby
incurred.
There comes a moment of
choice for groups
which consider
tHemseWes 'theoretically
enlightened':
they must choose
"with a
to their opponents,
in each instance
between enlightenment
and
struggie. thus between
maintaining and breaking
off
cationis

,

co™,

Because Habermas can
theoreticaily presuppose a
(counterfactua,

-interrupted reiationship between
opposing groups, he can
insist
that oniy discursive

-Possible

at

interaction between

that point

in

a,

,

participants (which

is

time) can decide the
truth of the theory

Prom this perspective,
political activity becomes

a

"moment of a

coliective process of education
or consciousness
formation which
not yet concluded" 69

is

.

It

seems clear from the above, and
from other of his

writings, that the breaking off
of communication and dialogue
as occurs when there

distasteful

is a

to Habermas.

resort to militant struggle
He opts

-

-

such

is

instead for a process of
'radical

reformism' which he defines as
"an attempt to use the
institutions of
present day capitalism in order to
challenge and to test the
basic or
kernal institutions of this system" 7 '.
Inserted into his theory of

08

6 9

ibid

.

,

p.

36.

ibid

.

,

p.

38

ibid

.

,

p.

ZjO.

See Frankel,

.

"Habermas Talking: An Interview",

|

oc

.

ci t.

.

p

.

53.
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social evolution,

this amounts to actively
attempting to create

legitimation and motivation
problems

in

the society,

for the re-politicization
of the public sphere.
for this dissertation

in

this regard

might point out today that

in

is

that

is.

to push

Of major relevance

the following cogent.

'.One

advanced capitalism, changing
the

structure of the general system
of education might possible
be more
important for the organization of
enlightenment than the ineffectual
training of cadres or the building
of impotent parties.

71

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

pp.

31-32.
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CHAPTER
EDUCATION:

IV

THE FORMATION OF A TECHNOCRATIC
CONSCIOUSNESS

The Possibilities for Praxis

One of the more consistent charges
levelled at Habermas is
that his work contains few guidelines
for a political praxis, and
as

was just noted, that

it

actually shifts concern away from
the concrete

realities of social and political

life.

while some, such as Hiller,

see the work as nothing more than a
"provocative cul-de-sac" 1

,

most

commentators have reserved judgement at this
stage, making clear at
the same time, however, that the theory

is

infusion of practical politics

to make good

if

it

is

badly in need of an
its promise.

John Keane, for example, writes:

Until a theory of organization is built into the
dialect of
distorted and unrepressed interaction, Habermas' critical
theory will
suffer the ironic fate of all preceding critical theory.
It will be
left without either the rationale or the means of
revolutionizing
late
capi tal ist society. 2

It

1

2

Miller,
Keane,

is

certainly true that Habermas offers little

"Review of Legitimation Crisis", loc. cit.,
"Habermas on Work and Interaction",

172

loc.

cit.

p.

in

the way

220.
p.

100.
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Of a concrete program
as that

is

frequent, y understood.

part
this stems from his
commitment to the belief
that the oniy people
who can legit imatel
y decide on the particuiars
of strategic poiitica,
,

action are those who are
willing to engage

consequences of that engagement.

in

it.

and to risk the

This implies a strong
critique of

the image of the revolutionary
vanguard, formuiating and
impiementing
a political strategy
with little regard to the
needs and interests of
the people on whose behalf
it is supposedly
acting.
t stems
too>
from his previously noted lack
of faith in militant activity
,

,

as a

possibility, given the nature of
advanced capitalist societies.
says

in

an

i

He

nterv ew wi th Boris Frankel
i

must say that to think of revolution
raises a lot of
One question is whether there can
be any type of
reyolufonary, i.e. rapid and violent,
classical change of a system
which s so complex as ours is, without
a breakdown which is selfm n anY Ca e th t IS 3 breakdown
of ba sic functions of the
svltem hbeginning withh%fuel? and ending
system,
in water, etc. 3
’**
„
questions.
.

1

.

|

'

’

-

It

nothing
will

in

does not follow from this, however, that
Habermas offers
the way of guidelines for political

be argued here,

action;

the object of the political

impl

i

rather,

it

cat ions of his

theory differs from that frequently associated
with the notion of
practical politics'.

Habermas'

political

a

program concerns the

formation of consciousness, and of the institutional
structures which
shape and support

it.

It

is

Frankel, "Habermas Talking:

here,

An

for Habermas,

Interview",

loc.

that the source of

ci t.

,

p.

58.

genuine individual and social
transformation

is

to be found,

F rom

this point of view, destruction
of the form (the visible

institutional representations of
advanced capitalism) will not

necessarily impinge at all on the
content (the internalized

consciousness which supports and reproduces
it).*

To place this within the context
of Habermas'
of the relationship between theory
and praxis,
the political

it

re-formulation

can be argued that

implications of his work are most clearly
visible at

the stage designated

'organization of processes of enlightenment',

rather than at the stage of the development
of political strategy.

Only when people are able to understand
themselves, through engaging

"

Contr oversy over this issue has a long history.
One of the more
recent significant contributions to the discussion
has come from
the Frankfurt School's analysis of the failure of
Soviet Communism
as being a function of (at least in part) the mistaken
assumption
that changed social conditions necessarily effect a
changed
consciousness in the members of the society.
Habermas' work on the
developmental logic of world-views can add considerably to the
strength of this analysis.
In a recent article on Russian
popu lists, Aileen Ke y captures the con t rove rsy in a very graphic
fash on
1

1

i

Against Bakunin's credo that violent destruction of the
existing order was the quickest path to utopia, (Herzen)
argued that those who seek to raze the field of history
to ashes are overgrown students, living in a world of
abstractions, unaware that "this field with all its wheat
and cockle is the immediate ground of the people, of all
its moral life, all its habits and all its consolations".
The popular consciousness, as the product of the past,
contains the contradictions of the past. 4
4

Aileen Kelly,
"Good For the Populists",
New York Review of Books
Volume XXIV, Number II, June 23, 1977, P- lA.

,
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the PrOCe5S ° f ref,ecti

-

'

"tersubj ect ve activity,
as the makers
i

of history can they act
consciously to transform
their present
historical circumstance.
The form of that attempted
transformation
will depend on who is
involved, when, and with
what purpose in mind.

It

political

certainly possible to critique
this as

is

action,

but

it

is

a

program for

inaccurate to argue that Habermas'

theory does not contain, or
cannot generate, such

a

program.

As was mentioned at the end
of the previous chapter,

Habermas has,

in

fact, explicitly endorsed a program
of radical

reformism, a policy he defines as "an
attempt to use the

institutions of present day capitalism
to challenge and to test the
basic or kernel

In

the

institutions of this system" 5

.

interview referred to earlier, Habermas
mentions

specific examples of what he considers the most
effective kind of
political action

in

advanced capitalist societies (he

is

careful

to

point out that this will vary from country to
country, depending on
the particular situation):

organizaing wild-cat strikes and

inserting workers' demands into clearly political

frameworks;

mobilizing larger sections of the population on specifically
political

5

Frankel

issues;

,

taking the more liberal or progressive politicians

"Habermas Talking:

An

Interview",

1

oc

.

c

i

t

.

p.

53.
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at

their word and pushing for
promised changes and reforms
"without

any concern for the vested
interests of economically and
politically

dominating groups" 6

In

.

other words, Habermas

is

concerned to

exploit all possibilities of promoting
motivation and legitimation
crises in the society.

This follows very naturally, of
course, from

his analysis of the possible
sources of breakdown in late capitalist
soc ety
i

Habermas has, at various times, referred
to the educational

system as one of the institutions most
amenable to this policy of
radical

reformism.

He was explicitly concerned with
such

possibilities during the student uprisings of the
late sixties;

and

his subsequent work contains numerous
references to the educational

system, so

it

has continued to be of significance for him

theoretically.

He has recently

more involved at a practical

indicated his

intention of becoming

level.

will get involved in curriculum issues for high schools ...
think that these material questions of what the children will learn
are relevant if the hypothesis is correct that the educational system
will be the promising locus of creating legitimation and motivation
problems in this capitalist system. 7
I

I

Developing

6

7

ibid

.

,

p.

54.

ibid

.

,

p.

57.

a

theory of education based on Habermas' work

177

would seem to be

a

fruitful endeavor on a number
of counts:

first,

U

WOUld PrOVide 3 mec ^ an sm by
which to consider the
possibilities
contained in that work for the
generation of a political praxis;
i

second, because there are numerous
implications for education

throughout his work (both explicit
and implicit),

a

systematic attempt

to draw them out and constitute
them as a theory would provide
a

perspective fromwhichto reflect back on
the theory itself;
finally, a Habermasian theory of
education, radical

and,

aim and

in

content, would contribute to the body of
theory known as philosophy
of education.

The significance of that contribution
will be

considered according to its ability to
education which emerged so dramatically
seventies;
in

(2)

(I)
in

extend the critique of
the late sixties and early

shed light on the apparent faltering of
that critique

the past few years; and

(3)

further the search for

a

genuinely

radical education.

Accordingly, this chapter will examine, through the lens
of

Habermasian categories, the present functioning of education
America, and provide

a

in

perspective from which to view recent

critiques of that functioning.

The following chapter will develop,

on the basis of the first three chapters, the rudiments of

a

radically-motivated theory of education.

It

be made

in

should be noted at this point that while reference will
the following discussion to the system of education

in

178

general, the primary focus
and college level.

win

be on education at the
high school

This emphasis responds to
Habermas' conviction,

based on his work both on the
development of communicative
competence
and on the crisis tendencies
of late capitalism, that
it is

adolescents

in

particular who are

in a

position to develop critical

perspectives on the society which are
both far-reaching and telling.

179

The Formation of Technocrat

ir.

Con sc ousness
i

Will

It

be argued

in

this chapter that Habermas'

theory of

knowledge-constitutive interests, despite
the difficulties associated
with it, provides a useful overall
framework for a discussion of
current educational structures
and activities.
his distinction between

More specifically,

instrumental and communicative
acitivity

serves to anchor a critique of that
operation.
will

be developed

fashioning

a

that the current educational

'technocratic consciousness':

'technical man

',

assimilated to
in

is

it

project

is

seeks to create

i

scientific and technological society.

a

a

This stands

concerned to develop what

'communicative consciousness';

this point of view, would have as

education, from

its primary orientation the main-

tenance and expansion of intersubjectivity.

It

would be concerned

with the transmission and mediation of social
understandings
values, traditions, beliefs

participate

in

one of

speak ng and acting subjects who are
completely

contrast to an educational endeavor

might be called

The argument which

-

with

a

-

of

view to enabling students to

deliberation and rational decision-making about the

future functioning of their social world.

A critique of education,

then, would pursue the process by which education has been
perverted
by the migration of purpos ve- rat iona
i

an

interactional kind;

it

1

systems of action into those of

would promote the kind of reflective

activity which would lead to the action necessary to re-const tute the
i

appropriate relationship between communicative and instrumental
activity

in

education.

180

It

may be helpful at this point
to re-state the essential

distinction that Habermas draws
between instrumental and

communicative action:

^i“

objects

ter

n
P
e
f
i
9
(or at the'tev:rof
p os sib, : i „

te r-’
su jective communication), we
encounter objects of the type of
speak, ng and acting subjects;
here we experience

:™^fit?

which

s

ln

principie

a

-

persons
p

-d

to

utterances

und:::^

The former relationship treats of
manipulation and control.

The process of theory construction,
hypothesis testing, observation
and measurement culminates in the formulation
of information which is

verifiable, general izable, and ultimately, technically
usable.

It

searches out the regularities of nature, such that
they might be

understood more clearly and utilized more effectively.

The latter relationship

is

of a different order:

here we

encounter other human beings, "speaking and acting subjects",

it

is

a

relationship of communication and interaction rather than of control.
Such interaction both aims at and reflects some kind of mutual

understanding;

it

is

representative of the broader social under-

standings that we share and on the basis of which we structure our
lives.

8

Accordingly, the knowledge generated

Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 8.

in

this encounter

is

1

interpretive rather than informative:

knowledge, coming at the end of

movements;

rather

a

it

is

8

not a deduced predictable

series of carefully controlled

draws on different traditions and beliefs,

it

mediating the nuances of those interpretations.

It

acts to broaden

the consensus obtaining between people about the
possible ways and

mot ves of living.
i

An

idea of education as both representative of, and

pursuant to, the maintenance and expansion of intersubjectivity has
its

roots in the Greek tradition;

clearly identified

the

in

its current expression

idea of a

liberal

is

arts education.

most
Michael

Oakeshott, one of the most eloquent proponents of such an education,

describes

it

in

these words:

... (education) is a transaction between human beings and
postulants to a human condition in which newcomers are initiated into
an inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief ...
(Education is not) acquiring an aptitude for imitating current adult
human performances;
it is learning to perform humanly.
Education is
not acquiring a stock of ready-made ideas, images, sentiments, beliefs
etc.;
it is learning to look, to listen, to think, to feel, to
imagine, to believe, to understand, to choose, and to wish.
It is a
postulant to a human condition learning to recognize himself as a
human being in the only way in which this is possible;
namely, by
seeing himself in the mirror of an inheritance of human understandings
and activities and thus himself acquiring (in the words of Leibniz)
the character of un m ro r v vant ... acquiring the ability to throw
back upon the world his own version of a human being in conduct which
9
is both a self-disclosure and a self-enactment.
i

9

i

i

The Engagement and Its Frustration",
"Education:
Michael Oakeshott,
Education and
in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (Eds.),
and
Routledge
Boston, Massachusetts:
The Development of Reason
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972, p. 22.
.
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accord with this conception,
the Greeks understood

In

education as

"serious and orderly initiation
into an intellectual,
'mag, native, moral, and
emotional inheritance" >•
(and to that
a

end, a

carefully worked out curriculum
helped channel the thought
and attention
of the learner); moreover,
it was considered an
"engagement to learn
by study"
n other words
educat ion requ red effort d
sc pi ine
.

I

,

i

,

and concentration on the
part of the learner.
imp ied "detachment from
the
I

" er

i

Thirdly, education

immediate local world of the learner,

current concerns and the direction

6

i

it

gives to his attention" 12

its

.

5 an i^ted not by the
inclinations he
brines wiih'hlm
h
bu ‘ b y 'ntimetions of excellences
and aspirations he
has n!,
^ a’reamed
of;
here he may encounter not answers
to the
"loaded"
n
0
f "
bUt questions wh 'oh have never
before
occurred to him; here he may acquire
new "interests" and pursue them
uncorrupted by the need for immediate
results;
here he may learn to
seek satisfactions he had never yet
imagined or wished for! 13
'

1

.

\

Finally,
personal

a

teacher

1

°

1

12
13
14

'bid

.

ibid

.

ibid

.

ibid

.

ibid.

pp.
p

’

implicit

in

in

this

.

p.

23-24
24

25.

a

idea of education

'teacher' and

a

is

the notion of

'learner* " 14

whom the heritage of the culture takes on

form, and

,

'

transaction between
one

is

living'

.

^

1*

it

is

his/her function to impart

it:

a

.

The

concretely

"to teach

is
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to bring

teacher

about that, somehow, something of worth
intended by a

it

learned, understood and remembered by a
learner" 15

is

The idea of inquiry contained

education

this conception of

strikingly similar to the kind of hermeneutical activity

is

which Habermas made so central

cognitive interest.
tradition

in

.

16

to his discussion of the practical-

Scattered references to the hermeneutic

recent educational

in

but growing

interest

educational

philosophy.

formulation of

a

in

literature 17 indicate an embryonic

its more explicit
It

incorporation into

would certainly be germane to any

theory of education based on Habermas' work.

One of the more salient (for this discussion)
this Greek concept of education

is

that

it

features of

explicitly sets itself

apart from what we would describe as technical or vocational

education.

It

has no extrinsic

'end'

or purpose.

... for the teacher, it is part of his engagement of being
human; for the learner, it is the engagement of becoming human.
It
does not equip the newcomer to do anything specific; it gives him no

15

ibid.

16

See Habermas,

17

Knowledge and Human Interests

,

pp.

1

6

1

7

1

-

"Toward a Remaking of
(ed.),
Heightened
Pinar
William
in
Curricular Language",
Curriculum
Theory.
and
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution
Corporation,
Publishing
197^,
McCutchan
Berkeley, California:
See,

PP.

for example, Dwayne Heubner,

36-53.

1

8*1

a Vanta 9 e °« r
other men,
points to’no
^
E
h
participating in thi,
0
large part of an inheritance
Sma " ° r
of human understandings! *"

and

it

“

ZIT

’

seems quite clear at this
point that education

It

in America
has, as a primary focus,
the equipping of students
with the various

occupational skills necessary for
effective participation
social order.

the

in

From the point of view of
the position just examined,

modern education has,
than an initiation

in

fact, acquired an extrinsic
purpose;

into understandings, education

is

rather

now primarily an

initiation into the skills, activities
and attitudes required for
that participation.

(although

it

is

From

Habermasian perspective, this bespeaks

a

not a necessary correlate of) a
de-emphasis on the

communicative aspects of the educational
endeavour
instrumental.
this.

A brief historical

in

favour of the

glance at the shift will clarify

19

Techn ca -vocat ona
1

i

i

1

education was once not considered

education, but rather as an alternative to education
for those not
able to enter the traditional schools and
universities.

1 8

Oakeshott, "Education:
loc

19

.

c

i

t

,

p.

It

was

The Engagement and Its Frustration",

26.

See especially Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement Its
Frustration" loc. cit Supplementary references include Michael
Katz (ed.) School Reform: Past and Present
Boston, Massachusetts:
Little, Brown and Company 1971 and Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas,
and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the
Twentieth Century Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Company 1973*
.

,

,
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considered at the time of its
inception (in the early
eighteenth
century) as the development
of useful skills for the
poor:
while its
rhetoric was altruistic, its
intent was more utilitarian.
Such a

program would not only service
the needs of the growing
industrial
economies of Europe, but it would
also further the integration of
the
society (by extending more control
over potentially disruptive
elements).
these

Always responsive to the changing
economic requirements,

trade-schools', as they were known,
expanded rapidly at the

time of the industrial

revolution, gradually spawning institutions

which catered not only to the poor, but
also

to

those entering the

newly created commercial positions
necessitated by the burgeoning of

economic life.

The need for widespread cheap education
became

paramount for the continued expansion of the
industrial and commercial
world;

the call

for public education has its roots here.

call was frequently couched

invoking, as

it

in

the rhetoric of social

Such

a

reform,

did, concerns for justice and equality, but

it

was, at

the same time, closely tied to the needs of the
newly evolving social

order.

Two quotes from Horace Mann, one of the leading American

educational

theorists of the time,

illustrate well

standing of the function of education as

nineteenth century.

Speaking

in

18A2,

it

this dual

was conceived

in

underthe mid

he said:

Education ... beyond all other devices of human origin, is
the great equalizer of the conditions of men - the balance wheel of
the social machinery ... It does better than to disarm the poor of

186

their hostility toward the
rich

In a

speech

prevents being poor.

it

;

20

which he was trying to make
a case to the

in

business community for public
education, he said the following:

a
in

e

y

st^k

the

:f ;o;S,;
police so vigilant

t0

^ds c^d

e

a te

™'l

*?

l

^

J Sff^ti^’Jo^’p^tSOT^i Zr
«
L:^m V"" Z
T-t;
Z
trai^ng

b

e

P

the?e °?n ::
a

our

h

and wou d^not
I

mena^of^sel f -pro tec ttoi^and^nsu ranee?

S'"""- ^

‘

th *

The gradual assimilation of education
to the economic world,

particularly as this has occurred since the
late nineteenth century,
has been well documented over the last
ten years by authors such as

Michael Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring,
Sam Bowles, and Herb
22

Gmt'S.

They have sought to demonstrate, and they
have amassed

considerable evidence

in

doing so, that, contrary to the rhetoric of

American education, schools

in

America have not only had the teaching

of occupation skills as a primary concern, they
have also inculcated

2 0

Quoted n Samue Bow les and Herb Gintis, Schoo ling in Capitalist
America:
Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic
Life, New York:
p"!
Basic Books,
976
28
i

1

1

2 1

,

.

Quoted in Clarence J. Karier, "Business Values and the
Educational State", C. Karier, P. Violas and J. Spring, op. cit.
p.

22

.

12

.

Katz, op. cit .; Karier, Violas and Spring, op. cit.; and Bowles
and Gintis, op. cit.

’
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the attitudes and
values necessary for
the continuation
of the
Present economic (and
poiiticai) system, and
that, in addition,

have functioned to
.aintain and re-produce
,S at

a

Cass structure

the ba5iS of that
system's operation.

they

which

cor
contrast
>trast to
fo claims
.

,

that education

in

America

is

"the
the nrpaf
great equal, zer of the
conditions

of men", these authors
arque
that
y 6 tnat

>

ns Karier j
as
describes

it, "The
exists as an instrument of
social and economic
power for
the most influentia.
and elite groups in
society, and for the

school

...

political and social
organizations through which
the society
managed" 2 3

is

.

that

it

One aspect of this transition
that illuminates the
argument
was a shift from communicative
to instrumental focus is

pointed to

in

Walter Feinberg's analysis of
the intellectual

foundations of twentieth century
liberal educational policy.
Michael Apple,

in

the effect that

theorizing

in

his review of Feinberg's book,
cites the author to

the major differences between
educational

the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries was "the

extent that the requirements of
sicence and technology found a place
in

the theory" 24

.

Educational

were ethically based;

theories of the nineteenth century

the focus of

later theorizing,

Karier, "Business Values and the Educational
Stated,
p.

6.

including

loc.

cit.

*

Quoted in Michael Apple, "Rationality as Ideology:
Review of
Reason and Rhetoric
Educational Theory. Vol
?fi. N.. m h»r
Winter 1976. p. 12**.
,

.

i
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discussion on human nature
and the function of
education was
conscious
designed, Feinberg argues,
"to meet shifting socia,
and
technological requirements"”.
The argument being
developed here is
not intended to imply
that education
should return to the moral

values of the nineteenth
century to secure a iegitimate
basis for its
operations;
it is to suggest,
however, that the standards
of science
have gradually taken over
the role once enjoyed by
the standards of
morality.
This shift was celebrated in
the early twentieth century
by industrialists and
reformers alike - as far as
the latter were
concerned, the application of
apparently neutral scientific
and
technological principles to the
institution of education held

distinct promise as a way to
ameliorate the more repressive
features
of the society.

That faith in the potential of
science for

education remains virtually unassailed
today.

Apple,
in

in

his review of Feinberg's book,
succinctly describes

the following quotation the appeal
of science for educational

theorists, and at the same time points out
how science, as

a

linguistic

system, has assumed the status of an ideological
world-view for

education.

(Note that while the quotation refers
specifically to the

progressive reformers of the twenties,
in

2 5

a

modern context.)

ibid.

its content

is

equally relevant
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SC enCe and technology)
offered a mode ’of description
\
that °J
P° Werful than Previous
ways of talking about educational
event!

T*

=crc ascSrrjM-a r:,i r

even more, impor^n^thln'^r^e^^esb ?'
0
p!ov
"def.n.t.on of the situation".
Science, with its !nfe!r!d1oiic
of
efficiency and control
performed a legitimating or
justificatory
unc ion ... (Legitimating language)
reassures a number of groups and
P
the
educator
•*
himself, that he knows
?• nue dom
and has a°Mah?
9h
tl**'
to
co "5'
S what he has been doing all along.
Flnalfv
.. Fma
ly
not^ only did it justify educators*
activity ... but it
also helped attract recruits, committed
individuals who would labor
for the cause.
Furthermore, it acted as a hortatory
device that
could prescribe action that should be
taken by various individuals
and groups.
This was primarily a political use of
language in which
science and technology carried a logical
imperative and an ideological
commitment needed to convince people to join a
movement for
ameliorative institutional reform, 26
,

.

This
its mark.

is

precisely the point at which Habermas' critique finds

Unlike some of the more intransigent adherents to the

Greek tradition of education, such as Oakeshott, Habermas
would not be
indignant about the incorporation of scientific, technical,
and

vocational enterprises into the institution we know as education.

would not, for example, consider science

knowledge (as Oakeshott does)

-

a

second-class form of

he would view it, on the contrary, as

indispensable to the continued transformation of the world

2 6

Apple, "Rationality as
loc.

ci t.

,

p.

126.

He

Ideology:

in

which we

Review of Reason and Rhetoric"
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live, and thus to the
projected emancipation of
mankind.

On the

other hand, he would be quite
opposed to the assumption
that
scientific and technical knowledge
was the most valid, or
valuable,
form of learning;

and he would argue vehemently
that to the extent

that the technical ethos begins
to invade the conception
of education
as an institution and as an
activity, to that extent it
becomes

instrumental.

Education, for Habermas, must
recognize that

activity of communication;

it

is

an

must remain rooted in, responsive
to,

it

and committed to the continued
expansion of,

Accordingly,

it

i

ntersubject

i

v

i

ty

must reverse the present trend towards
its

assimilation to the logic of scientific and
technological progress.

Such a perspective enables us to discern
more clearly that
the current educational

project

technocratic consciousness.
latter

in

is

indeed the formation of a

Habermas captures the essence of the

the following:

Technocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of an
ethical situation, but the repression of "ethics" as such
as a
category of life. The common, positivist way of thinking renders
inert the frame of reference of interaction in ordinary
language, in
which domination and ideology both arise under conditions of
distorted communication, and can be reflectively detected and broken
down.
The de-politicization of the mass of the population, which is
legitimated through technocratic consciousness, is at the same time
men s self-objectification in categories equally of both purposiverational action and adaptive behaviour.
The reified models of science
migrate into the socio-cultural lif e -wo rid and gain objective powe
over the latter's self-understanding. The ideological nucleus of
this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the
practical and the technical. 27

2 7

Habermas, Toward

a

Rational

Society

,

pp.

112-113.
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Apple's quote makes
science of

a

educators;

clear how the image contained

it

rational, predictable order could seem
desirable to

what was less clear to them,

to appearances and self-presentation,

implicit moral meanings of their own.
to by Habermas, which has

critique.

in

it

seems,

is

that, contrary

science and technology carry
It

is

this dimension, pointed

remained impregnable to understanding and

Science appears to eschew moral and normative
issues;

but

as Habermas has pointed out,

its underlying premise is the value of empirical
scientific
theories, and this not simply hypothetically, but normatively.
For
with its first analytic step, it already presupposes,
normatively,
that behaving in accordance with technical recommendations
is not
only desirable but also rational. 28

Progress, efficiency,
ex pan s ion

-

industrial growth, and continued

these hall ma rks of capitalist society are po rtrayed, and

accepted, as rational, as natural.
this

'rationality

1

asserts itself

Within an educational framework,
in

the assumption that the

educational system should have, as its primary goal, meeting the
intellectual and manpower needs of
and powerful nation.
be comprehended as

a

highly complex,

industrialized

Any questioning of such 'rational' ends can only

romantic and old-fashioned.

Habermas has commented directly on this assimilation of

2 8

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

p.

269-

192

education to the technological needs
of the society

entitled "The University

University"

in

in a

Democracy

-

in an

essay

Democratization of the

which he outlines the tasks he
considers the

university has an obligation to perform
vis-a-vis the society. 25
He uses,
in

a

as a counterpoint,

German newspaper

in

the following news

January of

1

item which appeared

967

In the vicinity of Sde Boker in
the Negev, Israel's larqe
desert, Ben-Gurion wants to found a university
town to serve the
exploitation of this desert area. The new town
is being planned for
ten thousand stdudents and the corresponding
number of faculty, and
is to bring Israeli youth into
contact with the development of’the
desert through the acquisition of the necessary
knowledge of the
natural sciences and technology.
It is intended primarily to
develop the trained personnel who will be necessary
for future
industry in the desert.
In particular, the development of such
industry will involve enterprises that require much
scientific
knowledge and little raw material. 30

Habermas acknowledges that

a

university has

a

responsibility

not only to transmit technically utilizable knowledge, but also to

produce it;

in

contrast to educators such as Oakeshott, Habermas

would have no quarrel with these as necessary aspects of the educational

enterprise.

But he goes on to argue that there are three other

equally essential tasks which the university must perform
avoid the status of

29

3 0

a

mere instrument of the wider society.

Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
ibid

.

,

p.

1

if

,

pp.

1-12

it

is

to
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Third, the university has
always fulfilled a task
that is
not easy to define;
today we would say that it
forms
the
pol
t ical
consciousness of its students, 31
i

These tasks represent, for Habermas,
the communicative
aspects of the educational endeavor,
and thus are vital functions
for
the university.
Whether these particular tasks are
performed

consciously or not, however, does not
alter the fact that the
university, of its very nature, will
continue to transmit and convey

communicative (moral) meanings.

If

a

university defines itself, as

the Israeli one appears to do, simply
with regard to fulfilling

productivity needs,
at

the same time,

will
will

communicate

it

can obscure the fact that

it,

influences communicative action.
a

technical ethos:

transmit and legitimize

a

in

inevitably and
Such

a

university

an unreflected fashion,

set of normative structures,

and without the consciousness of its students.

it

indirectly,

The abdication of an

explicit role vis-a-vis communicative activity on the
part of the

university amounts to its progressive de-politicization:

31

ibid.

,

pp.

2-3

it

becomes
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a

tool

for the system of social

labor

with regard to the wider society,

it-c
its

•

traditional autonomy

its abiiity to

cogent on

society's operation, to argue
for justice, to protest

domination and oppression, to create
this

is

a

in

that

the face of

vision of the future

-

all

of

eroded.

The invasion of the technical ethos
into education

is

confirmed by developments internal to
the institution as well.

The

apparent superiority of scientific and
techical knowledge means that
valid knowledge comes to be associated
with facts, facts that are

verifiable and predictable;

interpretation, nuance of meaning,

becomes suspect, labelled 'subjective'.

Knowledge, under this

pressure, takes the form of object, something
which can be

transferred, unchanged, from one mind to another;
be deposited

in

the learner.

it

is

something to

(Paulo Freire has referred to the

process by which this occurs as the "banking" concept
of

education.

3

^)

of positivism:

This kind of education

Such a process, says

3 2

3 3

;

buttressed by the doctrines

reality if equated with only those phenomena which

can be classified, counter, explained,

mind" 33

is

i.e.,

turned into objects.

Inglis, bespeaks a "reifying habit of

and an education based on

it

encourages reification.

Paulo Freire,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed
Press, 1970, p. 50.

New York:

.

Fred Inglis,
Ideology and the Imagination
University Press, 1975, p. 111.

.

London:

It

Seabury

Cambridge
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obfuscates the self-formative
processes of both
social

i

nd v dual
i

i

structures, and dilutes the
reality that men are,

in

and
fact

the makers of history.

This

is an

than meanings.

education, then, which validates
things rather

History, for example, becomes
a series of facts

names, battles, dates

-

-

which one has either 'right' or
'wrong', and

which bear little apparent
relevance to the contemporary world.
The decline of history as a
subject of study reflects the severing
of

tradition necessary for the development
of the technical mind.
Alv.n Toffler's Future Shock carried
this to an extreme, arguing that

because information was changing so
rapidly (presumably he equates

knowledge with information),

it

was pointless to try and acquaint

students with their past.

object:

In

similar fashion,

it

becomes something one learns to speak or translate.

a

foreign language assumes the status of
The

mysteries of culture contained within its structure,
its capacity to
express the values and traditions of
is

squeezed out.

a

people

it

does,

a

clear that

i

ntersubject ve learning
i

and the we, as Georges Gurvitch describes
34

living quality

-

meaningless collection of

formulae and equations which must be learned
is

its

Even science is not exempt from this process of

reification, becoming, as

It

-

-

it

in

order to pass

a

test.

knowledge of the other
34

-

has very low

Georges Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge
New York:
Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row Publishers, 1972, p. 26.
,
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priority
as

in

the educational

systems of advanced capitalism,
bowing,

does, to the increasi ng
dominance of scientific and
technical
knowl edge
it

The technologizat ion of
education has proceeded

areas as well as the curriculum.
well

in

other

The metaphor of factory
captures

the operation of most educational

institutions

in

this country:

the need for mass production,
designed to develop more
commodities
at a cheaper price,

inevitably leads to mechanization,
the drive for

efficiency, atomization of the work
process, and uniformity of
product.

From an educational

perspective, the consideration that

large numbers of students have to
gain

knowledge within

a

against engaging

in

its challenge,

a

sufficient amount of

certain period of time exerts great
pressure
critical discussion of the material,
encouraging

examining alternative interpretations, and
the like.

Quantity overtakes quality.

Teaching machines reduce labor costs;

they also confirm the assumption that knowledge
consists of facts, of
'right'

answers;

televised lectures to overcrowded lecture halls

represent the grimmest caricature of the shift from
an interactional

encounter between teacher and learner to
one.

a

technical and instrumental

Again, however, Habermas would argue that

advancement which

is

the problem here;

it

is

not technological

such aids can be of immense

assistance to the educational enterprise, but not when they supplant
the transaction,

the communication.
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We return again to the
communicative meaning carried
by the
technica, invasion of
education.
intersubjectivity is ignored
or
subverted; coiiaborative
inquiry, aiming to sustain
and expand
mutual understanding, is
repiaced by the individual
acquisition of a
body of facts, the sole
purpose of which is to secure
the requisite
number of credits to obtain
a dipioma or degree.
Critical skills
are foregone for skills
in repetition and
computation.
Education
becomes a passport - to an
occupation, to financial
remuneration, to

status.

Education conceived as an initiation
"into an inheritance

of human achievements of
understanding and belief"

currency

”

no longer has

the contemporary world.

in

^Humanistic

Critique.

Many aspects of the above critique

represent echoes of the critique advanced

in

the sixties and early

seventies by authors such as Paul Goodman,
John Holt, Jules Henry,
Carl
a

Rogers, and Charles Silberman.

Collectively these authors paint

grim picture of American schools and
universities:

hierarchical structures;

the emphasis on competition;

system;

intellectual

the concern with

emotional experience;
irrelevant curriculum;

independence,

3 5

.

i

.

,

the grading

learning to the exclusion of

the push for uniformity and quiescence;

the

and the resultant suppression of spontaneity,

initiative, emotional expression, creativity, and the

Oakeshott, "Education:
oc c t
p. 22.
1

authoritarian,

The Engagement and Its Frustration,

1
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development of self-directed

1

36

earn ng
i

Efforts to address the problems
and needs so keenly observed
by these critics have taken
several

forms over the years:

development of the 'open classroom',

in

the

which students progress at

their own pace, free to shift
focus from one area of study
to another;
the development of a curriculum
more personally relevant to students;
the abolition of the grading and
examination systems;

and a change in

the role and function of the teacher,
captured in the term 'learning

facilitator'.

In

keeping with the proposal that affective

experiences should provide an essential
counter-balance to cognitive
learning, educators are using techniques
which facilitate the

development of self-awareness, of value clarifications,
of effective
interpersonal

skills, and of personal

and process of learning.

primary goal

While pedagogical

for the movement,

relationships

in

considered

the literature.

in

responsibility for the content
reform has been the

broader issues such as administrative

schools and teacher training programs have also been

This seems, on the surface, to represent
that which the earlier discussion made when

it

a

call

referred to the

necessity for education to recognize the extent to which
'communicative activity

36

1

.

Certainly

it

is

a call

See, for example, Charles Silberman, Crisis
York:
Random House, 1970.

similar to

in

it

was a

for a return to a

the Classroom

,

New
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a situation

which interpersonal skills
are considered of paramount
importance;
and the heavy emphasis
on individuality and
creativity
together with the affirmation
of persona, experience,
certainly seels
to run counter to the
transformation of human beings
into objects of
a technological society.
Yet it will be argued here
that, despite
protestations to the contrary, this
movement ultimately reflects
and confirms the technological
society whose manifestations
it

condemns;

in

and further, that it

is

this contradiction which has

blunted the thrust of an initially
effective impulse towards reform.

This ultimate attachment to
technological society can be
identified

in

two related areas:

(I)

despite its effort to transcend

the constricting rationality which
is dominant

in

the society (and

which Habermas has defined as an
'instrumental rationality'), the
reform movement retains a technological
self-understanding;
in

and

(2)

its overriding concern to rescue the
alienated and dominated

individual, the movement fails to develop a sound
social and political

critique;

as a

result,

de-politicization.

it

These two aspects will be considered

The technological
is

ends up encouraging and legitimizing
in

turn.

self-understanding of the reform movement

revealed at the point at which,

in

students with genuine alternatives to

its enthusiasm to provide
a

demeaning and stultifying

education, the movement draws on the only body of knowledge that

appears to guarantee results:

technology.

Consequently,

in

the
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effort to resuscitate the interactional
encounter, the students, the

classroom, the teachers, are unobtrusively
turned into objects.

Consider the number of books spawned by
the reform movement which
consist of collections of exercises and
techniques designed to

achieve an already-designated goal
raising self-esteem, for getting
learning to be emphathic.

in

-

for clarifying values,

for

touch with one's feelings, for

One such book, unsel f-consc ious
y titled
1

Toward

Technology for Humanizing Education

a

tendencies rather explicitly.

In

,

reflects these

the opening chapter,

its author,

David Aspy, writes:

There are many models for describing the classroom interaction, but since we live in a technological society, an industrial
model is likely to be a communicative vehicle.
Thus, we can talk
about three stages of production:
(1) input,
(2) process, and
37
(3) outcomes.

There follows seven chapters outlining various exercises

designed "to construct

a

technology which will enable us to assess

and/or improve the levels of humaneness within classrooms" 38

exercises usually take the following form:
for example,

the raising of self-esteem

-

an object

is

Such

.

determined

and a set of exercises are

detailed which are supposed to achieve the stated purpose.

Thus, for

example, students might be asked to spend ten minutes giving only

37

38

David N. Aspy, Toward a Technology for Humanizing Education
Illinois:
Research Press Company, 1972, p. 7*
ibid

.

,

p.

15

.

-

.
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positive feedback to their partner;

or they might be asked to share

'new and good things that happened this week'
with the rest of the

group.
feel

It

not denied here that such exercises may help

a

student

better about himself, or that s/he may gain some deeper
self-

awareness as
that

is

a

result of the experience.

insofar as no attention

is

It

is

suggested, however,

paid to, for example, whether a

student actually has genuine positive feelings for another or not,
to
that extent, students are being treated as objects;

manipulated to achieve

a

they are being

certain, already designated, state.

When

the aim assumes greater significance than the students, a technical

ethos

is

providing the framework for the activity.

Jean Bethke Elshtain,

in

a

paper examining some of the radical

teaching proposals which have derived from the reform movement, points
out that one of the major aims of the proposals

'positive atmosphere", something that
"feel

is

40

reflects the movement's compatibility with
of human behaviour

-

it

the creation of a

assumed will help students

good" and "counteract (their) distress" 39

desired, rather than "pain and anxiety".

is

.

"Good vibes" are

Such an aim, she argues,
a

utilitarian understanding

assumes that "what matters

is

that the quantity

or yield of aggregate pleasure should be greater than the yield of

39

"Social Relations
Jean Bethke Elshtain,
Number 27, Spring 1976, p. 100.

40

ibid., p.

1

0A

in

the Classroom", Tel os
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unpleasure or pain" 41

,

That the expression of
pleasure may have

little connection either to
internal experience or to the
external
reality is finally of no consequence

This leads to the second aspect of
the movement's ultimate

attachment to a technological society:
penetrating critique of the social order
function.

This

is

in

not to suggest, however,

have ignored the need for social change;
it,

its

failure to develop

which

it

a

attempts to

that these educators

on the contrary,

they seek

envisioning the educational system as one of
the institutions

the society with greatest potential

for effecting

in

George Brown

it.

says, for example,

The greatest potential for change and significant
improvement
our individual predicaments and in our dilemma as
a society lies in
the school.
It is the one institution in Western society
outside the
family that most profoundly affects the human condition.
It is also
the
ns t tu t on that, though resistant, is the most practical
in which
to innovate ... If schools can be significantly changed elementary
through university - we can ameliorate the deleterious effects of
education and contribute substantial ly toward improving the human
condition - a contribution the schools are uniquely in a position to
make. 42
in

i

i

i

But the movement has stopped short of plumbing the depths of

the society which gave rise to the educational

4

42

ibid

.

,

p

.

1

Ok

system

it

so

.

George Brown,
Human Teaching for Human Learning.
Viking Press, 1971
PP- 8 9
,

.

New York:
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eloquently deplores.

The refusal

fashion the social, economi

education operates

is

c and

clear

Weingarter's book, School

in

to investigate

political

in

frameworks within which

this quotation from Postman
and

as a Subversive Activity

in _9

any systematic

.

The institution we call "school"
= f it
un001
. u
ls what
is
because we
made it that wav
f
S irrelevant
a s Marshall McLuhan says*
if
it shiplHc
l
en
r ° m rea,it
y» as Norbert Weiner says;
if it’educa e
n obsolescence,
K
ates
for
as John Gardner saysif it
°" fe3r '
as John Holt says;
if it avoids the prow
on f' i
,
t
learn, ng, as Carl Rogers says;
if it punishes creativity
and
independence, as Edgar Freidenberg says;
if
n short
it
nnt
doing what needs to be done, it m ust
be’changed?
t cL be chan ed
56
W Se men who > ln one wa or
Y
anothll^have^ff
V* intelligent, and new ways
offered us clear,
to use,
and nf,’ n9 S
656
635
the a,terna flves they suggest are
avaifab e th
available,
there is no reason to abandon hope. 43
i

i

V

;

<-

•

•

«;

,

.

'

™V

!

^

Nowhere here or

in

^

j

i

I

'

'

the rest of the book do the authors
make

any serious attempt to consider how American
education arrived at the

position so well catalogued above
to say that "we" made

it

-

except as Alan Graubard points out

that way. 44

Who?

Why?

The only conclusion

seems to be that the situation has come about out of
the rigidities of

bureaucracies, or the inadequate visions of individuals.
solution offered by Postman and Weingarter
the correction of such perspectives

-

-

The

the energetic pursuit of

involves no fundamental examin-

ation of the values and institutions of the society.

They frequently

Neil Postman and Charles Weingarter,
Teaching as A Subversive
Activity
New York:
Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1969, p. viii.
.

Alan Graubard,
p.

23.

Free The Chi ldren

.

New York:

Vintage Books,

1972,

20A

condemn the manifestations
of the social order

competition, acquisition and
status-seeking;

-

values of

norms of behav or such
i

as

rule-following and submissiveness

social

-

but they do not penetrate
the

structures which require those
qualities

in

its c

i

t

i

zens

from Habermas' point of view,
their analysis allows no room
for an understanding of the
political
a

and economic pressure towards

substitution of instrumental for
communicative action;

consequently, they legitimize

-

if

only be default

-

the increasing

technol og zat ion of the socio-cul
tural world, and confirm the
i

de-politicization required for the continued
operation of the soceity
other words, they contribute

In

of the motivational

in

large measure to the maintenance

syndromes of civil and fami

1

i

al

-vocat ional

pr vat sm.
i

i

One significant manifestation of the movement's

assimilation to technological society
of critical

thought.

is

its abetting of the demise

While one can appreciate the motivation behind

such suggestions as abolishing grades, encouraging
children to follow

their own initiative, and abandoning both the 'traditional'
classroom
and the

'traditional'

potential contained
thought.

teacher role,

in

it

is

important to recognize the

them for the loss of reflective, critical

This possibility emerges more clearly when these suggestions

are juxtaposed to the idea of education outlined by Oakeshott:
'serious and orderly

initiation into an intellectual,

as a

imaginative,
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"oral and emotional

inheritance",

a "detachment from the

an "engagement to learn by
study"

immediate local world of the
learner,

current concerns, and the direction

it

its

gives to his attention".

The sense of discipline and effort
connoted by this

description

is

often lost

Noting that one radical

in

the writings of the reform movement.

teaching manual contains suggestions for

teachers on how to counteract the belief
that intellectual work
"often accompanied by the feeling of doing
lonely,
labor" 4

is

isolated, hard

Elshtain writes:

,

The lonely, isolated, hard labor of Marx at work
on Das
Freud during his period of painful self-analysis
which
formed the basis of Die Traumdeutung perhaps? ... Both
Marx and Freud
saw their tasks, difficult and painful ones, as the
creation of ways
of looking at the world which were at odds with the
dominant reality.
The stress on "no pain" is reminiscent of B.F. Skinner's
goal of a
behavioural ist-technologist utopia - the creation of a world of
"automatic goodness" in which no one knows frustration nor pain. 46
Kapi_tal_ or

The ‘individualized study contract,

1

while responding to the

desirability that students be able to construct their own program of
study, also threatens to discount the substance of that program:

as

Elshtain points out, the statement that "anyone (can) get an A who

chooses to do the necessary quantity of work"

45
46
4 7

Elshtain, "Social Relations

in

47

reveals the tendency

the Classroom," loc. ci t.

,

p.

101.

ibid.

Quoted
p.

101.

in

Elshtain, "Social Relations

in

the Classroom," loc. cit.,
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to forget the quality.
ai lowing

Abandoning set curricuia

students to fo.iow their
own initiative

they 'choose'

to study can

in

terms of wha,

iead to the situation
reported by the New

York Times several months
ago,

in

which students can receive

school diploma without
having to read a book.

Fritz Peris'

favour of

in

4 8

a

high-

Phrases such as

'wisdom of the organism'
connote the corresponding

impress ion that the only
'wisdom' worth having

latently, already exists

in

is

that which, albeit

some way within the individual.

accumulated wisdom of the centuries,
presently gathered

in

The

libraries

and museums, attains the
status of 'second class'.

The issue of a curriculum which
figures here
a

-

again,

it

is

is

'personally relevant'

evident that this suggestion
responds to

perception that students have been
forced to learn bodies of

knowledge from which they feel alienated.
the blanket

At

the same time, however,

imperative of 'personal relevance'
allows no comprehension

of the 'manipulated consciousness'
most students bring to school.
If

Habermas' analysis

is

correct, a technocratic society requires

certain kinds of knowledge (pract ical -moral

considered irrelevant

-

for most students,

reflect merely the dominant

in

particular)

'personal

to be

relevance' will

ideology of the society.

Without the

accompanying ability to penetrate the smoke-screen
of ideological
manipulation, students will continue to mimic the wider
society.

4 8

Reported

in

the New York Times

,

May 29,

1977,

p.

1.
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Such suggestions, despite
their good intentions,
carry moral
meanings which legitimize and
confirm the process of de-po,
t c zat ion
the reform movement involves,
finally, a repudiation of
the •public',’
through contributing to the
^tivational syndromes of privacy
which
Habermas has described.
To escape the oppressive
domination of the
i

fact', the reform movement turned
to subjectivity:
opinion, everyone
Its content

is

entitled to express

secondary,

is

is

no general

everyone has an

|„

this momentum,

there are only individual truths
and

Critical examination of these, and
of their

underlying assumptions,
there

-

i

and every opinion counts.

its expression primary.

truth and morality disappear
individual moralities.

it,

i

is

discouraged

-

what

is

communicated

is

that

truth to be discovered.

From Habermas' point of view, the movement
for educational

reform responds to
But

a

legitimate perception of the educational world.

lieu of an explicit analysis of the social

in

supports it,

system which

refusing to commit itself to the necessary

in

transformation of the social and politcal conditions
which render
human beings to the status of passive and inert
objects, the movement

ultimately pursues

a

culture of withdrawal

rather than of protest.

The public is abandoned for the sanctuary of the private;

de-politicization, under these circumstances, can proceed unchecked.

This

0 PP r oss ve soc a
i

not to imply, on the other hand,

is

i

1

and po

1

i

t

ca

1

that a critique of

cond itions will necessarily

p

romo t e any
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kind of significant
educational

reform.

The 'social' critics

referred to earlier (authors
such as Michael Katz,
Clarence Karier,
Joel Spring, and Sam
Bowles and Herb Gintis)
have fared no better in
developing a genuinely 'radical'
education: where they have
no. ended
UP gravitating towards the
kinds of suggestions already
detailed, the
most common resort is to the
position best captured in
,van Mlich's

Phrase 'de-schooling'.

In a

certain sense,

it

could almost be

argued that their critique has
been too incisive:

institution

education as an

regarded as so completely
assimilated to the wider

is

workings of the capitalist society
that these authors are almost
forced
to conclude that changes in
the educational system can
accomplish
virtually nothing.
There seems no room in that
massively controlled
and administered bureaucracy for
anything like a radical education.

The last chapter of Bowles and Gintis'
book School inq

America reflects this impotence:

in

Capital ist

their critique has been so piercing

that education appears lifeless, the
feeble lackey of a capitalist

landlord.

They are forced to fall back on

a

tired formula:

"Hence

we believe ... that an equal and liberating
education system can only

emerge from

economic

it

broad-based movement dedicated to the transformation
of

life"'*

only that
that

a

a

9
.

The remainder of the chapter seems to imply not

liberating education requires such

must wait upon it.

few pages of the chapter

49

-

a

transformation, but

Their remarks on strategy occupy the last
hardly a political program of substance.

Bowles and Gintis, op. cit. p. 266.
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In

Search of An Alternative

The movement for radical educational

faltered

in

the past few years.

reform has indeed

The economic crisis has exerted

strong pressure for a return to more traditional

forms of education:

grades are becoming of greater significance for college students;
there

concern over statistics on dropping literacy rates;

is

and

there is discernible trend towards so-called 'traditional' schools

which emphasize discipline, respect for the teacher, and basic reading and writing skills.

The reform movement has little with which to

counter this growing pressure to abandon its enterprise.
theoretician who has offered some cause for renewed hope
Freire,

a

Brazilian educator who developed

literacy skills to peasants,

in

for

it

a

a

growing

America, and holds promise for

the continued pursuit of a radical education
in

Paulo

program for teaching

This theory has had

literature

program will be considered

is

program which was directly tied to

a

social and political critique.

influence on educational

a

(One

more detail

in

in

this country.

The

the following chapter,

intersects at many points with Habermas' work.)

It

will

theory offers

be argued

in

the following chapter that Habermas'

possibility for education which moves beyond that

a

proposed by the reform movement considered

possibility can be expressed as
formulation of

a

'rational

a

in

this chapter.

new project for education:

identity'.

This concept

is

That
the

drawn from

210

Habermas

essay, "On Social

'

Identity—,

development of ego identity

is

in

which he argue5 tha[

^

inextricably linked to the
discussion

of social evolution, and that
the designation 'rational'
represents
stage in the development of ego
identity corresponding to
Habermas'
postulated historically new stage of
human evolution.

A brief excursion

individual

into the developmental

relationship between

evolution*
its

identity and collective identity from
the point of view of

relationship to the theory of social

this point;

it

*

may be useful at

should further an understanding of the
projected

content of the concept of 'rational

In

identity'.

primitive societies, problems of identity do not
arise.

The mythical world images generated by the tribe
assign

place to every element of the culture,

threatening forces of nature.
social

a

formations, political

in

a

meaningful

an effort to stave off the

With the transition to traditional
institutions (such as the state or the

monarchy) gain a degree of autonomy with regard to the cosmic order.
At the same time,

the

the disintegration of mythical

for

individual, the perception that certain circumstances can be

brought under direct control

60

images allows,

-

Jurgen Habermas,
"On Social
974, pp. 91-103.

that

is,

the world no longer appears

Identity," Telos, Number 19, Sprinq

1

*

Note that this progression refers to one of the aspects central to
tracing the developmental logic of world-views.
See Chapter 3,
Sect ion ( v)
p. b
,

i

.
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as completely fortuitous.

of a 'self-identity',

This development encourages the
emergence

formulated

of the community (which

is

in

reaction to both the particularity

organized around the political

institutions)

and the universality of the cosmic order.

In

the following stage,

as Judaism and Christianity)

the rise of universal

religions (such

promotes the formation of an identity

which, for the first time, can be understood separate
from concrete
social

roles and norms of behaviour

-

the

individual can conceive of

himself as transcending his alliance to the political institutions.
This separation

aided by the disjunction between the sense of

is

equality before God, and the experience of inequality before the
political and economic institutions;

provide

a

complete

the power of the latter to

sense of collective identity falters.
in

the final

This tendency

is

stage, with an inevitable cleavage between

identity derived from un versal st ic structures (not religion as
i

such, but the moral

identity which

is

i

systems left over from religion), and collective

tied to a particular community.

This diremption, says Habermas, constitutes the "problem of

modern identity"
task:

5 1

ibid

.,

p.

95.

51

and

in

the face of

it,

he suggests the following

212

Craate anew he same integration of
the individual beings
with t-h*ir° a r-* icu1ar political
^
community within the horizon of a
£un versa! cosmic order
as was effected by the myth.
(The concrete
unity of the universal
the particular, and the individual.)
... This
time, however, ( the task m ust be accomplished)
under the extreme
cond.t.ons meanwhile posited by the modern ideas
of the freedom and
of the complete individuality of the human
subject. 52
-

i

.

From this perspective,

elements of both

a

a

'rational

identity' would contain

collective tie and an individualistic expression

Such an identity, Habermas suggests, would

... be grounded in the consciousness of universal and
equal
chances to participate in the kind of communication processes by which
identity formation becomes a continuous learning process.
Here ...
individuals are the participants in the shaping of the collective will
underlying the design of a common identity.
1

2 ... presuppose the validity of un versa
st c moral systems.
The latter ... can be linked with the basic norms of rational discourse.
This in itself is a step in the direction of a collective type of
identity which ... is grounded in the consciousness of universal and
equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming learning
processes. 53
i

1

i

i

A radically-motivated education based on the work of Jurgen

Habermas would situate itself with regard to this task.

57

ibid.

53

ibid., pp

.

99-100.

CHAPTER

v

EDUCATION: THE FORMATION OF
RATIONAL IDENTITY

The Concept of 'Rational

Idpnt-ii-y

'

The attempt to formulate a theory
of education based on
Habermas' work

is

immediately confronted with the
absence of

programmatic imperatives

in

that work.

chapter, this represents not so much
a position

internal

to

it.

a

As suggested in the previous

gap in the theory, but rather

Habermas' commitment to

discourse, predicated on

a

political consequence

the conviction that

willing to engage

in

in
a

a model

of

'consensus theory of truth', has its
it

is

only those who are

particular political action (and to risk
the

consequences of that engagement) who can legitimately
formulate the
strategy of that action.
articulated;

It

The context of the decision-making can be

the content belongs to the participants.

was argued

in

the last chapter, however,

to specify content does not

political

imperative

-

that the failure

imply that Habermas' work lacks a

rather, the theory offers both a direction for,

and guidelines to, political

activity.

From an educational point of

view, that direction can be expressed as the formation of 'rational

identity'.

political

A brief explication of this concept will

render the

imperative more tangible, and, at the same time, will

213
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indicate the crucial

The concept

role of education in its pursuit.

'rational

identity' captures the dialectical

relationship between individual and community which Habermas
has been

concerned to articulate from the very beginning of his work.
individual, from this perspective, only exists as part of

structure of intersubjectivity.
separate,

The idea of

a

a

The
social

monadic ego,

independent of the social world cannot suffice, for

denies the sociality which

is

development of ego- dent ty

.

i

i

an absolutely

it

intrinsic aspect of the

This does not deny the individuality

of which the ego is capable, but rather locates

it

as a derivative

I

of an

i

ntersubject ve process.
i

Identity is produced by socialization, i.e., by that through
which the developing person integrates himself for the first time in
a definite social system through the acquisition of symbolic publics.
The identity is secured and unfolded later on through individualization,
i.e., through a growing independence of social systems 1
.

And again, "In ego-identity

is

found the paradoxical

the ego as person is like to all other persons but
2
different from all other individuals"

is

relation that

absolutely

.

Tne mediation, as indicated above, occurs through the

1

Jurgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", Tel os
Summer 1975, p. ^52
/

4 ,

2

ibid

.

,

p

.

52

,

No.
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interactive, y

established and understood
sy m bo.s which constitute

ordinary language.

tha

nn g uistir: y ~:akes

5

and preservation of the
dialogue relation a d!a?t
individual, without which ego
9
realized. 3

Habermas

individuality

is

is

n

v

dity ° f
po::fb ,:
ec, P r ocal identification
n:
ndn-iH^tv
c
f °" e " ith another
ln the
both

I ?

i

'

9enel" a

'

'

not unique, of course,

in

this position lies

in

that constitution.

the
is

claiming that

socially constituted, nor that
language

medium of that constitution;

^

entity
dent
tj cannot ‘b'
be conceived,

his major contribution

in

is

the

extending

his articulation of the
historical

dimension of

By juxtaposing various
theories of ego

development (specifically those of
Piaget and Kohlberg) and his own
theory of social evolution, he can
locate the development of ego
identity within historically unfolding
social

formations.

From this

perspective, he argues that different social

formations reflect, and

require, different levels of ego identity.

The 'fully rational

society',

in

this schema,

ego development:

within,

a

full

individuation promotes, and

situation of full participation

only when all members of
in

reciprocally requires the highest level of

a

in

is

only possible

the community.

It

is

society can participate fully and equally

decisions of consequence to them and, at the same time, retain

their

individuality that there exists

a

possibility of creating the

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

157.
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'public sphere

1

,

an

ideal

retained

in

form (but submerged

substance) since the days of the bourgeois
social

in

revolutions.

An education formulated with regard to
the attainment of

'rational

identity' must, therefore, take cognizance of
Habermas'

discussion of the transformation from the present
form of social

organization to an historically new form:

it

is

predicated on an

understanding of human beings as able to become aware,
through
process of

i

a

ntersubject ve reflection and critique, of the selfi

formative nature of both their own development, and that of the
social

structures

in

which they live.

individual and a collective level,
to consider the extent

it

Proceeding on both an
would represent an attempt

to which people have been subjected

to

unnecessary authority structures, structures which, through the
invoking of illusory justifications based on distorted communication,

have come to constitute relationships of domination and exploitation.
Such ideological
be penetrated,

reflective

i

rationalization, both individual and collective, can

Habermas has consistently maintained, through

ntersubject ve activity.
i

To the extent that educational

institutions can promote such

activity, one that will enable people to recapture their historical
nature, to penetrate ideology and the distorted communication on

which

it

depends, and to conceive of the possibility of

social organization,

based on

a

universal

a

new stage of

linguistic ethic and
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prefiguring

a

tuat ion of moral and
political

freedom for all

members of the society, to
that extent will education
reflect the
thrust of Habe rmas
theoretical endeavor.

This conceptualization of
education calls to mind the
work
of Paulo Freire, the Brazilian
educator briefly mentioned in
the
last chapter.

Freire

is

To the author's knowledge,
neither Habermas nor

acquainted with the other's work,

a

fact which makes the

similarities between them even more
remarkable, and adds strength to
their respective analyses.
(Interesting in
this regard is the

different social and economic backgrounds
which have produced such
Similar theories.

Freire worked with illiterate
peasants

and underdeveloped economy;

in

a

rural

Habermas' milieu has been the highly

industrial and urbanized environment of
West Germany.)

While Freire's writings contain

a

revolutionary fervor

generally missing from Habermas' more circumscribed
style,

it

seems

clear that the two share an image of an education
based on dialogic

activity:

according to Freire, "Without dialogue, there

communication;
educat on" 4
i

In

and without communication,

is

no

there can be no true

.

lieu of that dialogic education, he continues,

Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed

,

p.

81

there

is

a
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'banking' concept of education:

"Instead of communicating, the

teacher issues communiques and makes

deposits which the students

patiently receive, memorize and repeat." 5

Such an education simply

mimics, for Freire, the functioning of the
wider, oppressive society
He lists the following as

1

.

2

.

its characteristics:

The teacher teaches and the students are taught;
The teacher knows everything and the students know
noth ng
i

3.

The teacher thinks and the students are thought about;

k.

The teacher talks and the student

5.

.

i

6

ibid.
ibid

,

.,

-

meekly;

i

The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the
students comply;

7.

The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of
acting through the action of the teacher;

8.

The teacher chooses the program content, and the
students (who are not consulted) adapt to it;

9.

The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his
own professional authority, which he sets in opposition
to the freedom of the students;

10.

The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while
the pupils are mere objects. 6

Against this, Freire argues for

5

istens

The teacher disciplines and the students are
d sc pi ned
i

6

1

p

.

p.

58
59-

a

dialogic education,

a
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revolutionary pedagogy
which " makes oppression
and its causes
objects
of reflection by
the oppressed and
from that reflection
will C ome
their necessary
engagement in the struggle
for their liberation" 7
•

.

essent

i

Thus, both Habermas
and Freire understand
dialogue as the
med at ng activity for
emancipation.
n the latter's
i

i

|

words
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roces s .

end point of a developmental

'Rational

process:

identity', then,
it

is

represents the

the individual

analog of

the highest form of social
organization that Habermas postulates,

the fully rational

society.

A brief explication of his theory of ego

identity will elucidate that developmental
process and at the same

7

8

ibid

.,

ibid.

,

p.

33.

p.

77.

i.e.

220

time, will

indicate the associated
implications for an education

based on Habermas' work.

Drawing heavily on the work of
Piaget and Kohlberg, Habermas

argues that the developmental
process moves through three broad
stages:

1

‘

Na tural

identity

the self.

The stage corresponds to Piaget's
'pre-

operat ona
i

Stages

I

refers to a physical, bodily idea
of

level

1

and

I

I

of cognitive development, and
encompasses

('punishment-obedience' orientation, and the

stage of 'instrumental hedonism') of Kohlberg's
scale of the

development of moral consciousness.
has not yet mastered a natural

yet been

have

integrated into

a

The child at this level

language, and accordingly, has

social

role,

i.e.,

s/he does not

concept of reciprocally anticipated behavior.

a

Social

identity

indicates the adoption of social

roles

which provide the child with an identity separable from his/
her physical

thought
point

in

in

self.

Corresponding to the level of concrete

the Piagetian scheme,

this stage represents that

development at which the child can understand,

anticipate and comply with behavioral expectations, whether
mediated by the family or other social
school).

Kohlberg's Stages

III

and

IV

institutions (such as
('good boy'
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orientation and 'law and order'
orientating
3
orientation) are
associated
with this level of identity.

3

.

Ego identity

operational

thought,

assimilation
at

least

corresponding to Piaget's stage
of formal

in

in a

indicates

a

shift from total

socially structured identity
to one based,

part, on the ability to
separate from particular

social overlays.

It

occurs at the stage of adolescence,

and reflects the capacity to
question the social

roles and

expectations formerly accepted as 'givens'
of the social
world.

These socially ordained expectations
can, at this

stage and for the first time, become
the object of

reflection and critique.
of

'ego

identity', " ...

As Habermas puts

it,

at

the stage

the bearers of roles transform

themselves for the first time into persons who
can maintain
their identity independent of concrete roles and
special

systems of norms" 9

This level
(

'cont ractural

orientation).

-

1

egal

.

incorporates Kohlberg's Stages V and
i

st ic

1

orientation, and the 'ethical principle

9

1

At this point, however, Habermas wants to go beyond

Kohlberg's final stage, for he believes
'rational

VI

it

stops short of a fully

identity'.

Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", op. cit.,

p.

^9.
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According to Kohlberg, the final
stage of moral deve opment
characterized by the eth ical -pr nc
pi
orientation:
1

i

s

1

'

i

i

R
ht is defined by the decision
of conscience in accord
1r '?
with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to
comprehens'yen^s, universality and consistence. logical
These principles
are abstract;
they are not concrete moral rules.
They are universal
f JUStlCe
P eS
thG reci P rocit y and equality of
human
ri^i
rights andH° off respect for the dignity
of human beings and of
individual persons. 10
’

It

will

be recalled that Habermas

locates the development of

ego identity within the historical unfolding of
social formations;
thus, he argues that Kohlberg's Stage VI

reciprocally requires

a

particular stage of social formation, one characterized
by an ideal
of moral

freedom for all members of that society, but which,
at the

same time, encompasses a notion of human beings as private
persons.

Akin to liberalism, this
good

1

is

is

a

social

formation

in

which the 'social

presumed to result from the combination of

private goods.

Pol

i

t

i

ca

freedom under such

a

individual and

scheme becomes

conti ngent

Kohlberg's analysis

characterization of
referred to

in

Stage

a

social
VI

Habermas argues, does nor allow For

situation

in

a

which the principles

can themselves become an object of collective

decision-making and review.

10

,

Such

a

conceptualization would prefigure

Quoted in Dick Howard, "Moral Development and Ego Identity:
Clarification", Telos No. 27, Spring 1976, p. 178.

A
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a social

formation

which the mechanisms and
rationale of norm

in

justification, rather than indicating
the individual's ability to
generalize from self-chosen principles,
would derive from the

collective activity of discursively
deciding upon normative validity
claims.

In

such a social

Habermas' postulated
political

1

formation,

(corresponding, of course, to

fully rational society

'

),

both moral and

freedom for all members of the society
(finally of

'world society') would be the object of
collective pursuit;

a

its

philosophic underpinning would be the 'communicative
ethic' which
was elaborated

Chapter

in

II.

0n 1y communicative ethics guarantees the generality
of
admissable norms and the autonomy of acting subjects solely
through
the discursive redeemabil ity of the validity claims with
which norms
appear.
That is, generality is guaranteed in that the only norms
that
may claim generality are those on which everyone affected agrees
(or
would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or were to
enter
into) a process of discursive will formation.
The question of which
sectors should, if necessary, be regulated through compromise or
formal norms of action can also be made the subject of discussion.
Only communicative ethics is universal (and not restricted to a domain
of private morality separate from legal norms).
Only communicative
ethics guarantees autonomy. 11

This communicative ethic, as was argued

linguistic representation of the traditonal
and justice;

guarantees

it

a

in

Chapter

II,

is

ideas of truth, freedom

symmetrical distribution of

opportunities for all possible participants to choose and perform
speech acts, thereby ensuring:

1

Habermas, Leg

i

t

imat ion Crisis

,

p.

89-

a

22b

Unrestrained discussion;
2.

Mutality of unimpaired
self-representation

(i. e .,

communication under conditions of
individuation);
Reciprocity of behaviour expectations.

3*

Under these (as yet, counterfactua
will can be rationally formed;

1

)

conditions,

a

general

participants preserve their

individuality through presenting for consideration
what they believe
to be their true interests, and at the same
time engage in the search

for the general izable
i.e.,

interest which represents their commonality,

individuals no longer experience themselves or one
another as

separate privatized people but rather as thoroughly social.

Because Kohl berg's scale of moral development cannot, as
stands, contain the shift from moral
moral and political

freedom as its telos to that of

freedom both, Habermas presses for

'Stage VII' corresponding both to a rational

individuals, and to
then,

indicates

rootedness
that

is,

it

in

is

fully rational

dialectical

a

an

a

i

a

so-called

identity on the part of

society.

Rational

identity,

tension between individuality and

ntersubject ve y constituted social
i

1

simultaneously an individual and

This developmental

it

a

framework

-

collective identity.

schema outlined by Habermas has direct

implications for an educational practice concerned to contribute to
the attainment of a fully rational

society.

The ability to reflect
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on and critique the present
social system with a view
to its

transformation requires the development
of certain capacities

capacity to engage

in

1

formal -operat ional

•

-

the

thought, and the capacity

reason at the highest levels of moral
development (the postulated

Stage VII).

These, then, become educational
objectives of the

highest priority.

As was noted

stages, the shift from 'social

in

the discussion of developmental

identity'

to

'ego identity* can only

occur once the stage of adolescence has been
reached;

only then do

individuals possess the ability to resist total
constraint by their

socially-ordained roles;

only then does the possibility of critique

and transcendence of the social order emerge.

This suggests that a

radically motivated education would tend to focus
its attention on
high school and college-age students.

As Habermas says,

... only the adolescent who is capable of stepping outside
of the contexts of communicative action from time to time and
who can
negate not only propositions and speech acts but also validity claims
as such, (i.e. think hypothetically) learns to master the modalities
of being:
i.e., he learns to distinguish being from appearance, is
from ought, essence ... from existence ... 12

Such

analysis.

a

choice

is

His discussion of the looming crisis of motivation

suggests that that crisis

1

2

corroborated by other aspects of Habermas'

is

most clearly reflected

Habermas, "Some Distinctions
p.

165.

in

Universal

in

the declining

Pragmatics," loc. cit.,
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13

likelihood of a "conventional"

adolescence.

A conventional

resolution of the stage of

resolution involves,

the acceptance of the motivational

in

Habermas'

terms,

structure (for work, for

establishing families, etc.) required for appropriate participation
in

the society.

lieu of this progression, Habermas envisages two

In

outcomes

1

Withdrawal, "as a reaction to an overloading of personality

•

resources

(a

behavior syndrome that Keniston has observed

and examined

in

Protest, "as

a

2.

the

'

a

1

i

entated

1,1
'

.

result of an autonomous ego organisation that

cannot be stabilized under the given conditions
behavioral

syndrome that Keniston has described

15
'young radicals')"

(a

in his

.

A Habermasian based education would attempt to channel

the

disaffection into forms of protest rather than of withdrawal.

This focus on the stage of adolescence does not, at the same
time,

13

14

1 5

imply that earlier age-groups need not be considered by

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
ibid

.

ibid.

,

p.

92

,

p.

91

a
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rad ca
i

1

1

y-mot vated educational practice.
i

On the contrary,

strong reason to suggest that work
with younger students
and particularly from a preparatory
point of view.

is

there

is

vital,

Apart from the

fact that younger children need to
acquire certain cognitive and
moral

reasoning skills as

a

basis for the later development of

critical-reflective abilities,

also seems that attitudes to the

it

educational process, and the child's conception
of his/her role

within it, are formed early

in

the educational

experience.

A

radically-motivated education would strive to create
an image of
learning which obviated the associations and
expectations attached
to the more usual

'banking' model;

such an image would value

collaboration, interaction and curiosity, and its concret zat
ion
i

would reflect those values.

It

to intersubjectivity.

it

Thus,

is

an

image based on a commitment

would support many of the

recommendations made by proponents of school

reform

in

the sixties,

recommendations such as the 'integrated day' programs, the 'open
classroom'

format, the emphasis on group projects, collaborative

learning, and so on.

create

a

These are the kind of changes which help

new image of learning, and

a

renewed interest

in

education.

The following discussion, however, will address itslef

primarily to education at high school and college level;

this choice

reflects Habermas' conviction, deriving from his work on both

communication theory and the crises of late capitalism, that
the stage of adolescence which

is

a

crucial

point of leverage

it

in

is

the
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development of
a

a

political praxis.

The discussion will proceed via

consideration of the two themes which have appeared consistently

throughout Habermas' work:

the development of intersubjectivity and

the critique of ideology.

In

Studies programs will be cited
practical

both sections, the example of Women's
in

order to consider some of the

implications emerging out of the discussion.

The chapter

will continue with a brief treatment of some of the structural

implications for education contained

conclude with

a

in

Habermas' work, and will

consideration of some of the unresolved problems

the theory itself.

in
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The Development of

I

ntersubject v tv
i

i

The understanding, recognition and articulation
of the

intersubjective bases of our culture
expression,

its knowledge,

-

its

forms of representation and

its norms and values - must constitute a

major concern of a radically-motivated education.
basic for the emergence of rational
the previous section,

which

it

is

Such a concern

identity, for, as

is

clear from

the matrix of shared cultural meanings

simultaneously, the basis of community and of genuine

is,

individuation on the part of the members of that community.
in

is

terms of the projected shift to

a

fully rational

society,

the disclosing of the intersubjective bases of social

elucidate the notion that truth
rationality the property of
isolation.

i

is

Couched
it

is

life that will

discursively discovered, and

nd v dual s- n- nteract ion rather than
i

i

i

i

in

From this perspective, the disregard or suppression of

intersubjectivity

is

subterfuge, corresponding to the distortion of

communication, and finally to de-politicization;
represents the loss of the social;

it

is

its

repression

the abandonment of the

possibility that men and women can come together and rationally
reconstruct their society according to their own choosing.

A radical education,

specific task:

then,

is

confronted with

whatever its subject matter

-

be

i

t

it

is

directed,

it

very

economics,

literature, medicine, biochemistry, political science
the age group to which

a

-

and whatever

must enable the student's
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awareness of

i

Fred

ntersubject ve meanings and aspirations.
i

Inglis,

one of the most sensitive and beautifully

in

written books on education to appear
an example of an educational

the past few years, provides

in

process with this intention.

chapter entitled "Public Townscape and Popular Culture",

a

In

Inglis

suggests, as an educational task for students, an historical

investigation of the English townscape:

this would stimulate, he

writes, an enlivened discussion of culture, "its whole busy action,
its values,

structures and institutions" 16

its arts and symbols,

From the start, he

is

.

very clear that any such examination of culture

must "imply, or make explicit,

a

powerful political content.

Culture reposes within the circuits of

living politics, and

a

it

is

that politics which may explain how our culture may move and change" 17

He proceeds,
Ra nbow.
i

.

through the use of literature (Lawrence's The

Eliott's The Waste Land )

,

music (such as the Pastoral

Symphony), art (the painting of Constable and Gainsborough), historical
documents, parliamentary tracts and so forth, to trace the changes

townscape and countryside

in

England.

This involves, of necessity,

an appreciation of the changes wrought by

burgeoning of city life;
changes

16

1

7

in

ibid.

industrialization, and the

the rise of technology and mass production;

the perception and consciousness of work;

Inglis, op

.

c

i

.

,

p.

in

162.

the eruption of
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individualism, with all

its attendant changes

philosophical and political

thought;

in

morality,

the rise of the private world,

and gradual concomitant loss of the public.

Consider, for example,

the following paragraph:

The giant size and intermittent splendor of a Victorian
capitalist or industrial building begins ... to become a symptom
of a
deep split in the consciousness. On the one hand, power, capital,
organization, the public world; on the other, individuals, domestic
living, powerlessness, poverty, f regmentat ion, the private world.
And a townscape grows up which expresses this split.
The corporate
state comes into being;
it follows the demise of the public-spirited
and philanthropic Victorian businessman.
The diffusion of responsibility through the giant institutions, the need for capital to increase
its surplus-values if it is to hold on to the profits, the managed
perpetration of old social forms and classes in unprecendented
conditions for production and labor, all this created a townscape in
which the giant agencies would place at will the cathedrals of their
productivity, and individuals did what they liked with the space that
was left.
The unbelievable speed with which the industrial landscape
covered England, the abrupt change in the materials of building, the
scale of the new technology, the dominance of the free enterprise and
individualist ethic and the absence of an adequate social and moral
economy, combined to devestate the brief, precarious and lovely
balance in the ecology discovered and held for different decades in
different places between 1750 and 19^5Capital and industry dominated
cities;
beneath their vast walls crept out the long lines of private
dwellings whose response to the smell, dirt, magnificence, and brute
size of the city was to cherish the romantic dream of the countryside
at its best.
The suburban garden becomes a central symbol of English
domestic lving any time after 1930. 10

Out of such an analysis,
i

Inglis can articulate the following

ssue:

No doubt the motorways too have known their successes, but
the huge and terrible ru n
primacy
of the road-building program
the
i

l n

ibid.

,

p.

176.
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which

it

symbol ic and

°"

Ce the
**
actua^WWsect ion'of *the"Vast
W6"t
h ve ° f makln
decent modern environment.
9
And what does tha^l
*
astf ^frai
portend? What homeland is
phrase
thinkable
lnKable for the
i-h
next few decades? 19
a

He hints

in

the following direction:

H
W
people a re prepa red t o^ choose!^
^he^ol
short term:
stop the Hk resist thf

m^of
of
*

•

f

,OCal

the seventies are

a?:
f

r

"^‘of^i^?

h elp?n 9

^

"
interests of public living, but so
t^a? private !v! ng'wi Tie
e
a
We Can 9et be V°" d the
short-term
goarand
ana see the
y
th; land as having its own non-human
f Q __,j
n-ig t recover so me of
the dignity which
g
ihe knowl^ge*^
we live in a geography larger
than we are ourselves. 20
'

1

1

>

;

ZsTtU

Such an educational activity

eloquently akin to the intent

is

and thrust of an education based on
Habermas' work.

First,

it

is

an

example of an educational task directly
concerned with the recognition,

examination and re-appropriation of

a

cultural heritage.

Its

historical perspective, encompassing the period
from the rise of modern
industry to the present day, prompts an
awareness of tradition, and of
the changing nature of that tradition;

students

19

in

turn,

forces

in

recognition that their contemporary social situation

bid

-

*

P-

'bid

.

,

pp.

*

20

a

this,

183

185-186.

is

not
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'natural', as

so often appears, but rather socially
constructed,

it

and in numerous identifiable ways.

Such a realization, simple as

sounds, has a number of important consequences for
students:

stimulates

a

it

it

very particular kind of inquiry, one which probes

beneath the actuality of events

in

order to understand the pressures

and constraints which resulted in one course of events
rather than

another;

it

prompts questions of

like what happened?

likely to happen
social

in

Might

it

a moral

or evaluative kind

have been any other way?

the future?

What

do we
is

Can the present tendency of the

system to continue the process of industrialization

way be deflected?

-

Such questions lead,

in

in

the same

their turn, to reflection

on the operation and rationale of the present society, and to the

recognition that, for the most part, the members of that society have
very little impact on its performance.

This kind of study promotes other kinds of realizations

fundamental
It

to the objectives of a radically-motivated education.

highlights, for example, the interlocking nature of knowledge

art;

of literature;

of the sciences;

a

learning activity which

inquiry described here relocates knowledge
it

is

not

learning which

is

in

a

is

responsive

The kind of

interpenetration of all aspects of culture.

context;

most

in

institutions can only appear sterile and uninteresting

beside Inglis' description of
to the

of

of economics and commerce.

The rigorous separation of disciplines which obtains

educational

-

soc o-h stor cal
i

i

i

oriented to acquisition and

23 ^

recapitulation of facts;

rather

it

view to refashioning the future.

seeks to examine the past with
It

a

stimulates the learner's

curiosity, encouraging research into
areas and sources of information

which might otherwise never have come
to attention.
the kind of

inquiry which

education;

it

is

Finally,

denied

is

in

the

It

'banking'

is

precisely

form of

reconstructive rather than mimetic.

Inglis'

description suggests structures of learning

quite different from those encouraged by most
educational activity.
In

fact,

it

almost as if his task requi res certain kinds of
student

is

participation

-

it

is

very difficult, for example, to imagine

individually-based undertaking.

it

is

an

Rather, group activity seems to be

the appropriate mode, one group studying the art of the
period,

another the economic thought, another the political history, and
so
on, with ail

groups pooling their information

comprehensive analysis.

in

order to create

a

Co-operative investigation and collaborative

sharing seem the most effective ways to embark on such an educational

enterprise.

Certainly the privatized nature of knowledge and its

acquisition

is

Ability,

such an educational

in

de-emphas zed
i

to the learner's capacity,

this

;

in

is

a

social, public knowledge.

situation, would be assessed according

conjunction with his/her fellows, to

understand and interpret the puzzling.

The above

knowledge

-

is

an example of the generation of a kind of

interpretive, as distinct from factual

-

which has
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frequently been discredited

modern educational practice.

in

constitution of this 'hermeneutic activity'
as
process giving rise to 'valid' knowledge

is

potentially radicalizing undertakings of

a

education.

As the

a

The re

valid educational

one of the most

Habermas an-based
i

institution endowed with responsibility for the

identification and transmission of knowledge, education
makes
critical contribution to the way

in

which knowledge

is

a

perceived.

One of Habermas' earliest concerns (one which has remained
of crucial

significance throughout his work) was to penetrate the

fraudulence of scientism, and to reconstitute the possibility of

a

normative or practical knowledge on the same level of validity as
scientific knowledge (i.e., to demonstrate that
of reason in the same way).

is

susceptible

The attempt to prise the practical out

of the grip of the technical
social

it

is

life is to be resisted.

essential

Education

if

is

the technolog zat ion of
i

in

a

pivotal

position

for such an attempt to alter the wide-spread perception that

knowledge

is

identical

to science.

As demonstrated

the first chapter, Habermas has worked to

in

critique the dominance of scientism by laying bare its normat ve
i

presuppositions.

Once these are revealed, the convergences between

scientific and practical knowledge become more discernible.

He has

argued that the metatheoret cal knowledge decisions made by
i

scientists

-

"of the utility of an analytic framework,

the experience
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of research strategies, the fruitfulness of
hypotheses, the choice of

methods of investigations, the interpretation of
the results of
measurement, and the implicit assumptions of
operational definitions
not to mention discussions of theoretical

foundations of the

fruitfulness of different methodological approaches"
derive from

a

21

-

do not

neutral, objective and value-free pre-theoret cal
i

structure.

Rather, they are decisions that are made

-

argued for,

disputed, supported, and justified through rational discussion
a

community of investigators, operating out of

intersubjective framework.

It

jective constitution, that

is

is

by

shared

a

this element,

suppressed

-

that of intersub-

by the scientistic self-

presentation of modern science.

Critical

reflection on the theoretical and methodological

decisions of modern science would demonstrate that these decisions
are made

essentially the same way as are practical or normative

in

questions.

The choice

-

strategy, or of accepting

of adopting a particular methodological
a

particular norm as legitimate

from the same process of rational dec son-mak ng
i

presuppose

a

community of investigators,

i

a

;

-

results

both decisions

shared theoretical

framework, and the desire to arrive at mutual consensus and under-

standing.

The model

for both decisions

is,

in

Habermas'

terminology, discourse, or the ideal speech situation.

21

Habermas, Toward

a

Rational Society, pp. 6-7

Here,
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theoretical and practical

Thus,

a

reason converge.

major educational

requirement from Habermas' point

of view would be that students investigate
the theoretical and

methodological presuppositions of whatever discipline
they are
studying, so that they understand the process by which
its contours

were delineated,

its object of concern

methodological procedures outlined.
of such

investigation can be seen

in

identified, and its
A simple example of the import

Peter Sedgewick's discussion of

the value-laden content of our generally-considered meutral

concepts

of health and disease.

All departments of nature below the level of mankind are
exempt both from disease and from treatment - until man intervenes
with his own human classifications of disease and treatment. The
blight that strikes at corn or at potatoes is a human invention, for
if man wished to cultivate parasistes (rather than potatoes or corn),
there would be no 'blight' but simply the necessary foddering of the
parasite crop ... Outside the significances that man voluntarily
attaches to certain conditions, there are no illnesses or diseases in
nature ... What, (you) will protest, are there no diseases in nature?
Are there no infections and contagious bacilli? Are there not
definite lesions in the cellular structures of the human body? Are
there no fractures of bones, the fatal ruptures of tissues, the
malignant multiplications of tumorous growth? Are not these, surely,
events of nature? Yet these, as natural events, do not - prior to the
human social meanings we attach to them - constitute illnesses,
sicknesses or diseases ... Out of his anthropocentric self-interest,
man has chosen to consider as "illnesses" or diseases" those natural
circumstances which precipitate the death (or the failure to function
according to certain values) of a limited number of biological
species:
man himself, his pets and other cherished livestock, and the
plant varieties he cultivates for gain or pleasure ... Plant diseases
may strike at tulips, turnips, or such prized features of the natural
but if some plant species in which man had no
landscape as elm trees;
interest (a desert grass, let us say) were to be attacked by a fungus
or a parasite, we should speak not of the diseases, but merely of the
The medical enterprise is, from its
competition of two species.
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inception, value-loaded;
it is not simply an applied
biology, but
biology applied in accordance with
the dictates
of social

a

interest. 22

An understanding of the normative
basis of modern science

would free the social sciences from the
pressure to imitate

-

in

understanding, self-constitution, methodology,
and application
natural

sciences.

It

and operations central

advocate.

the

would enable the realization that the concepts
to the scientific endeavor are not applicable

to the study of human beings,

objectifications.

-

self-

their social context, and their

Here, a radical education can play the role of

The argument that the structure of science must reflect

its objects and

its aim

is

crucial

to Habermas'

project:

in

of man, the appropriate form of knowledge is hermeneutic.

the case
It

is

only

this kind of approach which can recognize, understand and contribute
to

intersubjectivity.

by means of causal

Whereas empirical sciences seek to explain

connections, or demonstrated correlations between

certain variables, hermeneutic sciences seek to generate an understand
i

ng of the ways

in

which men and women subjectively and culturally

experience their social world.
dialogue:

its practical

consequences are expressed by Taylor when

he says that "the survival

existence of

22

a

Hermeneutic activity occurs through

of societal

individuals

is

limited to the

reliable intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" 23

Peter Sedgewick,
"Mental
1972, pp. 211-212.

Illness

is

Illness",

Salmagund

,

.

No.

20,
23

Charles Taylor,
"Hermeneutics and Politics", in Paul Connerton,
New York:
Penguin Books, 1976, p. 172
editor, Critical Sociology
.
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From a societal perspective, then,
hermeneutics makes possible
the reconstruction of the unconstrained consensus
on which open

communication depends.

At the same time, engagement

in

the process

forces a recognition of intersubjectivity and the mutual
and

ongoing construction of the social world, i.e., there

understanding of the self-formative process
individuals are implicated.
if

It

is

in

is

a

beginning

which societies and

this perception that

is

crucial

human beings are to break the grasp of the apparently 'natural

forces which currently constrain them and move to participate

1

in

their own self-construction.

This translates straightforwardly into educational
it

requires

social

a

terms

-

different method and concern for the teaching of the

sciences.

No longer attached to the logic of technology,

such disciplines are free to generate

knowledge aimed at under-

a

standing and mutuality rather than one aimed at manipulation and
control

As exemplified

in

the selection from Inglis'

book,

the study

of history would no longer take the form of a narrative recitation of

dates, names and battles, but rather an activity

matter 'comes alive', as
a

it

were, for

'

which the subject

in

students-as- nterpreters
i

'

.

In

similar fashion, all disciplines which fall under the rubric of

'social

sciences' would be taught with

a

view to stimulating an

awareness of traditions, of historically shared and mediated concerns,

2A0

and an interest
future.

In

its true,

in

in

the potential contributions they
might make in the

this way, knowledge loses its
i

'facticity', and appears

ntersubject vel y-const tuted form.
i

i

When knowledge abandons its status as 'object',
students are

enabled to adopt

a

more richly evaluative attitude towards

The

it.

drawing out of the moral, or normative, dimensions
of various subject

matters not only confirms the difference between an
hermeneutic and
technical

learning activity, but also directly reflects Habermas'

conviction that the shift to
full

a

a

fully rational

development and articulation of such

a

society requires the

knowledge.

Habermas'

reliance on Kohlberg's theory of moral development would imply that
the latter's educational

programs for moral development might be of

great significance for an education based on Habermas' work.

In

work

in

chapter

fact, a review of the literature suggests that Kohlberg's

this area intersects with the direction indicated
-

this

he has found that the most effective method of moral

education (effective

in

higher level of moral
one.

in

terms of enabling children to shift to

reasoning)

is

a

dialogic, or

i

ntersubject ve

Assigning children at different stages of moral

(say Stages

II,

II

and

IV)

a

i

reasoning

to the same group and engaging them in

discussion of situations of moral conflict has the greatest effect
in

terms of overall upward shift of moral

consciousness.

His

research suggests that children can learn from the reasoning at

a

a

2*n

level

above them, and can identify and articulate the
fallacies

the level

below them.

in

24

The choice of method, so akin to the kind of educational
setting implicit

in

Habermas' work, stems from evidence suggesting

that "the main experimental determinants of moral development
the amount and variety of social

(are)

experience, and the opportunity to

take a number of roles and to encounter other perspectives" 25

A

.

study conducted by Holstein indicated that children who advanced

in

moral development had parents who tended to encourage reciprocal

role-taking with the child, or who sought the child's views and

elicited the expression of others.
upward movement
a

in

moral

26

A study by Dowell

demonstrated

reasoning after students had participated

form of peer counselling based on Rogerian theory

-

in

both the author

and Kohlberg speculate that the intense effort associated with the

understanding of another's experience and perspective contributed
major ways to the increase

in

moral

reasoning.

in

27

Any attempt to integrate such work, must, of course, take

cognizance of the fact that Habermas has argued for the extension of

2U

Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
_ 6
1972, pp.
3
Education", The Humanist November-December
,

2 5

26

2 7

ibid

.

ibid

.

ibid.

,

p

.

15*

,

1

1
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Kohlberg's scale, an extension tending

would no doubt repudiate.

in a

direction which Kohlberg

Moral education from a Habermasian
point

of view would have as its final
aim the closest possible approx-

imation of an ideal

speech situation.

Kohlberg's method

of group

-

discussion and attempted resolution of moral
conflict situations

-

seems highly conducive to such an aim.

In

keeping with Habermas' attempt to situate
moral

development within a social and political framework,

seems that the

it

most useful examples of 'moral conflict situations'
would be those

drawn from actual material under study (this

is

in

contrast to

Kohlberg's examples, which tend simply to be presented).

Thus, for

example, an historical event such as the American Revolution
might be

explored via an examination of the series of choices made by
the

conflicting parties.

Role-plays and other simulation games could be

used in order to identify the moral conflicts that arose, and
to

discuss the ways

in

which they were resolved.

Consideration of

alternative choices, and articulation of the rationality behind these
alternatives, would promote the kind of activity which, according to
Kohlberg, facilitates the shift to

The issue of 'personal

concern here.

a

higher level of moral

relevance'

to the student

A catch-word of the reform movement

then responded to a situation

in

in

reasoning.

is

of

education,

it

which students were expected to learn

things to which they had no personal

response,

interest or involvement.

2*43

The heart of intersubjectivity, on the other hand,
and interpersonal

recognition of students

in

is

the personal

the objects of study.

From this point of view, a Habermasian education would no
doubt

endorse starting at the point of personal

relevance;

but

it

would

move beyond that, working out from that point, considering the
formation of that present life-world, its roots,

concerns and preconceptions,
changes.

traditions,

its

its original

its hopes,

and its

And such an investigation must return to the present, to

the people who engage in that reflection on the past, such that the

enhanced understanding of tradition illuminates the present, and

potentially fashions the future.
under an

i

is

where personal

relevance

ntersubject ve aegis differs from the promulgated by the
i

reform movement
immersion

This

-

for

it

is

a

personal

common culture, to

in

which inevitably bind people.

awareness (although this

is

a
It

relevance which leads to an

recognition of the social ties
is

less an

issue of expanded self-

clearly an essential part of

it)

and more

one of expanding awareness of one's connectedness to others.

The Example of Women's Studies

.

The substantial,

development of Women's Studies programs
past decade

is

this context.

a

in

if

uneven,

this country over the

particularly appropriate phenomenon to consider

in

The intent of those programs, and of the movement

which spawned them, can be characterized precisely as

a

search for

intersubjectivity, and to that extent, reflects the intention of an

education based on Habermas' work.

The initial structural

form of the movement, that
of the

consciousness-raising group, represented
an explicit attempt to
encourage, support and legitimate
sharing - of experience, of
thought
of anger at
it

isolation and stereotyping, and of
hope for change

-

and

was through this activity that
awareness of long-suppressed

connections and commonalities among women
arose.

An image formed of

womanhood as an oppressive social role,
and out of this, developed

a

critique of the instruments of that
oppression, the institution of
education being one of the primary targets.

A recognition of the social,

rather than the natural, basis

of the female role forces an historical
perception of education's

role in its construction:

initially,

in

this country, education was

denied most women, being seen as irrelevant, and
even damaging, to
their assigned role

conditions made
educational

it

in

society.

institutions, the latter then took on the task of

their appropriate social
-

While perceptions of women and

functions have changed over time, the common

coalescing around their participation

hood and domesticity

education for women.

-

arts, or

in

marriage, mother-

have formed the basis, and limits, of

Accordingly, certain professions have

traditionally been closed to them, resulting
the liberal

and economic

more acceptable for women to have access to

preparing women for those roles.

elements

As changing social

into occupational

in

their gravitation to

training consistent with, and

complementary to, their designated familial role, such as social work,
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nursing or school -teaching

.

This concerted shaping of women's

academic aspirations has resulted
intellectual

role

-

in

their repudiation of the

as Conway has suggested, men remain
the creators

of knowledge, while women have only
been able to take part in its
appl

i

cat ion

It

28
.

was against this background that the Women's
Studies

programs took form.
the social

The central

identified objective was to reveal

construction of the female role, and education's

participation

in

that such that that construction might be

consciously resisted.

Both the structure and content of the

programs reflect this objective:

structurally, they have been

modelled on the consciousness-raising groups,
first that

interaction among women was necessary

alternative roles might be formulated;
to the classroom model

of hierarchical

the conviction
in

order that

and second, that resistance

relationships involved

resistance to an index of male domination.
a

in

From this point of view,

collaborative model not only seems more desirable, but also more

conducive to the attainment, on the part of women, to

intellectual

competence and mastery.

In

28

terms of content, the programs have sought first to

Jill K. Conway,
"Coeducation and Women's Studies: Two Approaches
to the Question of Woman's Place in the Contemporary University",
Daedalus, Volume 103 Number 4 p. 243
,

,

-

2^6

acquaint women with their history so that
their common and long-term

oppression might become clearly visible;

and second,

to

illuminate

the suppressed dimension of the study of women
themselves.

major fields

psychology,

-

programs

-

Women

in

all

literature, history, economics, theology,

political science, philosophy

have been neglected.

In

-

the experience and concerns of women

The courses sponsored by Women's Studies

Literature, Feminism and Philosophy, Women and

Religion, the Psychology of Women

-

explicitly reflect the concern to

broaden the general understanding of legitimate knowledge.

From a specifically educational
are consistent

in

Habermas' work.

even
and

i

f

several major ways with an education based on
First,

to a small

perspective, such programs

they have forced the university to respond,

degree at this stage, more directly to the needs

interests of its students;

second,

in

their effort to generate

alternative forms of knowledge and methods of its transmission, the
programs stand as an implicit critique of the idea that the

scientific

is

the only legitimate form of knowledge.

The impulse to

study and comprehend the lives and experiences of women

is

a

hermeneutic one, unconstrained by the dictates of positivism.
Finally, as indicated earlier, the structural

express their

i

ntersubject ve concerns.
i

forms of the programs

Habermas'

theory suggests

exactly the kind of collaborative model of teaching and learning (in
deep contrast to the 'banking' concept of education described by
Freire) which has emerged as a major feature of the program.

2^7

The functioning and intent of Women's Studies
are similarly

consonant with the broader thrust towards the attainment
of
rational

society.

fully

a

The recognition and expression on the part of

women of previously obscured common meanings and experiences
prompts

awareness of their traditional exclusion from full social and
political

participation;

moreover,

it

encourages the identification of those

needs and interests which, according to Habermas, should be brought
into the communicative situation of discourse as a basis for rational

decision-making.

(The history of the women's movement over the past

decade supports Habermas'

thesis

-

that

i

ntersubj ect ve recognition
i

and contact are vital

to any projected shift

social organization

at precisely this point.

-

fully individuated activity, such as

is

to a higher form of

required

It

suggests that

in

the ideal

speech

situation, arises on the basis of group identification and support

-

this was a consistent discovery in consciousness-raising groups, and

appears to carry strong implications for education.)

In

addition, the contribution of the Women's Studies programs

to exposing the emotional,

social

and

intellectual constraints imposed

on women by traditionally ascribed roles serves to heighten the crises
of legitimation and motivation which Habermas has described

-

the

coherent and widely-articulated rejection of traditional educational
roles and the corresponding attempt to carve out new and more

satisfying roles

is

a

significant part of this.

The increasingly

sanctioned refusal on the part of women to participate

in

traditional

family structures captures both elements

-

on one hand,

it

is

a sign

of w thdrawl of the motivational commitment
to the setting up and
i

nurturing of
legitimacy of

family, and

a
a

social

it

is

simultaneously a questioning of the

system which prohibits more expansive and

alternative roles for women.

More broadly, this growing rejection

of a socially-constructed role serves to alert
other members or

groups of the society to the

i

ntersubject ve basis of their own
i

lives, and to the possibility of transformation.

As the discussions of rational

rational

identity and the fully

society have made clear, however, the possibility of their

attainment requires more than the recognition and articulation of
intersubjectivity.

From this point of view, Women's Studies programs

operating under the aegis of Habermas' theory would need to engage
a

systematic analysis of the ideological nature of women's oppression,

not only historically but also contemporaneously.

expressed
of

in

it,

ideology.

As Habermas has

hermeneutic activity must be supplemented by

a

critique

2*49

The Critique of Ideology

The necessity for the incorporation of

a

critical element

into reflectivity, such that the systematic
suppression of

intersubjective awareness and activity can be identified,
was made
clear

in

the first chapter.

There,

was argued that hermeneutic

it

activity takes as its object the conscious representations
texts, art forms, religions, and so forth
or societies under study.
i

say_

events,

of the individuals, groups

Any incidence of distortion must remain

inaccessible to hermeneut cs

people

-

-

\

about themselves.

the latter has to be guided by what

Just as psychoanalysis responds as

much to what people to not say about themselves, to the

unconsciously operating forces which influence experience, so the
critique of ideology responds on

a

societal

level

to the systematic

distortions of communication, which artificially constrain sociocultural

Hermeneutics cannot mount a critique of false

life.

consciousness

The concept of

fully rational

a

society, and the linguistic

and communicative structure which supports it,

ability of participants to engage

domination, expressed as
not be considered

a

in

a

requires precisely the

critique of ideology.

For

set of power relationships which would

legitimate if

it

was subjected to discursive

examination, derives its ability to sustain itself from ideological
(thus

illusory)

justifications.

The transcendence of domination,
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and ultimately the institutionalization of a fully
rational society,

requires the ability to penetrate those ideological supports, and
for Habermas,

this means an ability to penetrate the underlying

distorted communication structures.

Non-d storted communication,
i

according to this theory, would automatically dismantle and prohibit
the regeneration of unjust and unequal

simultaneously,

it

structures of authority;

would enable the shift towards the historically

new stage of social organization.

The educational task follows from this.

Its aim is

to

enable students to move from mimetic activity (complete
identification with and acceptance of the social structure) to
cr

i

t

i

ca

1

-

ref ect ve activity.
1

i

The latter requires (as was clear

from Habermas' work on communicative development)
of certain skills,

the acquisition

linguistically represented as the abilities to

distinguish between illusion and reality, between essence and
appearance, and between
a

is

and ought;

it

clearly the conern of

is

radically-motivated education to facilitate the student's

acquisition of such skills.

It

of empirical

is

sobering

in

this regard to reflect on the implications

studies which demonstrate

less than half of the

that

American adult population has reached the levels of development
required as a basis for the emergence of cr

i

t

ca -ref ect ve abilities.
1

i

1

i

stage of
Thus, fifty percent of American adults never attain Piaget's
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formal operation thought;

and Kohlberg's

investigations indicate

that the majority of people operate at levels

development scale. 29
then,

engage

III

and IV on the mora

From the perspective of Habermas'

theory,

less than fifty percent of the population has
the capacity to
in

essential

discursive critique and decision-making, an activity
to a higher form of social

cessation of development after

a

organization.

The apparent

certain point must be of great

concern to an educational practice aligning itself with Habermas'
theory

As was

education are,

indicated
in

the last chapter, some conceptions of

fact, prohibitive of the development of critical-

reflective abilities.
by technological

in

means

The latter cannot, for example, be stimulated
-

they cannot be drailled

ingrained through repetition and practice.

into the student,

The distinction that

Habermas has drawn between the development of technological knowledge
and that of moral

practical knowledge

teaching objectives.

is

reflected

As Passmore describes

these different

in

it,

By drill, a child can be taught the multiplication table,
irregular French verbs, a religious or political catechism, the order
in which to test a motor car for results, the order in which to
But a person cannot be
analyze the salts in a chemical solution.

drilled into appreciating

29

a

poem, making a good translation, detecting

"The Adolescent as
Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan,
The Discovery of the Self in a Post-Conventional
Philosopher:
97
World", Daedalus, Volume 100, Number b, Fall
P> 10651

1

»
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defects in a new type of car, or suggesting a
modification in
accepted chemical routines. Nor can he be drilled
into beinq
30

cri tical

.

This

is

not, of course, a startling revelation to educators;

Socrates expressed precisely this understanding
with Meno.

3

It

is

in

his conversation

vital, therefore, to reflect on the extent to

which the distinction has been eroded, particularly since the rise of
mass public education and the incorporation of technological

procedures into classrooms.

efficiency and cal cu ab
1

i

1

i

Succumbing to the pressures of

ty

,

educational practice has evolved such

that particular skills have been

according to

a

technological

identified which can be imparted

imperative;

if

they have proved

resistant to such atomization and ordered transfer, they have

gradually dropped out of the curriculum, losing significance as an
educational objective.

This kind of technol og zat on of classroom experience
i

i

provided, as was stated

in

the last chapter, much of the impetus for

the reform efforts of the sixties.

chapter, however, that

in

was suggested

the backlash, critical

abilities were also abandoned

30

It

in

the name of

the same

and reflective

immediacy of experience,

"On Teaching to be Critical", in R.F. Dearden,
John Passmore,
pp. ^16-417P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) op. ci
.

31

in

,

Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse, Editors, Great Dialogues
Mentor Books, 1956, pp. 28-66.
New York:
of Plato.
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the development of self-awareness, and
concern for education as

pleasurable, rather than an irrelevant activity.

a

Critique and

reflection were frequently associated with the overly
intellectual,
with distance from experience, and with the isolation
and

ineffectiveness of theory.

A radical

education deriving from

Habermas, while sympathetic to the resistance against technolog
zat ion
i

of the classroom, must insist that critical and reflective
abilities
be retained as of the utmost educational, social, and political

importance
part

in

-

it

is

these skills which will enable students to take

rational decision-making about their own, and their society's

ex stence.
i

The issue becomes, from this point of view, one of examining
how these disappearing abilities can be re-activated.

aphorism, that the question-mark

is

the most succinct representation

of the dialectic, points the way here.

teaching which

is

32

From this perspective,

aimed at stimulating reflection and critique would

proceed through the use of questioning
the

Adorno's

-

not one aimed at eliciting

'right' answer, but rather a questioning concerned to engage the

learner

in

an extensive exploration of his/her theoretical

and social

pre-suppositions, the set of assumptions, values, and beliefs
brings to the object of study.

In

this way,

modes of thought are revealed, new knowledge

3

2

Theodor W. Adorno.
p.

239-

Minima Moral

ia.

a

learner

latent assumptions and
is

London:

acquired, and new

New Left Books,

197*4,
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images and possibilities are stimulated.

Such a pedagogical method,

based on questioning and oriented towards reflection, incorporates

normative or moral meanings central to Habermas' concern:

it

suggests that no opinion cannot be taken up or criticized.
of questioning from Habermasian perspective, then,
a

validity claim.

that

is

The moment of questioning (again, not

The import
implies

it

in

the sense

of asking for information, but of submitting an assertion, an

assumption,

a

'fact

to judicious consideration)

1

,

the world is no longer accepted

in

its giveness.

is

a

moment

in

which

The significance of

this for Habermas' entire project was described in Chapter II.

We experience the (domains of external nature, society,
internal nature, and language) with a certain degree of giveness - as
objectivity, r.ormat v ty subjectivity, intersubjectivity. The
importance of grasping that there is a validity claim attached to
each domain lies in the fact that we can thereby set our experiences
of each one in a different perspective - a perspective which includes
the possibility of the negation of the form in which these different
In other words, we are now able to
domains present themselves.
what we think is true can, in fact, turn
that
consider the possibility
we behave according to a normative
although
that
out to be illusion;
framework which we consider legitimate, the legitimacy may, in fact,
rest upon coercion or mystification (i.e. it would not be verified in
and finally, that even though a speaker
the process of discourse);
appears to represent sincerely his true intentions or attitudes, he
suffering
may, in fact, be consciously misleading his listeners, or be
between
distinctions
from self-deception. The ability to make such
and
essence
being and illusion, between is and ought, and between
appearance - is essential to successful communication.
i

i

,

The situation of discourse

is

not only regulative

in

which this model of
the identification of communicative skills

33

See Chapter

II,

p.

85.

terms of
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education would be concerned to develop, but also serves as

a model

of non-distorted communication against which all other forms,

historical and contemporary, might be judged.

discourse

is

a

In

other words,

communicative situation which enables an assessment of

the nature and extent of systematic distortion operating in other

communicative situations.

A critique of

to the standards operative in this

ideology proceeds according

speech situation:

ideal

unrestrained discussion, enabling unconstrained consensus;
or unimpaired self-representation,

conditions of individuation;

mutuality,

implying communication under

and the complementarity of

expectations, requiring universalized norms of behavior

and thus,

the prohibition of privilege.

Thus,
is

a

critical analysis of

a

particular social situation

guided by the following question:

How would the members of a social system, at a given stage
the development of productive forces, have collectively and
bindingly interpreted their needs (and which means would they have
accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on an
in

-format ion
organization of social intercourse thought discursive wi
functional
and
conditions
limiting
the
of
knowledge
with adequate
34
imperatives of their society.
1

1

To ask this question

to presuppose the existence of a

is

aim
general izable interest that has been suppressed; the educational

34

Habermas, Legitimation Crisis

,

p.

113

*
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of the

investigation would be to articulate (as
clearly as possible,

given the restraints) that interest, and
to identify the nature and

mechanisms of the distorted communication which
enabled its
suppression.

Habermas'

theory of social formations can be seen as an

historical evolution of communication structures
the ideal
is

speech situation.

the direction of

in

The attainment of the latter, however,

not a necessary aspect of that evolution, and in
the present

historical

situation, that of advanced capitalism, the possibility

of that attainment seems greatly threatened.

confronted with increasing de-politicization,
its culmination

point of view,

in
a

a

Instead, we are
a

movement which has

completely technocratic society.

From that

critique of contemporary forms of ideological

constraint seems most pressing.

An historical analysis of ideology, however,

indispensable preliminary step for

communication structures.

a

is

an

critique of contemporary

Not only does an historical

perspective

heighten the possibility of identifying present modes of distorted

communication, but

it

also creates an awareness of

a

social

organization's ability to alter its ideological support systems
response to both internal and external pressure.

in

A sense of the

pervas veness of distorted communication allows people to recognize
i

the possibility that their own sel f-understand ngs are ideologically
i
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constrained

Accordingly, an education based on Habermas'
work would

encourage the study of history (as
discussion, the idea of 'history'

is

in

evident from previous
this context

incorporates all aspects of an historical period,
all

cultural

is

one which

i.e.,

includes

phenomena, modes and forms of thought and expression,

the level of scientific development, and so on).

This

contrast to much of contemporary educational thought;
indicated in the last chapter,
as

it

ideological

a

is

in

sharp

as was

Habermasian education would regard

the argument that history was no longer relevant to

the modern student.

example of the changes

Inglis'

the industrial

in

English life wrought by

revolution can be used to illustrate the kind of

inquiry referred to here.

An investigation into the changing nature

of work might provide an appropriate point of focus, and principally,
the movement of laborers from the farmlands

Primary sources

-

into the city factories.

such as diaries, parliamentary papers, newspapers,

popular fiction, factory reports, demographic material

-

would

provide the information necessary for identifying the nature of the
class relationships

in

the society,

relationships which would be

the communication structures.

reflected

in

Habermas'

theory of social evolution, this historical period would

fall

at

(Note that, according to

the centre of the shift from a traditional

to a

liberal-
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capitalist social formation
yet be submerged.)

-

hence, the class antagonisms would not

On the basis of such information, students would

be asked to identify patterns of communication

in

the society and to

describe the nature of the ideology which arose on the basis of them;
in

addition, they would need to articulate the precise ways

in

which

various segments of the population, and particularly the working
class, were denied access to those communication structures.

The contemporary significance of such an historical study
first,

indicated in at least two areas:

it

would demonstrate that,

contrary to the ideological assertion that the worker was paid
fair wage for a fair day's work',

value

in a

in

is

'a

fact, the worker produced more

day's work than was returned

in

the form of wages.

Because of that ideology, the capitalist grew richer, pocketing the
'surplus' value produced

ideological basis.

-

capitalism still operates on that same

Second, such

a

study,

through highlighting the

then antagonistic relationship between capitalist and the working

class, would encourage reflection on the present relationship between

those two groups

access

i

-

its submerged nature

immediately becomes more

bl e

As suggested

in

the last section,

simulation games would prove
investigation.

a

role-plays and other

useful educational

tool

for such an

The attempt to articulate all points of view

-

of child laborers,
of the working class, of the factory owners,
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of parliamentarians, of landed gentry

-

would demonstrate the

complexity of the issue, and make more concrete the differences
between structures of distorted communication, which exclude

participation on the part of some participants, and the activity of
discourse, which insists on equal opportunity to present needs and
interests, and precludes decision-making on any grounds except that
of the force of the better argument.

The critique of contemporary ideology follows as

necessary

a

progression from the kind of historical approach just suggested.
Given Habermas' analysis of advanced capitalism, the contribution that

education can make to the development of
to lie

in

its ability to reveal

a

critique of ideology seems

and promote the developing crises of

Habermas' argument

motivation and legitimation.

-

that the

ideological nature of advanced capitalism becomes more apparent as the

state intervenes to facilitate the continued operation of the system
-

indicates that the point of weakness resides

in

the contradictory

nature of the self-presentation of advanced capitalism and its actual
functioning.

Education can play

contradiction, and

in

creating

only detach themselves from

a

a

role

a vital

in

exposing that

framework by which students can not

particular societal self-understanding,

but can also begin the process of ascertaining the general

i

zabl

interest which would emerge under conditions of non-distoi ted

communication.

The development of such

the part of students

is

essential

if

a

critical

perspective on

the possibility of moving to a
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more rational

form of social organization

ever to materialize

is

Instances of contradiction are not difficult
to find at the

present time.

As was discussed in Chapter III, for
example, the

past fifteen years in this country has
witnessed a widening gap

between the political system's self-presentation
and its revealed
functioning.

All

such

instances

-

America's role

Cuba and in Chile are only the most blatant

-

in

Vietnam,

in

represent the targets

of an education designed to expose the ideological
underpinnings of
late capitalist society.

Less blatant

instances are perhaps more fruitful areas of

concentration at this point.

The F.D.A.'s role

in

investigating

food additives, corporate irresponsibility in regard to exposing

workers to cancerous substances, the complicity of various Health
Departments

in

covering up major health hazards, corruption within

administrative and police departments
split between promise and provision.

-

all

these are indices of the

Investigation of such matters

must finally produce recognition of the process of de-politicization.

One logical

point of focus for such a critique would be the

educational system itself.

Following the work of the so-called

'social' critics of education referred to in the last chapter, such a

critique would attempt to expose the ideological basis of the
assertion that there exists equal educational opportunity

in

this
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country, and of the expectation that
of that belief;

is

crucial

for the maintenance

namely, that occupational attainment will be

commensurate with educational attainment.

The opportunities for

exploring that myth have rarely been greater.

One major problem

in

this regard, which a radically-motivated

education must confront, arises from the recognition that the re-

politicization of the public sphere does not proceed simply on the
basis of revealing the ideological nature of the present social

formation.

If

it

did, then there would have been far more overt

and continuing response to the discrepancies between rhetoric and

reality that have become increasingly apparent

the American

in

instead, effective political

economic, political and social system;

protest seems to have faltered with the unwinding of the Vietnam war.
Yet,

it

is

since that time that some of the most damaging exposes

of the ideological nature of the American political

particular
at

-

have occurred.

the present

social

system

-

in

What seems more of an unknown quantity

time is not the unjust and unequal nature of the

system, but rather the nature of people's response to that

Habermas' analysis of the motivation crisis suggests that

situation.

disenchantment will proceed at
formerly integrative forces:

suggested

in

the third chapter

a

pace consonant with the breakdown of

what
-

is

is

not clear

-

and this was

whether that disenchantment will

take the form of withdrawal or protest.

Certainly, the former

than the latter;
position seems to be attracting more adherents

and,

262

as was suggested

in

the last chapter, education has at times

contributed to that by celebrating the private over the public.

An education true to Habermas'

theory must counter this

As was suggested in the last chapter, Habermas would

trend.

certainly support many of the reform efforts of the past decade

the

relevance of educational

stress on expanded self-awareness, personal

content, the move to an interactional

-

rather than authoritarian

relationship between teacher and student, the 'integrated day'
concept which de-emphas zes the separation between disciplines of
i

study

-

but not

in

the absence of a social

and political context.

He would reject privacy at the expense of the public,

relationships

in

lieu of the

i

ntersubject ve
i

,

personalized subject

matter abstracted from its soc o-h stor cal context.
i

i

interpersonal

i

An education

must resist
concerned with the re-politicization of the public sphere
the embracing of privacy and relativism;

possibility of the genera
discovered
in

in

1

i

zabl e

it

must insist upon the

interest, of truth that can be

the course of discursive deliberation.

It

must seek,

the reform effort into
other words, to incorporate the intent of

an explicitly social

and political

This amounts,

in

context.

of
large part, to extending the critique

nature of personal and
ideology to include reflection on the

interpersonal

responses to the social world.

In

other words, whereas

expression of true feeling.
the reform movement encourages
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Habermasian education would begin from the prior
position of
recognizing the possibility of manipulated
consciousness.
point of view,

individuation

with one's feelings'
it

is

as an

not a matter of 'getting in touch

implication,

'whatever they are');

rather

more difficult and complicated process of reflecting
on what

a

seems to be one's
actual

(by

is

From this

'true'

validity.

feelings

in

an effort to discover their

Such a position allows for a critique of withdrawal

ideologically induced and supported response which furthers,

rather than counteracts, the process of de-politicization.

This connects, of course, to the activity of discourse which,
in

its call

for people to be able to offer and argue for what they

believe to be their true interests invites shared and critical
reflection on the interpretation of the society's needs or those of
the

individuals who make

it

up.

Without such

a

process, we are left

with no way to gauge the differences between 'real' and 'manipulated'
interest

-

only

an

in

interaction situation akin to that of discourse

can we subject what we believe are our true interests to the kind of

critical

reflection which can penetrate self-deception.

of the T-group

is

a

useful educational

tasks of such a group

is

tool

The model

here for one of the central

to observe and reflect on how particular

normative systems are formulated, motivated and maintained (in contrast
to encounter groups, which employ already established normative

systems).

This allows for the suggestion of alternative modes of

interaction, and corresponding conscious decision-making and
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implementat ion.

The subjection of the process and rationale
of withdrawal
(together with the associated shift to privacy,
pluralism and

corresponding diffusion of moral meanings) to systematic
reflection
and critique

is

one of the more significant tasks of an education

which seeks the formation of

'rational

a

provides an alternative vision,
people

in

a

it

identity'.

It

not only

also immediately involves

different, more publicly oriented participation.

both offers and represents the notion of

prefigures the possibility of

a

a

genera

1

i

zabl e

It

interest and

fully rational society.

A critique of ideology,

then, on both individual and social

levels, would represent a fundamental aspect of any educational

practice based on Habermas' work.
a

The impact of incorporating such

critical perspective into education will be further indicated

through considering the implications for Women's Studies programs.

The Example of Women's Studies

explicit concern with

manifests itself

in

a

.

At

the most obvious

critique of ideology

in

level, an

Women's Studies

programs of study aimed at revealing the historical

trajectory of women's oppression, up to and including the contemporary
age.

Responsive to Habermas' theory of social evolution, such an

investigation would locate itself according to the economic, social
and cultural dictates of the series of social

formations which he has
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outlined.

The role of women

particular formation and

in

in

both the stabilization of a

its displacement would provide
a central

focus for attention.

This kind of inquiry has been central to
many of the Women's

Studies programs; taking as a primary target
the role of women

in

capitalist society, such investigations have sought
to expose the
ideological content of the socially-proffered
conception of women as
the

'social -emotional

centre' of the bourgeois family, alternatively

producer and consumer as economic pressures dictate.

From such an

analysis has emerged the possibility of an alternative version
of

woman's participation

in

the society, one that

is

not gender-based or

formulated under other ideological constraints.

Women's studies

programs have addressed themselves to both issues

-

old role and formulation of

critique of an

new.

a

Less critical attention has been paid, however, to

more

a

broadly conceived historical analysis of the role of women, one which

extends beyond the boundaries of

a

capitalist society.

Habermas'

theory would encourage this broader purview on the grounds that such
an analysis would

itself.

social

In

indicate the historical dimension of ideology

other words,

it

would highlight the fact that

a

particular

formation will organize its ideological support systems

according to its current needs
ideology

-

-

as

those needs change, so does the

not necessarily simultaneously,

but certainly

in

close
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relationship.
of

From this point of view, the breaking up of one
set

ideological constraints does not by any means imply that
the

formulation of an alternative occurs
situation,

i.e.,

that

it

in

an

ideological ly-free

occurs under conditions free from domination.

The significance of this emerges

in

a

contemporary discussions of the role of women
society.

consideration of
in

advanced capitalist

A theory of education based on Habermas' work would be

forced to take into account the possibility that such discussions,
and the self-understanding which emerges from them, are just as

ideologically constrained as the roles which women are
of rejecting.

in

the process

From this perspective, the break-down of sex-linked

activity, the assertion that women have equal

right with men to

education and occupation, the rejection of the nuclear family as the
basic unit of society and so forth

-

collectively, these tendencies

may represent the exact dynamic of advanced capitalist society rather
than any resistance to it.

Madison Avenue's successful capitalization

on the women's movement is only a minor example of this possibility.

Women's Studies programs functioning under the aegis of
Habe rmas - based education would engage

in

a

a

sustained critical analysis

of the varieties of images presently offering themselves to women.

Such an analysis would argue that rejection of traditional

family

roles with their associations of dependence and constraint also

contains the possibility that women are complying with the pressure
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for

individualistic privatism exerted by
the underlying mechanisms
of
late capitalist society;
that the desire for higher
education and

access to previously male-dominated
professions may require women to
interact in the same acquisitive and
competitive ways that men have
been compelled to do;

that the quest for autonomy,

insofar as

it

remains tied to an individualistic dynamic
with corresponding loss of
social content which Habermas has articulated,
finally repudiates the

intersubjective awareness which carries the
probability of social
transformation.
to withdrawal

As Habermas has suggested, an autonomy
which tends

rather than protest

critical potent

i

is

a

precise abandonment of its

al

One concrete focus of such

a

critique could be the role and

objectives of the Women's Studies programs within the wider
educational structures.

Recalling Habermas' expressed intention of

pressing on the institutions of late capitalism
reveal

in

their contradictions would seem to establish

order that they
a

broad goal

for

such programs, according to which they would have to develop particular

strategies of action.

It

was stated earlier that insofar as Women's

Studies had generated institutional and financial support for their

operation, they had been successful

in

requiring the educational

system to be responsive to expressed student need.

The result has

been the establishment on numerous campuses across the country of
we

1
1

-funct ion ng Women's Studies programs.
i

asked as to whether they have,

in

But

the question must be

fact, exerted pressure on their host
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institutions such that the latter have been substantially
affected,
or their functioning exposed as contradictory?

would have to assess the impact as minimal.

A cursory glance

Certainly, many women

who gravitate to these programs find them conducive to
their needs
and

interests;

there now exist opportunities previously absent for

women to study their history, to understand the nature, mechanisms
and causes of oppression, and to formulate alternative visions for

their participation

But

it

in

the society.

would seem that the effects of such programs have

rarely spilled over into the rest of the educational
into general

institution

-

course content, methods of teaching, the kinds of

experiences considered valid objects of study, the more general
treatment of, and interaction with women at all
educational enterprise

personnel.

-

levels of the

students, faculty and administrative

Frequently, the restriction of concern to the Women's

Studies programs themselves has been

a

matter of choice

secure their institutionalization, particularly at
'special

and sometimes,

in

in

order to

time when such

programs' are threatened with economic cutbacks;

to provide women with a point of
to them;

a

-

in

order

identification previously unavailable

the belief that a separatist position

is

politically the most advantageous.

A conception of education based on Habermas' work would

reject the latter and regard the former two positons as preliminary.
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An index of the further political

success of these programs would be

the extent to which they do come to exert a strong and lasting

influence on the wider institution.

curriculum

in all

This would involve changes

in

departments, such that women's concerns and

experiences are considered legitimate aspects of the subject matter;
it

means the increasing integration (preferably not under the

artifical eye of the legal system) of women into fields long denied
them, such as the natural

political science;

it

sciences, mathematics, philosophy,

means changes

in

faculty administrative

configurations, such that women have equal access to those positions;
it

would require respect at all

levels of the system for women's

intellectual capacities and interests.

In

other words, Women's

Studies must intrude into the centre of the educational
rather than maintain

a

position of separation.

way that women can begin to participate
and thus

in

the way

in

in

It

is

institutions

only

in

the creat ion of knowledge,

which, as Conway puts it, the "culture

defined and transmitted".

this

She goes on to say

in

is

this regard:

The problem ... is complex for women seeking a place at the
center rather than at the margins of the academic institutions which
create and transmit the learned culture of the West. On the one hand,
and
to be in command of the culture, women must master skills in math
unfeminine
defined
as
the hard sciences which have traditionally been
On the other hand, if
and neglected in the education of females.
which
these skills in abstract reasoning are to be applied in a manner
in
a
acquired
draws on the inner springs of creativity, they must be
achieved
way which is no threat to the female identity. This can be
of the
by an educational experience which is critical of many
the female as
takes
which
and
culture
male-controlled
assumptions of a
life of the mind.
the norm rather than the deviant exception to the
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One precondition for such a view of intellectual
solidarity with female colleagues. 35

life is a sense of

The last sentence highlights the important function which

Women

s

Studies has so far been able to provide.

the quotation indicates the rest of the task.

dominated classrooms and general course content
if

the educational

proceed.

It

project generated by

requires

a

a

The remainder of
The shift into maleis

a

necessary step

Habermasian theory

to

is

consistent demand for representation and

reflection, and a continual willingness to point to the ideological
base of much of current educational activity.

systematic prevention of women's participation
knowledge.

It

in

means exposing the
the creation of

36

This brief examination of Women's Studies programs has
indicated some of the directions which would be implied by

a

radically-motivated education based on the work of Habermas.
of the models of discourse and the ideal

Mindful

speech situation, such an

education would attempt to further the increased participation of
women

in

all

spheres of the institution, and would facilitate the
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35

J.K. Conway,

36

the
One example of this is cited by Conway in her discussion of
in
the
who,
worker
work of Ida Cannon, a prominent medical social
very
del
th-care
19^0's, enumerated most of the criticisms of heal
radical and new in the
in this country which were to emerge as
Her work went unheeded at the time, and remains
1960's.
ibid
p. 246.
unacknowledged today.

"Coeducation and Women's Studies,"

loc.

ci t.

p.

,

i

.

,
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development of the cr

i

t

i

cal

-

ref ect ve abilities which would
1

i

encourage women to examine not only past but also current ideological
intrusions into their self-understanding and aspirations.
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Discourse as

a Model

for Educational

Interaction

Reference to the situation of discourse
as
model

structural

for Women's Studies programs suggests
implications for the

of education
in

a

general.

-

its process as distinct

from its content

-

Seen from the perspective of preparation
for

participation

discourse, and emphasizing

in

collaborative approach

a

to inquiry, a Habermasian education would display
the basic

suppositions that truth
rationality

is

is

discovered only

property of

a

of individuals per se.

discourse as its model

In
-

i

consensus, and that

in

nd vidual s- in- nteract ion rather than
i

i

approaching discourse,

that

is,

it

it

would take

would strive to manifest the

characteristics of unrestrained discussion, communication under
conditions of individuation, and reciprocity of behaviour
expectations.

Consequent upon such

a

description are certain

implications for classroom interaction.

Ideally, the structure

would be such that students have equal opportunity to participate
discussion, to initiate it, and to maintain

defending opinions and assertions;
to express their own feeling,

it

to comment,

in

through asking questions,

clarify and interpret;

needs and intentions;

and to establish

and share expectations of behavior.

The exact relationship of the educational project to the

activity of discourse, however, can be further specified by pointing
out that education as reflexive
d

i

scourse.

This

is

i

most evident

ntersubject ve activity
i

in

that

it

is

is

not

not an activity

(in
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contrast to discourse) which

is cut

free from action and experience.

On the contrary, as was clear, for example,

Women's Studies,

in

the sections on

radically motivated education would continually

a

draw on, and address itself to, the experience of students;

the

if

latter are to understand themselves as simultaneously products and

shapers of a commom culture, their immediate experience of themselves
in

the world

crucial

(whether privately felt or publicly shared)

is

of

significance.

A second major distinction between the educational

and discourse (and the clearest

activity

indication of the former's status as

'preparatory for discourse') appears

in

its structure:

there

asymmetr ical ty of relationship between participants.

an

Clearly, some

i

of this is not intrinsic to the educational

is

process, frequently

representing instead the arbitrary assumption of power on the part of
various participants such as teachers or administrators.
crucial ways, however, some asymmetr ical

nature of the educational engagement.
learner as

to the

'newcomer',

a

a

i

ty seems

to

In

rather

inhere in the

Oakeshott, for example, refers

'postulant', being "initiated into

inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief'

an

3

and to the teacher as a keeper of the cultural heritage whose function
in

the educational

transaction

induction into that heritage.

37

Oakeshott,
1

oc

.

c

i

t

.

,

"Education:
p.

22.

is

to facilitate the learner's

Habermas certainly seems to understand

The Engagement and Its Frustration",

education

this way, somewhat akin to his conceptualization
of the

in

'organization

of processes of enlightenment', a situation
in which

an

individual or group of people engage with another
group of people

in

the interest of having the latter begin to perceive
themselves and

their position

the society in a different, more 'enlightened'

in

fashion.

Habermas has also utilized the term 'therapeutic discourse
to describe this

interaction,

a

1

term reflective both of its

prel iminary-to-d scourse character, and of its analogousness to the
i

psychoanalytic relationship, particularly with regard to the

centrality of reflection.

The following quotation points to the

potential utility of the concept within an educational framework.

... self-reflection, as can be shown in the model of
psychoanalytic-dialogue between doctor and patient, is not a
discourse ... the patient by no means takes up a symmetrical posture
vis-a-vis the doctor from the very beginning;
the conditions for a
participant in discourse are precisely what is not fulfilled by the
patient.
It is only the successful therapeutic discourse which brings,
as its result, that which in ordinary discourse must be required from
the very outset:
the effective equality of opportunities in
perceiving the roles within the dialogue, and in general, in the
choice and exercise of speech acts, must first be established between
3 8
partners in a dialogue who are so unequally equipped,

I

ts use

clarify that

38

,

the context of a discussion of education serves to

in

from

a

Habermasian perspective, the aim of educational

Habermas, Theory and Practice

,

p.

23-
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activity

is

responsibly

to enable the student to
participate equally,

freely and

the choice and exercise of
dialogue roles.

in

Such a

characterization carries immediate implications
for the educational
process.

It

would be prohibitive, again, of the
'banking

teaching so well described by Freire;

it

1

form of

would conteract the idea

that knowledge is already constituted,
unchanging, an 'object';
it

and

would militate against the arbitrary
promulgation of one

interpretation, presented as truth.

understood as

a

Instead,

learning would be

process of collaborative inquiry, knowledge
as

something to be generated

in

interaction and dialogue.

structure and activity would reflect this image

-

small

Classroom
group

discussion would probably be the major 'modus operandi',
although the
actual

format would matter less than that teacher and
student

participate

in

an

interactional encounter.

lecture-demonstrations or individual

automatically discounted;

Thus, for example,

investigations would not be

rather the appropriateness of the form

would be judged according to its contribution to
d

a

learning based on

ialogue.

Another structural requirement of discourse, that every
participant has equal opportunity to pose and defend what s/he
believes to represent his/her 'true'
level

interests,

by encouraging students to consider all

is

matched at this

alternatives

in

the

search for knowledge, even those which have been (rationally)

discredited.

In

this process, the student

is

not only alerted to the
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idea that there are many different possible alternatives to under-

standing a particular set of apparent 'facts', but

is

also exposed to

the process by which particular interpretations gain ascendancy over

others.

The questions of 'how to we know what we know?' and 'how

and why does knowledge change?' emerge of themselves from this

process.

These are questions which would constantly inform

a

radically-concerned education.

The quotation also contains however certain implications for
the role of the teacher in the educational
the asymmetr cal

i

i

ty

is

most apparent.

process and

It

it

is

here that

recalls Habermas'

understanding of the critique of ideology as akin to the

psychoanalytic dialogue;

thus

it

will

to consider what

be useful

similarities might exist between the role of the therapist

psychoanalysis and that of the teacher

It

will

be recalled that the analyst,

patient, seeks to reconstitute at

privatized 'language' expressed
The analyst,

this process,

in

is

a

in

in

the educational

in

process.

through dialogue with the

public level

the submerged and

the patient's sympton construct.

considered less as an interpreter

his
and more as a teacher, one who "teaches the subject to comprehend

own language"

39
.

The import of this

analyst's interpretation

3

9

is

is

that the accuracy of the

corroborated "only by the successful

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,

p.

228.
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continuation of a self-formative process, that
of self-reflection" 40

recognize himself

in

.

the

is,

by the completion

The patient must be able to know and
interpretation offered.

This formulation

is

most applicable to that aspect of the

educational process which has been labelled 'critique of ideology',
and involves the development of abilities which enable the understanding and public reconstitution on distorted patterns of societal

communication

-

for example, the recognition and articulation of how

particular societal norms,

in

contrast to their self-presentation,

actually function to maintain and reproduce an unjust and unequal
class structure.

Here, the role of the teacher, analogous to that

of the analyst, would consist in making interpretive comments,

offering alternative perceptions of the situation, and

in

general, of

encouraging reflection on all assumptions, beliefs, norms, and values
that are usually taken for granted.
a

Again

it

can be seen that such

conceptualization of the teacher's role precludes an authoritarian

posture, an impositional

towards students.

form, and

instead impels a dialogic stance

The authority which the teacher possesses by

virtue of his/her position does not, under this model, automatically
legitimate the authority of his/her perceptions,
bel ief s

4 0

ibid., p.

266.

interpretations, or
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This model of teacher behavior
Freire:

is

akin to that suggested by

his conception of the teacher role is readily
subsumed under

the idea of one who 'teaches the subject to comprehend his
own

language'.

S/he elicits what Freire calls "generative themes"

(themes which occur repeatedly

in

41

conversations with students),

refashions them, and presents them to students

in

such

a

way that

previously opaque connections and understandings are illuminated.
As part of that process, the teacher presses for continued reflection

on all

'root assumptions' held to by participants.

As was pointed to in the first chapter, however, the

utilization of the therapist-patient relationship as

a

model

for the

process of enlightenment has come under some fire, for inherent
that relationship is, as Habermas indicates, an asymmetrical

inequality of dialogue roles.
the grounds that

that unequal

of an

it

a

ty, an

Just as its invoking was critiqued on

admitted the possibility of

exchange, so

i

in

a

manipulative use of

radical education formulated on the basis

inequality of dialogue roles raises questions about the

possibilities of authoritarian, manipulative, and doctrinaire teaching.
The structural conditions of discourse prevent (at least theoretically)

illegitimate or arbitrary assumption of power on the part of
individuals or groups;

in

the absence of that structure, the

constraints against misuse of power and authority are far more

41

Frei re,

Pedagogy of the Oppressed

,

p.

86.
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difficult to identify,
the teacher to misuse

In

an educational

setting, the potential for

with relative impugnity

-

his/her position of

authority (by imposing interpretations,
arbitrarily controlling
discussion, penalizing dissenting arguments)
seems to expand.

As

is

clear from the earlier discussion,
certain features of

Women's Studies programs reflect this ambivalence.

On the one hand,

the model of the consciousness-raising group
exerts

on the organization of education for women

reject hierarchical

-

in

Habermas'

access to, and use of, dialogue roles.

commitment to non-h erarch ca
i

i

1

In

strong influence

such groups explicitly

relationships, attempting,

patterns of interaction which,

a

instead, to create

terms, allow for equal
the face of this

forms of interaction, Women's Studies

programs which support and strive to provide opportunities for women
to achieve standards of

intellectual competence previously denied

them, are confronted with a dilemma.

They must devise an educational

process which allows for the transmission of knowledge but which does
not replicate traditional

with all

authoritarian teacher-student relationships,

their attendant possibilities for manipulation and control.

Habermas' attempted resolution of such

a

dilemma, through

invoking the model of the psychoanalytic relationship (or therapeutic

discourse) has, as was just noted, come under criticism on the grounds
that

it

contains no real safeguards against the arbitrary assumption

of power on the part of the therapist.

His response to those
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original misgivings

is

appropriate to the present discussion

In the case of psychoanalysis, two fundamental
and two
pragmatic sanctions against misuse in the sense of exploiting
deception can be enumerated.
For one, the fundamental theorems lay
claim to truth, and this claim must be defensible in accordance with
the usual rules of scientific discourse, otherwise the theory must be
relinquished or revised. Secondly, the appropriateness of the
interpretation which is theoretically derived and applied to the
particular case, requires confirmation in successful self-reflection;
truth must converge with authenticity - in other words, the patient
himself is the final authority.
Furthermore, psychoanalysts must
comply with the requirements of professional ethics and practices of
a legally sanctioned profession of physicians;
within limits,
violations of professional norms and regulations can be controlled.
Finally, in general the patient can maintain a certain distance from
his doctor;
in spite of transference (and countertransference) the
role of the patient is not a total role, but only one among many within
a differentiated system of roles.
Within certain limits, the patient
retains the option to change analysis or to break off the treatment. 42

Similar safeguards are operative

There
theory

is
1

,

in

an educational

setting.

not, of course, a widely accepted and wel -devel oped 'body of
1

such as is provided by psychoanalysis,

interaction of teacher and student:

'right

the

in

which to insert the

interpretation'

in

this

context does not have substantiated categories such as the 'unconscious'
and

'repression'

to draw on

in

its support;

rather the theory (which,

in

this case, would include such diverse elements as the centrality

of

intersubjectivity, the communicative ethic, and an analysis of

advanced capitalism)

is

still

The major point, however,

42

Habermas,

is

very much

in

the process of development.

that no theory should be promulgated or

Theory and Practice,

p.

29.

28

acted upon

in

the absence of open
discussion and debate.

true for the theoretical

particular aspect that

This

IS

a

This

is

framework as a whole, as well
as for any
teacher attempts to communicate
to students.

supported by the second caveat
mentioned

referred to earlier in this
section:

the quotation and

in

the 'truth' of the theory
can

only be judged according to the
extent to which

it

is

genuinely

embraced by students, and, moreover,
acted upon, at least

the form

in

of further self-reflection.

Teachers, similar to psychoanalysts,
have
ethics which act

in

a

against transgression.

a

set of professional

regulative manner, providing some sanction
(One

interesting aspect of this

the current

is

attempt to establish some legal guidelines with
regard to issues such
as discipline;

from Habermas' point of view, this constitutes
state

regulation of activities previously left to tradition,
and opens the

possibility for increased community participation

in

rational

decision-making about the nature and purposes of education.)

Finally, the teacher-student relationship

diffuse

in

its

is

impact than that of the doctor-patient

usually even more
-

certainly by

the time students reach high school, their contact with any one teacher
is

greatly limited.

(From the point of view of the present

discussion, this probably works against the possibility of enabling
students to develop skills which will allow them to pursue
identity within the society.)

Far greater

impact

is

a

rational

exerted on the
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student by the institution of education
itself;

if

understood and modified according to the desires
of
community, the whole project of education
nature and purposes

-

-

this
a

to be

is

participant

its present and potential

must be opened up to discussion and debate.

Despite the several disclaimers Habermas has offered vis-avis his use of the psychoanalytic model, he has remained
uncomfortable

with the asymmetrical

relationship obtaining between participants

the process of enlightenment, whether that

is

occurring

in

in

the context

of a psychoanalytic relationship, working-class organizing, or, as

here,

in

specifically educational settings.

discomfort stems,

it

A major aspect of the

would seem, from the anomolous nature of this

particular facet of the process with regard to the overall activity:
it

is

almost as

if

the safeguards

involved against misuse of power

presuppose the very abilities (i.e. to engage
have not yet been fully established and which,

'therapeutic discourse'

is

not fully articulated this

in

in

concerned to achieve.
issue,

it

is

discourse) which
fact, the

While Habermas has

clear where his interests lie

the vindicating superiority of those who do the enlightening
over those who are to be enlightened is theoretically unavoidable,
in a
but at the same time is fictive and requires self-correction:
43
be
participants.
process of enlightenment, there can only

The issue points to what seems an ongoing unresolved tension
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for Habermas:

on the one hand, the 'linguistic ethic'

his analysis of communication structures

ation for all members of the society
the attainment and maintenance of

-

-

is

full

revealed

and equal

fundamental

in

particip-

for him, and

its concrete embodiment

project which underlies his entire work; on the other,

in

is

a

his

consideration of the process of that attainment, he must contend with
situations which do not and cannot reflect that ethic.
is

While there

no necessary presumption against the resolution of this issue,

Habermas' apparent ambivalence about explaining the concrete aspects
of these preliminary situations prevents him from articulating the

process of their metamorphosis into situations of full and equal

participation.

The relationship remains

a

purely formal one.

Freire's conception of the teacher-student relationship

offers assistance here, providing, as
notion of equality of participation.

it

does,

a

far more cogent

Attached to the idea that all

are learners and, simultaneously, that all have the potential

to teach,

his theory allows, at the same time, the designated

to

exercise the specific skills s/he does have
re-conceptual ze an issue so that
i

previously opaque to them;

'students'

in

'teacher'

this situation:

to

perceive facets

to suggest connecting

links between

formerly isolated events, situations, ideas; to offer alternative

interpretations which have not yet been considered.

certainly the kinds of interventions made by

difference

in

the models

is

a

These are

psychoanalyst; one

that Freire's teacher

is

far more personally
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and actively involved in the process, and
can invite or even press
for conflict and dissent

psychoanalytic

It

is

in

rel at ionsh

i

a

p wi

way that the constraints of the
1

not allow.

1

true, however, that Freire's model was developed in
a

situation which exhibited no immediate structural constraints
against
the kind of interactions he describes.

work of current American educational
more obvious

-

immense control

the process of education.

is

Considered within the frame-

institutions, the constraints are

exercised over both the content and

The characteristics of Habermas' model of

therapeutic discourse seem more responsive not only to this
institutionally created asymmetr cal ty between teachers and students
i

(as well

as that

i

involving other participants, such as

administrators) but also to the broader and more inclusive idea of

education which
offer

-

and

it

is

the focus of attention here.

What Freire does

would seem to constitute some kind of middle ground

between an education modelled on the psychoanalytic relationship and

one based on the functioning of consciousness-raising groups

-

is

impetus towards continued reflection on, and critical analysis of,
that

induced asymmet r ca
i

1

i

ty

an
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Assessment and Critique

The attempt to generate the rudiments of
based on Habermas' work has been successful

in

a

theory of education

providing a model

for

educational activity both significantly different from the one presently

operating

in

Habermas'

theory.

the society and responsive to the radical

Conceived as reflexive

such an education would take as its dual

articulation, and development of the
culture, and critical

intersubjectivity.

i

i

impulse in

ntersubject ve activity,
i

focus the recognition,

ntersubject ive basis of our

reflection on the forms and expression of that
Its telos

is

the attainment of

'rational

identity', the developmental stage which enables full and equal

participation

in

a

rationally-constituted social formation.

So far, however,

the investigation

has yielded guidelines

for the activity of education, with correspondingly reduced focus on

the practical difficulties and outcomes of instituting the various

recommendations.

Accordingly, the last section of the chapter will

focus, albeit briefly, on this issue, choosing one theme

particular
of students

the attempt to develop the cr

-

-

for consideration.

i

t

i

in

cal -ref ect ve skills
1

i

Because of the internal

relationship between these skills and the possibility of the ideal
speech situation (so central to Habermas' postulation of the fully
rational

society), this brief investigation will enable some

communication
examination of the viability and usefulness of Habermas'

theory
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A consistent theme throughout
this chapter has been the

importance for

a

Habermasian education of the development
of

critical-reflective capacities:

is

it

these which enable students to

render problematic that which has previously
been taken as given;

examine the form and content of social

alternative visions of that life.
the

'fully rational

life;

to

and to generate

Within the specific framework of

society' such abilities involve choosing, on
the

basis of rational deliberation, between competing
understandings and

interpretations of social needs, collectively identifying and

deciding upon principles of norm justification, and so forth.

The devising of an educational program specifically

concerned to develop these cr

i

t

i

means straightforward, however.

cal -ref ect ve abilities
1

i

For any such attempt

is

is

by no

immediately

confronted with the recent controversial debate over whether such
abilities, and the possibilities of their acquisition and use, are

class-specific

in

nature.

A major body of literature emerged during the 1960's to

suggest that lower socio-economic classes are far less capable than

middle classes of developing critical perspectives on the society to
which they belong, and of expressing their rights, claims, or
interests

U4

in a

political milieu.

See Bibliography

in

Mueller,

44

op

Moreover, that differential,

.

c

i

.

it
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was argued, had

a

linguistic representation

class-specific differences

in

-

that

is,

there are

the acquisition and use of language

which prevent the lower classes from developing
the capabilities

necessary for full and effective political participation.

Mueller, who undertakes
research

in

a

comprehensive review of the

his book The Politics of Communication

position of the lower-class member

in

,

describes the

the following way:

The individual's language, cast in the immediacy of his
environment, conditions his perception. The categories of his
language allow for a grasp of the here and now, but they do not
permit an analysis, hence a transcendence of, his social context.
Seen politically, this language reinforces the cohesion of a group
which shares a specific (language) code, but it can prevent the group
from relating to the society at large, and to its political
institutions. The individual experiences his deprivation
subjectively;
cognitively speaking, however, he lacks the reference
points necessary to perceive the objective reasons for his condition
and to relate it to the structure of the society in which he is
living.
The individual's language thus becomes his internal
In narrowing his ability to discriminate, to
plausibility structure.
conceptualize, and to analyze, it renders his conditions more
45
He is immune from perceiving alternatives.
acceptable to him.

This would seem to have strong implications for an education

aiming to develop critical and reflective capacities

in

children,

Consider, for example, the following table, based on the research of

Anselm Strauss:

4 5

Muel

1

er

op

.

c

i

t

,

p.

55.
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Lower Class
1.

perspective

Middle

fixed perspective;
rigid description.

ass

Cl

use of several standpoints and
alternative interpretat ons
i

2.

organization

lack of clear
referents;
few
qual f cat ons
segmented
organizational
framework;
little
grasp of context of
event
f more than
one actor involved.

frequent qual f cations and
lustrations;
clear
narrative is complex;
unitary framework of
organization.

relative inabi
ty to
use categories for
people and acts since
the speaker tends not
to think in terms of
classes;
imprecise
use of logical
connect ons

rich conceptual
terminology;
frequent classification and use of
logical categories.

sensitivity to
generalizations and
patterns

i

i

i

i

i

i

1

i

3.

classification
and relation

1

i

i

^4 .

abstractions

insensitivity to
abstract information
and questions.

5.

use of time

d

is

It

scont nuous
emphasis on the
particular and the
ephemeral
i

continuous;

i

emphasis

on process and

development.
46

the kind of material which formed the basis of the

so-called 'compensatory' educational programs widely heralded
1960's;

on a similar basis, one conclusion might be that

in

the

a

Habermasian education may also need to take, at least at this level,
a

46

focus.

remedial

Quoted

i

n

Mue

1

1

er

op. c

i

t

,

pp.

53~5^-
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But the compensatory programs came under
increasing fire

during the late

1

960

'

s

in a

body of literature which arose in

explicit opposition to the findings suggested above.

The programs

themselves were denounced, on the grounds that they
stigmatized the
lower socio-economic classes, holding up the speech
variant of the

middle classes as the norm, and attempting to impose that on other
social

and racial groups.

Moreover, the empirical

generated the programs (of which the above table
was subjected to severe criticism;

it

research which

is

representative)

was claimed that the verbal

capacities of lower class and black children had been misunderstood,
and, more significantly, as far as critics were concerned,

misrepresented. 47

The labels generated

'culturally deprived',

in

that

investigation

'socially disadvantaged' etc.,

-

-

obscure,

according to the critique, the real basis of socio-economic
exploitation;

the implication,

it

was argued, was that

it

was

linguistic deprivation which caused lower soio-economi c status, thus

mystifying the ways
working classes.

in

which the wider social system exploited the

Under the guise of eliminating poverty, which was

indeed the expressed aim of the compensatory programs,

education' facilitated adhesion to

a

'compensatory

capitalist society.

Dittmar

cites the following quotation as an example:

The economy is expanding most rapidly in those service
industries that demand high educational attainment and highly developed

47

See William Labov, Sociol inguistic Patterns
Pennsylvania Press, Pa., 1972.

,

University of
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^

he

Symbo1 systems.
At the same time, as a result of
there has only been moderate
expansion in
manufacturing employment in the United
States in the past twenty
years.
Unskilled jobs are rapidly disappearing
as more and morl
physical work is assigned to machines.
The economy is being
°n
in which worl<ers produce physical
products to one
!
which they produce
services.
Many of the new services deal with
the management of information.
Society, therefore, is accelerating
its need and demand for persons who have
developed highly skilled
elaborate methods of processing information, and
who are able to
manipulate the environment, not directly as in
factory work, but
representat lonal ly by symbolic means - the means
essential for
coping with the conditions of an advanced technological
48
civil zat ion
f

?
inrrIJY
increased productivity,
.

^

m

i

.

The indictment,

impl icit

the compensatory education

in

programs, of working class and black children and their families was
also

a

target of this critique.

Dittmar quotes from

designed by Bereiter and Engelmann,

in

a

program

which the authors describe the

verbal capabilities of the children:

They are indifferent to the content of verbal utterances;
in
their social environment (family) they have not experienced the
linguistic stimuli necessary to be able to use language with any
degree of mean ngfu ness
they lack the ability to grasp and reproduce
with linguistic adequacy correlations, processes, etc., their
retarded development is accounted for by a 'dissociation' of speech
and behavior
similar to that which is assumed for mentally-retarded
and psychologically disturbed children. 49
i

1

;

William Labov has been one of the most articulate critics of
he has demonstrated,

the compensatory education programs;

48

In

Norbert Dittmar, Soc

1976 p. 86.
49

ibid.

,

pp.

80-81.

i

ol

i

ngu

i

st

i

cs

,

London:

Edward Arnold Ltd.,
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successfully, that lower class children speak not
of Standard English but rather

a

a

distorted version

different kind of English, one which

deviates systematically and regularly from the standard version.

These differences, however,

in

contrast to the claims of the original

researchers, do not involve impaired logical or analytic capability.

Rather non-standard English uses different syntactical features (such
as double negation

communication.

-

'nobody knows nothing')

This

is

for the same

the kind of linguistic feature which the

compensatory program sought to 'correct'.

Labov has been able to demonstrate that what he refers to as

Black English Vernacular, rather than possessing fewer or worse

possibilities of expression, instead employs other, functionally
equivalent, linguistic forms.

Moreover, according to Labov, lower

class speech contains rich symbolic imagery which contributes to
wel

1

-devel oped sense of imagination and fantasy.

education, from this point of view, seeks to impose

which would place children
their

'mother tongue'.

in

a

Compensatory
a

system of speech

verbal and communicative conflict with

Labov concludes,

The view of the black speech community which we obtain from
our work in the ghetto area is precisely the opposite from that
morning
reported ... We see a child bathed in verbal stimulation from
the
upon
depend
We see many speech events which
to night.
of
competitive exhibition of verbal skills ... a whole range
use of
his
through
activities in which the individual gains status
skills
these
acquire
language. We see the younger child trying to
groups
peer
older
of
from older children, hanging around the outskirts
no
see
We
to the best of his ability.
and imitating this behavior
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connection between verbal
skill in the speech
events characteristic
of the street culture
and success in the
schoolroom. 5 o

So any

education program aiming

to develop critical

and

reflective abilities, such
as one operating under
a Habermasian
aegis, would have to be
cognizant of what Labov has
amply demonstrated
that speech variants, though
divergent at the level of
grammar,
possess, at the same time,
functionally equivalent
possibilities of

expression.

Habermas'

at an educational

level,

theory does seem capable of
responding to this
thus avoiding the difficulties
encountered

by the attempt to remediate
children with apparently different
levels

of skill:

he has always emphasized the
communicative context of

language use rather than the specific
linguistic features (in fact,
the entire controversy over class-specific
language differences has

added credence to

a

recent development

in

linguistic philosophy to

which Habermas subscribes, viz. that the
speech
legitimate point of focus than the grammatical
it

another way, that communication

particular linguistic skills).

is

ac_t

i.e.

50

is

to express

Moreover, his work on language has
a

set of linguistic

the pragmatic universals, which he insists are germane

common linguistic base.

then,

more

more than the regimented use of

to ilLL communication situations and which should,
a

a

rule, or,

centred on the identification and articulation of
features,

is

therefore, provide

The demonstration of their existence,

necessary to any attempt to develop an educational program

Quoted in Allen D. Grimshaw, "On Language in Society:
Contemporary Sociology, Vol
2, 1973. p. 583.

Part 1"
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based on Habermas' work, but avoiding the pitfalls
of the

compensatory programs.

This brings Habermas' communication theory to the foreground.
Its substantiation becomes of central

theoretical endeavor, for

it

is

importance to his entire

out of this universal communicative

and linguistic base that he has drawn the concepts of the ideal speech

situation and the model of pure communicative action.

Without that

basis, the entire foundation of his theories of communication, social

evolution and, more specifically, the possibility of

a

'fully rational

society' would falter.

Accordingly, one of the most pressing tasks which Habermas
faces is the validation of his theory of communicative competence.

The mechanics of this validation could only be specified on the
basis of an in-depth acquaintance with linguistic philosophy, and

certain aspects of the theory are likely to remain philosophically

contentious for
points

in

a

long time to come; nevertheless, there are some

need of immediate clarification which can be identified

here

With reaard to the claim that the pragmatic universals
have to
inhere in every language, for example, Habermas would
does not contain
account for the fact that the Vietnamese language

personal pronouns (at least as we know them

in

English) and, as

African languages do
reported by Buck-Morss, that some traditional

29 ^

not contain a verbal

distinction between reality and appearance.

51

Such variations on Habermas' thesis may or may not
prove detrimental
(this could only be judged by an expert in linguistic
philosophy);

they do raise the possibility, however, that the 'communicative

ethic

developed by Habermas, rather than being universal, as claimed,

may

fact be tied more closely to the socio-economic development of

in

the Western world.

This possibility gains more credence when
that Habermas,

in

it

recalled

is

his attempt to concretize the theories of

communicative competence and social evolution, using his work on
ego-identity as
theorists

a

bridge, draws heavily on the work of two

Piaget and Kohlberg

-

-

both of whom have been recently

criticized on the basis that their respective theories of
development, while claiming universal applicability,

in

fact reflect

particular socio-economic developments and values.

It

will

be recalled that Habermas used Piaget's work on

cognitive development as

a

basis for his own account of the

development of communicative competence, attempting, thereby, to
buttress his claim to the universal nature of that development.
Again, his ability to substantiate that claim

51

is

essential

if

his

"Socio-Economic Bias in Piaget's Theory and its
Susan Buck-Morss
Development,
Implications for Cross-Cultural Studies", Human
,

Vol

.

18

,

1975, P- ^0 (Note)

295

account of

rationality which can be normat vel y-der ved from the

a

i

i

structures of communication (and thus of the image contained
those structures of

a

'fully rational

society')

is

to stand.

use of Piaget to substantiate that claim carries with

pedagogical

in

His

strong

it

implications, namely the importance of enabling children

to progress through the stages of cognitive development to the stage

of formal operational

thought.

Habermas' work

damaged, then, by critiques of Piaget's

is

work which suggest that his account of the evolution of cognitive

competence represents not
Morss describes

capitalism

it

universal sequence but rather as Buck-

"the particular logical structure of Western

its present

in

a

industrialized stage, that characterizes

both the socio-economic mode of production and the mode of
52

consciousness"

.

From this point of view, Piaget's stages mark the

"progressive assimilation of the structural principles of bourgeois
industrialism"

53
.

Certainly, this

is

an issue not easily or quickly

work may jeopardize
judged, but Habermas' uncritical use of Piaget's
his own theoretical

formulations.

There are similar problems
mora

53

1

development.

ibid., p

.

ibid., p

.

37.
CO CO

in

his use of Kohlberg's stages of

Certainly, Habermas' addition of

a

seventh stage
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indicates his dissatisfaction with Kohlberg's
work, but his failure
to reflect or comment upon the possible
difficulties associated with

incorporating that work

is

a

curious oversight.

It

would seem that

Habermas accepts that the moral stages as outlined,
apart from the
failure to derive the seventh stage, are
Koh berg claims.

fact universal

as

One of the most troubling aspects of this

1

apparent espousal

in

in

is

the

that work of many of the values of liberal

and

advanced capitalism

-

theme

writings, losing out to the value of human life

in

Kohlberg

as a prime moral

development.

s

respect for property, for example,

consideration only

Moreover,

individual

in

is

a

major

the higher stages of moral

right

the index of morality

is

throughout Kohlberg's schema:

Moral development in terms of these stages is a progressive
movement towards basing moral judgements on concepts of justice. To
base a moral duty on a concept of justice is to base it on the right
of an individual;
to judge an act wrong is to judge it as violating
54
such a right.

This translates, finally,

about the highest form of moral

application of

54

a

into an unequivocality for Kohlberg

reasoning:

it

is

a

private

universal principle:

"Moral and Regligious Education and the Public
Lawrence Kohlberg,
A developmental View", in Sizer, T., (ed.), Rel igion and
Schools:
Houghton-M f f n Co., 1967, p. 173Public Education Boston:
i

,

1

i
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a morality of justice which claims to judge the law can
never be anything but a free personal idea. b5

The implications for cultures which have always accorded
high priority to the collectivity, sometimes giving
than a single life, are not considered.

the collectivity to

a

higher status

it

Certainly Habermas elevates

pre-eminent position, co-extensive with the

a

status of the individual, but even so,

conclusion to be drawn

is

it

seems that the only

that cultures committed to the collectivity

are, of necessity, functioning at a lower level of moral

reasoning

than that exhibited by advanced capitalism.

There are further problems
indicated earlier

in

Kohlberg's work.

in

the chapter, his research suggests that the

development of moral consciousness
of group discussion and review.

is
In

best facilitated in situations
this way, moral

it

reasoning seems

and yet Kohlberg

closely tied to dialogic communication;
equivocal when

As was

is

highly

comes to the issue of collective decision-making.

as much as from
This seems to derive from his cultural background

any empirical evidence.

He argues

the validity of majority beliefs

in

in

the following paragraph against

situations,

moral

consensus on moral issues
partly because the majority has no
majority beliefs are grounded more
partly because studies show that

b5

A Modern Statement of
for Justice:
Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education
Moral Education, Boston:
in Sizer, T., (ed )
the Platonic View"
p. 77Harvard University Press, 1970,
.

,
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on Stage III beliefs in conforming virtues and Stage IV conceptions
of law and order than upon Stage V awareness of justice and
56
constitutional democracy.

Now one might not take issue with this as
Kohl berg

moral

is

certainly right that consensus does not exist on most

issues, and there is no a priori

majority beliefs stem from Stage
reasoning.

stands;

it

What

is

III

reason to doubt that current

and Stage

disconcerting, however,

levels of moral

IV

is

that Kohlberg, on

rational collective
that account, dismisses the possibility of

decision-making based on the Stages higher than

III

and

IV.

of his reticence
Another, more clearly ideological example

decision-making, comes from an
the area of collective moral

in

Theory and the Practice of
article entitled "Collective-Developmental

Collective Moral Education".

57

-

Here he argues

in the

face of

who
the effect that Kibbutz children,
statistical demonstrations to
and engage
a communal environment
live, work, and learn in

function at
collective decision-making,

a

in

higher level of moral

children
and 'disadvantaged' class
consciousness than U.S. middle

-

indoctrination.
education is akin to
that collective moral

S
56

the New Social

-

Counc

ona

Studies, May 1973,

t
Lawrence Kohlberg,
ve-Mor
Practice of Collect,
’

.

i

j

i

1

^ f or

P-

ve-Deve opnten t a

^ory

1

and

th^

1

^^^

Ed«c.r

£!!

3

L Pat!L olJouth
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Habermas' detailing of the seventh stage
becomes,

light, no mere addition of a stage, but rather
a fundamental

ordering of Kohl berg
moral

reasoning

j_s

1

s

schema.

For Habermas,

one of discursive wi

1
1

this

in

re-

the highest stage of

-format ion

,

in

which all

members of the society, participating under conditions of
individuation, collectively decide on the legitimacy or otherwise of
those universal principles which,

self-evident.

in

How this affects, and

Kohlberg's schema, are left
affected by, the latter's

is

apparent repudiation of collective decision-making, something which

clearly reflected

in

is

the stages of development as he has outlined

remains unconsidered.

them,

There are other troubl esome aspects of Kohlberg's work which
Habermas has allowed to pass without comment.

Buck-Morss, for

example, picks up on other potentially ideological points which are

smuggled

in

under the guise of statistical evidence.
58

Kohlberg's assertion that "retardation"
example of which
class children

in

is

that

in

She notes

moral development

(an

'disadvantaged' children lag behind middle

speed of movement through the stages) can be

attributed to the "amount of social and cognitive stimulation
provided by the culture (or sub-culture)

in

question"

59
.

From this

perspective, Buck-Morss argues, Kohlberg can show that lower class

50

Buck-Morss, "Socio-Economic Bias
p

59

.

kk

ibid.

.

in

Piaget's Theory ...

" j_oc I_c_U
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children see the law as an external force which
must be obeyed
(Stage

1

reasoning), whereas upper-middle class children
are more

prone to make autonomous moral judgements relative to the

circumstances, and to the awareness that bad laws can be changed
(Stage V reasoning), without having to reflect on the broader social

circumstances working to cement such differential perception.
she puts

As

it,

perhaps the moral rigidity of the lower-class child reflects
the reality of authoritarian or arbitrary enforcement of the laws
against his segment of society, whereas the upper middle class's
greater flexibility of principle reflects its ability to bend the law
in its interest, and to avoid its punishment, even when caught. 60

Habermas'

difficulties

in

failure to comment upon these kinds of

Kohlberg's work renders his heavy dependence upon
This

questionable.

not to suggest that his theory falls or stands

is

with those of Piaget or Kohlberg, although
substantial

re-formulation

theories.

It

is

an anomolous aspect

of

ideology

-

of his own.

to be overcome

in

if

it

would certainly require

he was to revise his use of their

to suggest that his unreflective use of their work

is

-

it

given his ardent committment to the critique
It

is

certainly one of the major obstacles

any future attempt to substantiate the theory of

the
social evolution, and, thereby, to legitimate the possibility of

'fully rational

6 0

ibid.

society'.
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We return now, after substantial digression, to
the issue of

different linguistic capacities, and its educational

implications.

For the critique of the compensatory educational programs
and the

argument that language variants such as Black English Vernacular

contain the same linguistic and communicative potentials as Standard
English, do not provide
Habermas'

a

clear direction for the crucial

point of view) educational

(from

task of enabling students not

just to develop but also to use the cr

i

t

i

cal -ref ect ve abilities
1

i

necessary for the perception of ideology, and for participation
discourse.

Assuming that all

in

language variants provide the linguistic

skills necessary for those abilities, the focus must now turn to the

utilization of such skills.

From this point of view,

it

may well

be demonstrable that lower socio-economic classes employ critical

and

reflective abilities less frequently than the middle classes, but

it

seems equally as clear that the latter do not employ those skills

very frequently either.

In

fact, de-politicization implies a

diminished use, on the part of all members of the society, of exactly
those ab

i

1

i

t

i

es

Here the latest work of scoiologist Basil Bernstein may prove
a

useful

adjunct to Habermas' theory.

major figure

in

Bernstein was perhaps the

the early investigations leading to the demonstration

abilities and patterns (he
of class-specific differences in speaking
codes, associated
referred to 'elaborated' and 'restricted' speech

with the middle and working classes respectively).

Accordingly, he
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he has been thoroughly denounced and his work rejected
in the backlash

against the compensatory education programs;

Bernstein,

in

fact,

explicitly dissociated himself, and has continued to do so, from
those programs, protesting that his investigations were never intended
to signify the

inferiority of working-class speech.

Whatever the

truth of that situation, Bernstein's latest formulations have

incorporated much of Labov's work, and have focused on the social

constraints

operating on the acquisition and use of particular

linguistic abilities.

From this point of view,

it

may be possible to

demonstrate that less frequent use of critical and reflective skills
is

a

result of 'systematic distortion

perhaps mediated via educational

1

,

to use Habermas'

systems.

terminology,

Any class differences in

utilization of speech variants would then be understood not as

a

function of the inferiority of working class speech, but rather as
case of

a

culturally mediated restricted access.

a

Bernstein argues

that most speakers are able to say what they want or need to, and

that most control more than one cognitive mode and have access to
So the focus has now turned to the

range of ways of talking.
con s t ra
in

i

nts

i

a

mposed on va r ou s utilization patterns.
i

Bernstein says

this regard,

must
Language is a set of rules to which all speech codes
the
of
function
a
is
comply, but which speech codes are realized
specific contexts.
culture acting through social relationships in
of the social
form
Different speech forms or codes symbolize the
and
encounters,
relationship, regulate the nature of the speech
relation.
and
relevance
create for the speakers different orders of
by what is made
transformed
then
is
speakers
The experience of the
... Because the speech form
significant or relevant by the speech form
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3 func t ° n of a given social
arrangement, it does not
mean that the speech form does not in
turn modify or even change that
socia structure which initially evolved
the speech form.
The
formulation indeed invites the question:
Under what conditions does
a given speech form free itself
sufficiently from its embodiment in
the social structure so that the system of
meanings it
pomts to alternative realities, or arrangements in the realizes
affairs of
1
men?
!

Again, this direction seems highly suggestive for any
theory
of education based on Habermas' work.

example, what has hinted at earlier:
speech variant which allowed

could be regarded as

a

a

It

is

worth pursuing, for

that restricted access to a

critical

perspective on the culture

measure of de-politicization

-

decreasing

literacy skills, together with lowered reading and comprehension

abilities (buttressed, no doubt, by an increasing dependence on
visual and aural

stimuli

-

such as

is

induced by television viewing)

may reflect aspects of decreasing abilities

in

the use of the

elaborated speech variant.

Educationally, this suggests the need for

investigation of the ways

in

a

detailed

which present educational systems

inhibit general access to the kinds of skills needed to participate
in

a

critique of ideology and

this basis,

in

a

situation of discourse, and, on

the formulation of programs designed to counteract that

'systematic distortion' of communicative processes.

Cognizant of

Labov's work, such programs are probably best undertaken within the

context of particular linguistic variants.
61

Quoted

in

Grimshaw,

"Language

in

Society",

loc.

ci

.

,

pp.

578-579
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Freire

s

experience with illiterate farm workers

in

Brazil

appears to provide the best available model for this activity.
repo rts outstanding success

literacy

in a

in

very short time

He

enabling peop e not on ly to acquire
1

(6

to 8 weeks),

62

but also, and at the

same time, to utilize critical and reflective skills such that their

self-image changed significantly, and their ability to identify
instances of ideology increased measurably.

Freire's method points

clearly to the difference between inculcating linguistic skills
(along the lines of compensatory education programs) and developing
the skills needed to engage in critical and reflective activity.
(That differential, along with its political

implications, was to cause

Freire's eventual expulsion from the country).

The suggestion that educational programs designed to develop
these skills are best undertaken within the context of particular

linguistic, and therefore cultural and social, environments reveals,

however, another potentially problematic feature of Habermas' work,
While the chapter has

one that has been suggested previously.

primarily focused on the educational possibilities within the present
social

formation, there needs to be some consideration of the

the
mechanics of the projected shift from the present formation to

postulated historically new stage of human development;
might such an educational program play

6 2

Freire, op. ci

t

.

,

p.

59-

in

that shift?

what part
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The 'fully rational society' depends on the model of

discourse,

a

participate
it

situation

in

which all members of the society can

collective decision-making

in

-

this requires, finally,

would seem, the acquisition on the part of all the members,

common grammar

,

vocabulary and range of meaning.

a

Given the val id

outcry against the compensatory programs' arbitrary designation of

particular language variant as the language of choice,

it

is

a

difficult

to conceive of the process by which the particular variant best

suited to the creation of Habermas' envisioned ideal speech situation

might be chosen.

Even more difficult to imagine

process (as distinct from the formal) by which

a

is

the empirical

range of common

meanings might be acquired.

The sort of educational activity which derives from Habermas'
theory exemplifies this difficulty.

The classroom situation may more

or less approximate the model of discourse:
of participation.

freedom of expression and

But there are arbitrary limits to the activity

which pre-empt the full achievement of the ideal speech and action
models.

Habermas argues, for example, that the

'

general

i

1'

zabl e wi

1

emerges as a result of, among other things, unrestricted discussion.
But what does this mean

in

practical

terms?

An educational

system

the
designed on Habermasian lines may well be able to inculcate

critical-reflective skills necessary to participation

in

discourse;

about the process of
but that does not seem to guarantee anything

acquiring common meanings or of identifying

a

general will.

1

1

may
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enable students to penetrate the ideological
smoke-screen of advanced

capitalist society, but

it

seems unable to ensure its transcendence. 63

Rather there seems some hidden hope that metamorphosis
will ensue of
its own accord from the actual

attempt to engage

in

discourse.

Here we confront again Habermas' unwillingness to specify the

concrete steps involved

in

the transition from the current

social organization to that of the 'fully rational

form of

society'.

He is

clearly committed to the idea that that movement can be rationally
undertaken;

but

it

seems at least intuitively clear

-

and Habermas

does appear to be cognizant, albeit unwillingly, of the fact
that transition will

in

that

at some point require the abandoning of certain

aspects of the ideal speech situation.

appears

-

His own recognition of this

his reluctant discussions about the potentially inevitable

need to 'break off dialogue' with certain groups (presumably those

unwilling to give up power) for the sake of the movement towards

He will acknowledge that such

more rationally constituted society.
a

a

repudiation of attempted dialogue may have to occur;

but he reamins

mute as to what the next step might be.

It

was argued

in

Chapter

IV

that

it

was incorrect to argue

that Habermas' work contained few guidelines for
It

was suggested that

in

fact

it

a

political

praxis.

carried numerous implications for

of processes
political activity at the stage designated 'organization

63

Dialec tic of Ideology
See in this regard Alvin W. Gouldner, The
138-152.
and Technology, New York: Seabury Press., 1576, pp.
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of enlightenment', and the
present chapter has demonstrated
this

regard to the development of an
educational praxis.

in

Habermas argues

that it is only those who are willing
to engage in strategic political

action who can legitimately decide on
the particulars of that action.
But

insofar as Habermas'

theory does not allow him to comment
on this

form of political activity, except to the
extent that he acknowledges
must invariably violate the model of discourse,

it

doubt the possibility of the actual

speech situation.

it

does place

in

institutionalization of the ideal

As his theory is presently constituted the
model

of discourse can play a regulative role, of considerable
significance;
its

inability to provide

social

theoretical

a

basis for the actual moment of

transformation, however, must limit that significance.

The problem is,

it

seems, built into Habermas'

theory,

deriving precisely from the nature of the task he has set:

to create anew the same integration of the individual beings
with their political community within the horizon of a universal cosmic
order, as was effected by the myth ... This time, however, the (task
must be accomplished) under the extreme conditions meanwhile posited
by the modern ideas of the freedom and of the complete individuality
of the human subject. 64

He argues precisely and persuasively for a situation

which individual
a

64

interests intersect

interests and universal

way that neither set

Habermas, "On Social

is

He has not,

compromised.

Identity",

1

oc

.

c

i

.

,

p.

95*

however,

in

in

such

308

delineated

in

intersection.

a

comprehensive fashion the elements of that
Consequently,

its possibility remains just

possibility, one that can exert
still

a

possibility,

in

a

that

-

a

regulative pressure to be sure, but

sore need of

a

concrete referent.

CONCLUSION
As should be apparent at this point, Habermas'

both wide-ranging and complex;

his theoretical

the attempt to formulate an epistemological

thought

is

project encompasses

basis for both normative

rationality and critical theory, the identification and illumination
of a

'latent positivism'

in

Marxist thought,

a

detailed analysis of

the crisis potential of late capitalism, and the development of

a

theory of social evolution which, juxtaposed to his work on

communication, prefigures an historically new form of social

organization, the 'fully rational society'.

Within that framework, the dissertation chose, as something
of a unifying thread, to focus on Habermas' changing conception of the

relationship between theory and praxis:
least partly because of Habermas'

this selection was made at

attempted movement beyond the

position of his earlier colleagues

in

the Frankfurt School, a

position which seemed to admit of little possibility for the

development of an effective political praxis, given the demise of the

working class movement and the constraints of advanced capitalist
society.

In

order to investigate this more precisely, the

dissertation attempted to elicit from Habermas' work the rudiments of
a

radically-motivated education.

discern the possibilities contained

309

This was
in

in

an effort both to

his work for the fashioning of

310

political program, and to reflect on some of the unresolved issues

a
in

that work.

The institution of education has frequently been identified
as playing a fundamental
-

role in any projected social

transformation

those of John
this has been true from the days of Socrates, through
Yet, despite this perception, education has

Dewey and beyond.

concerns and political
remained relatively isolated from the ongoing
alike, who seek
activities of Marxists, theorists and practitioners
to a socialist state.
the transformation from a capitalist

This

is

history of the last 50 years
remarkable in view of the fact that the

suggests, as the Frankfurt School

-

among other groups

of
cogently argued, that the possibilities

a

-

has so

revolution ary

have diminished considerably.
transformation of the social order

Habermas' overt endorsement of

a

political program of radical

likelihood that his thought will
reformism encourages, then, the

inplications for

involve practical

to chal enge
of present day capitalism
l
(using) the institutions
of this system
institutions
kernel
or
and to test the basic
1

The educational

system seems

a

for th
particularly appropriate one

kind of endeavor.

Frankel

,

"Habermas Talking:

An

Interview

loc. ci

58

.

i

s
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In

addition, the institution of education
seems

a useful

framework within which to view Habermas'
explicit shift of focus

-

from subjectivity to intersubjectivity,
from the isolated subject to
individual s- n- nteract ion
i

distorted communication'
of the dissertation.

focus

from oppression to 'systematically

i

-

,

which was explored

in

the early chapters

The directions emerging from that shift of

concern with intersubjectivity, an analysis of ideology
as

-

rooted in distorted communication, and the articulation
of the

possibility of

a

rationally-constituted social formulation

contain hints of the potentially significant role
institution of education could play

in

in

-

all

which the

reversing the socially created

and sustained process of de-politicization.

It

is

this latter

concern which has informed, and no doubt will continue to do so,
Habermas'

theoretical project.

Given the nature and stated aims of the dissertation, only
the contours of a radically-motivated education could be articulated.

These emerged straightforwardly from his major themes, were fashioned
with

a

view to his own stated objectives (to provide an

epistemological basis for

a

practical

to work toward the establishment of a

provided
theory.

a

rationality and, on that basis,
'fully rational

society') and

vantage-point from which to reflect back on the original
The most persistently troubling aspect of Habermas' work,

as seen from this perspective, concerns his attempt to derive

the structures of communication)

(from

the normative basis of a practical

312

rationality, and the associated situation of ideal
speech and action.
It

was suggested that considerable evidence needs to be
adduced

in

order to support that theory's claim to universality
(particularly
given its present heavy reliance on theorists whose work
under review);

is

currently

was also suggested that Habermas' fundamental

it

concern with mediating the interests of individuals with those of the

community finally prevents him from being able to consider, and thus
illuminate, the mechanics of the shift from one social formation to

another.

In

of the ideal
role,

it

light of this,

was concluded that while the concept

it

speech situation can play an extremely useful regulative

is not

by Habermas.

able to shoulder the theoretical burden assigned

it

falls silent exactly at the point of transformative

It

change, the point,

it

seems, at which the dictates of the ideal

speech

situation may have to be violated.

Despite these comments,

it

seems clear that the theory as

it

stands offers substantial direction for the development of praxis.

This was explored

globally
radical

-

in

chapter, which indicated

the final

-

albeit

the contours of a philosophy of education informed by a

intent:

that philosophy took 'reflexive

activity' as its central
the dissertation,

image.

i

ntersubject ve
i

As was stated repeatedly throughout

the success of such activity

(and thus of Habermas

only be
attempt to reformulate the theory/praxis relationship) can

gauged by the extent to which

it

gives rise to

a

"successful

social

313

practice which erodes

a

fraction of actual constraint"

the urgency of attempting to develop practical

Habermas' work.

-

herein lies

programs based on

The accuracy of his vigorously pursued, and

potentially crucial, argument that

undertaken within

2

a

situation of

i

it

is

reflective activity,

ntersubject ve interaction, which
i

can reverse the process of de-politicization depends finally on

concrete attempts to test

2

Wellmer,

it.

A Critical Theory of Society

,

p.

**1
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